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This thesis examines through the use of archives and oral evidence the role of the 
Pakistan Army in the context of Pakistan’s domestic politics and foreign policy. Its main 
purpose is to explore the autonomy of the Pakistan Army in shaping national and foreign 
policy between the years 1947-1965. Focusing on its independent relationship with three 
instruments of policy-making in the United States – the Department of State, the White 
House and the Pentagon – the thesis argues that the relationship between the Army and 
these policy-making bodies arose from a synergistic commonality of interests. The 
Americans needed a country on the periphery of the Soviet Union to contain Communism 
while the Pakistan Army needed US military support to check Indian regional military 
hegemonism in South Asia. This alliance was secured to the disadvantage of democratic 
political institutions of Pakistan. The Army, which became stronger as a result of US 
military and economic support, came progressively to dominate domestic politics. This 
led not only to weakened civilian governments in the period I am examining, but in 1958 
to the military seizure of political control of the country itself. The infringement of the 
Army into civilian spheres of government further caused a deterioration in relations 
between East and West Pakistan. The increasing clout of a US-backed Army whose elite 
officers had a bias against the eastern wing of the country, the thesis argues, thus 
indirectly resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan itself. 
To explain the Army’s ascendancy its transformation from British colonial army into 
a national political actor, is documented. The thesis explores the influence of the martial-
race theory and of Punjabisation in the Army as it developed in the colonial era. 
Secondly, it reconstructs how provincial politics weakened the Federal Government and 
allowed the Army to usurp political power to a disproportionate degree. Thirdly, the 
thesis considers the extent to which the US-Army relationship influenced and even took 
precedence over decision-making within the government itself. It details the military 
pacts made between the two countries to contain the USSR in this period. Finally, it 
explores where and how the interests of the US and Pakistan Army diverged, in particular 
concerning their respective relations with India. The complications arising in Indo-
Pakistan relations in consequence of an abrupt tilt of the US towards India after the Sino-
Indian war in 1962 are also examined. In reaction to this new Indo-US nexus, it is argued 
the Pakistani military junta leaned towards China and in 1965 endeavoured to make use 
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of it advanced, US-supplied weaponry before – as they saw it – the strategic balance was 
to be irrecoverably lost in favour of India.  
In conclusion, the thesis argues that the period under consideration saw a complete 
failure of the US policy of containing communism whilst at the same time avoiding war 
between its allies in the region, and that this had tragic consequences for the future of 
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In the closing years of the British Raj a limited form of democracy - provincial 
self-government - based upon a restricted franchise was introduced by the colonial 
government in the Indian subcontinent according to the terms of the government of 
India act of 1935. Following independence, India soon expanded upon this to 
introduce a constitution and an electoral system based upon universal suffrage. 
Elections were held in 1951 and democratic governance was established. For 
Pakistan, however, this transition to full democracy proved elusive. The first 
constitution was not introduced until 1956 and was challenged soon after. Power was 
shared amongst a small feudal elite and governments proved to be unstable. 
Eventually democracy was abandoned altogether with the commencement of the first 
of successive periods of military rule in 1958. And in 1971, the country felt apart 
altogether, with the eastern half, breaking away to form the separate state of 
Bangladesh. 
In the more than sixty-two years since independence, Pakistan has enjoyed 
democratic government for less than three decades.  The constitution has been re-
written on numerous occasions, and the transition between regimes has been 
determined more often by the military than it has been by the ballot box. There have 
been numerous attempts to explain this both in terms of personalities (the founder of 
Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah died within two years of independence) and through 
studies of the huge structural, economic, strategic, and financial problems faced by 
Pakistan at the time of independence.1 But although there has been considerable 
speculation as to why the governments of post-independence Pakistan proved to be so 
unstable, there has been no detailed empirical study of exactly how this came about, 
and particularly how it was that the military came to assume such a dominant role 
within the Pakistani state. Any satisfactory explanation must consider both internal 
and external factors. In this thesis therefore the attempt is made to explain the reasons 
for the instability and weakness of the central government, and how it was that the 
military came to assume such a dominant role in determining the foreign policy of 
                                                 
1 For details see, Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative 
Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
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Pakistan and ultimately in the government of the country itself. In this process, 
foreign policy, it is argued, had a crucial role to play. 
Although the break-up of Pakistan is beyond the period considered in this 
study, it our contention that the crucial developments which led to this tragic outcome, 
as well as repeated conflicts with India, and the continuing dominance of the military 
in Pakistani life can all be located in the years between 1947 and 1961. For a 
professional army, trained by the British to serve politicians, the assumption of 
political power was an extraordinary development. It was the peculiar and self-
interested use of this power which then led to so many of Pakistan's later difficulties. 
Quite how this came about will be explained with careful reference to developments 
within the army in the years leading up to and immediately after independence. The 
thesis considers the causes of instability within the central government, arising from 
the self-aggrandisement of provincial politicians. It then proceeds to examine the 
unique and special relationship that was established between the Pakistani military 
and the US foreign policy making and influencing institutions- the Department of 
State, the White House and the Pentagon (henceforth called the institutional 
interaction/relationship), which allowed the army such a commanding voice in matters 
of foreign policy, and ultimately a controlling influence in the governance of the 
country itself. This relationship, it is argued, was widely accepted, as it apparently 
solved so many of the country's short-term financial and strategic problems. It was 
also especially helpful to the Americans, as Pakistan became a tool in the global war 
of attrition against Soviet power: a policy of containment that became known as 'the 
Cold War'. The consequences for the long-term, in Pakistan, were however disastrous, 
with embarking upon a trajectory of authoritarian, military rule, to the neglect of the 
developmental needs of the country as a whole, which Pakistan has struggled to 
escape from ever since. 
The study of Pak-US Institutional Interaction during the 1950s and 60s is 
especially pertinent for the contemporary politics of Pakistan. The Army thus still 
exercises the same old tactics of the 1950s and 60s to secure power and govern the 
country with international connections. General Ayub Khan exploited the US need for 
the containment of the Soviet Union by joining SEATO and CENTO. Domestically, 
he introduced the idea of ‘Basic Democracy’ to prolong his rule. His focus on support 
for US policies annoyed East Pakistanis which later resulted in the debacle of Pakistan 
in 1971. He was followed by his immediate junior- General Yahya Khan. In the 
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1980s, General Zia-ul-Haq exploited the US policy of containment in the Cold War 
and fought a proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The US was 
supportive of General Zia’s role in the war against Afghanistan that brought a 
Kalashnikov and drugs culture to Pakistan. Pak-US institutional interaction helped 
him prolong his dictatorial rule. He also gave his own version of democracy – 
‘Islamic Democracy’ – to quench the thirst of democratic trends in the country. 
Finally, it was 9/11 that gave a chance to the military to extend its rule via 
international connections with the same old master, the US. General Pervaiz 
Musharraf fought the US proxy war against terrorism at great cost to his own country. 
Support for the US brought Pakistan to the forefront of terrorist activities as well as 
terrorism. Interestingly, General Musharraf offered a new term for his rule – ‘Real 
Democracy’ – to satisfy his subjects. ‘Basic’, ‘Islamic’ and ‘Real’ never 
accommodated what in true words may be called a democracy – the voice of the 
people. Hence, Generals Zia and Musharraf followed the path of General Ayub Khan, 
whose period of influence is under study in this thesis. The history of Pakistan during 
1947-65 is firstly the history of a civil-military hybrid (1947-58) and secondly the 
history of military rule (1958-65) supported by an international connection i.e the US. 
It is a history in which America plays a very active role in serving its own as well as 
the Pakistan Army’s interests by weakening political democratic institutions.  Thus 




Research on the Pakistan Army so far has not systematically looked at its 
relationship with US policy making institutions. The existing literature on civil-
military relations as a driving force behind institutional hegemony, democracy and the 
rise of military to power has not explicitly covered the relations between the 
Department of State, the White House and the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the 
Pakistan Army. To date, no cogent and systematic theoretical and empirical analysis 
of the rise of military, based on its autonomous disposition especially in foreign 
policy towards the US during the 1950s and 60s, has been published. 
Arguments concerning the political role of the army have been most 
elaborately developed by Stephen Cohen, who urges that military strength was the 
dominant reason for its assertive role in the country’s politics. Cohen is particularly 
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concerned with the army’s organization, its training, and the role of Islam in the 
military setup especially during General Zia’s era.2 He provides an institutional and 
strategic policy analysis of the army within a broad socio-political and security 
framework. Hasan Askari Rizvi blames fragmentation of political forces, weak civil 
structures and lack of institutionalization of democratic currents in Pakistani society 
for the military intervention.3 He completely ignores the Pakistan Army-US nexus for 
their short and long term gains and consequences. Ayesha Siddiqua Agha reflects 
upon the controversial assessment of the Pakistan military’s role in the domestic 
economy. She exposes the Pakistani military’s ubiquity in the country’s economy and 
points to evident motives for its continued position of privilege in Pakistani society.4 
However, she touches only very briefly on the 1947-65 period. Her work is mostly 
limited to the economy of the Pakistan Army rather than its interaction with the US. 
Brian Cloghley5 ignores the initial history of the Pakistan Army. He fails to cover the 
British Indian colonial social and military legacy that later on would affect the modus 
operandi of the Pakistan Army. He looks at the Pakistan Army from an organizational 
performance point of view rather than its political and international role. Mazhar Aziz 
analyses the role of the military in the context of political developments in Pakistan.6 
His work establishes that it is the ‘institutional interests’ of the military that are the 
major determinant of the military intervention in politics.7 However, he looks at the 
issue from a purely theoretical perspective. Dennis Kux in The United States and 
Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies, gives a concrete analysis of the history of 
Pak-US relations, discussing the history of the relationship in general terms. Though 
he writes about institutional benefits, no specific space is given to an in-depth 
investigation of the Pakistani Army and its interests in cultivating relations with the 
US policy making bodies. Moreover, Kux takes an elite-centric approach, focusing on 
upper echelon decision makers with political agendas. My approach is based on 
subaltern interviews, investigating the perspectives of lower ranking officers as less 
                                                 
2 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (Karachi: OUP, 1984), pp.5-31 & 86-104. See also, by the 
same author, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 2005), pp.97-130. 
3 Hassan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2003), pp.57-81 
& 89-113. See also, by the same author, The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86 (Lahore: 
Progressive Publishers, 1987), pp.45-47. 
4 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, The Military Inc. (Karachi: OUP, 2007), pp.58-82 & 175-219. 
5 Brian Cloghley, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections (Karachi: OUP, 2000), 
pp.52-63 & 79-124. 
6 Mazhar Aziz, Military control in Pakistan, the parallel state (London: Routledge, 2008), pp.24-37 & 
38-54. 
7 Ibid, p.23. 
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politicised observers interacting with policy at the operational level. In contrast to 
Kux, who follows a chronological structure, my approach is to take an issue based 
approach focusing directly on the US role in supporting military rule during the era in 
question. Ayesha Jalal in her book The State of Martial Rule covers pre-partition 
events but those are mostly looking at political and administrative legacies rather than 
the British Indian Army and its further development into the Pakistan Army. As she 
focuses on 1947-58 era, she discusses initial problems of Pakistan vis-à-vis India and 
the Pak-US relations without highlighting any particular Pakistani state institution.  
She explores the period 1947-58 but most of her research is on the soaring defence 
budget and the national economy.8 Jalal also looks at the State-Centre relationship 
with respect to provincialism.9 However, she fails to show the background currents 
during 1947-58 that resulted in the break up of Pakistan later in 1971. Jalal in another 
book, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia focuses on the failure of party 
politics as a reason for the failure of democracy in Pakistan.10 This thesis fills the gap 
left by Jalal. It takes the study of the Pakistan Army and its relationship with the US 
beyond 1958. It shows how the institutional relationship between the Pakistan Army, 
State Department, White House and the Pentagon developed and worked in the later 
years and how their interaction resulted in the rise of dictatorship in Pakistan. I not 
only take Pak-US relations from an international perspective but also look at the 
institutional collaboration between the two countries. In some instances, I find that 
such institutional cooperation of the two countries was stronger than the state-to-state 
relations between them. I also focus on the frustrations of Bengalis with the Pakistan 
Army due to the US bias against East Pakistan. Though in terms of sources- the 
National Archives of the US, National Archives London, India Office Library, and 
Public Record Office- my work shares something in common with that of Jalal, I have 
gone beyond these sources. The recently opened CIA archive in Washington DC is 
the latest contribution to such study. Here, I found some very interesting material 
which further strengthened my arguments regarding institutional interaction of the 
two countries. The range of interviews from the Pakistan Army officers was also an 
excellent input that dispelled numerous weak notions and braced new research.  
                                                 
8  Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
9 Ibid, pp. 60-93 & 222-235. 
10 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia, pp.48-63. 
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The Pakistan Army influenced the country’s foreign policy in favour of US 
policies (formed by specific foreign policy making bodies) on the periphery of the 
Soviet Union. In return, US policy making bodies’ support to the Pakistan Army 
encouraged military rule and weakened democratic political institutions. Both of these 
arguments make this study different from earlier works on the role of the Pakistan 
Army in the country’s domestic and foreign policy. While the political role of the 
Pakistan Army is over-researched, there is no study based exclusively on the Army’s 
independent relations with American foreign policy making and influencing bodies – 
the State Department, the Pentagon and the White House. The bulk of the work done 
thus far looks at the political role of the Army, its organizational strength and the 
swelling defence budget. This work focuses on the Army, and its internal and external 
dynamics in the pursuit of power to influence domestic policies. It documents and 
analyses how and why the Pakistan Army entered politics, weakened political 
institutions and formed international connections for prolonging its rule. The study 
also looks at how and why a professional army in strict British colonial traditions was 
transformed, later on, into a national political actor. 
 
Why Study the Period 1947-65? 
 
Acting upon inherited trends of the British colonial Army, right from the 
inception of Pakistan, the Pakistan Army was an autonomous and authoritarian unit of 
federation within the state structure. Its strength and autonomous dictatorial nature 
was so great that it declined to obey the orders of the founder of Pakistan. In October 
1947, Jinnah had himself been slighted when the Pakistan Army chief, the British 
General Douglas Gracey, disobeyed his order and refused to send troops into 
Kashmir.11 According to Aitzaz Ahsan, ‘the question often asked is: how did the civil 
and military bureaucracy wrest power from the politicians at the very outset of 
Pakistan’s creation? The answer has to be that it never relinquished it’. The 
authoritative and autonomous institutional role passed from the British Indian Army 
to its successor, the Pakistan Army. The period in focus was the result of the blunt 
practice of trends that the Pakistan Army inherited from the British Colonial Army. 
The first two Commanders–in-Chief (C-in-C) were both British. Generals Sir Frank 
                                                 
11 Aitzaz Ahsan, Meghnad Desai, (henceforth Ahsan, Desai), Cross-border Talks: Divided by 
Democracy (New Delhi: Roli Publications, 2005), p. 98. 
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Messervey and Sir Douglas Gracy, besides reporting to the Government of Pakistan, 
also turned for guidance to their superior, Field Marshall Sir Claude Auchinleck.12 
This naturally created a duality of authority and control.  
During 1947-58, frequent changes of political governments on the instructions 
of the bureaucracy of the civil-military hybrid broke the backbone of nascent 
democracy in Pakistan. Though direct military rule started in 1958 with the 
declaration of martial law, the power of democratic political institutions was already 
severely circumscribed by the hybrid. The first Pakistani C-in-C, General Ayub Khan, 
was appointed to that office in January 1951. A year later, riots broke out in the 
Punjab against the minority sect of Ahmadis – the followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad 
of Qadian13. The civil administration called in the military. It imposed regional 
martial law, Pakistan’s first military rule in any area.14 It immediately restored law 
and order. This would be normal in any democracy: a military commander obeying 
civilian orders. But the local military commander used the cover of martial law to do 
much more. He clamped down on the markets, freezing prices and enforcing 
improved hygiene measures. He arrested the smugglers and hoarders of essential 
commodities. The army thereby enhanced its position in the polity. During a weak and 
divided civilian administration and government, such steps were sufficient to give a 
confidence boost to the army.15 It also earned a four year extension in the tenure of 
Ayub Khan’s service.16 The way the army took care of Lahore during martial law 
enhanced his personal stature, authority and influence in the state structures. He also 
developed a personal friendship with Governor General Ghulam Muhammad. This 
provided Ayub with an opportunity to see the weaknesses and hollowness of 
democratic political institutions. After Jinnah’s death and Liaquat Ali Khan’s 
assassination, there was a leadership gap that none was large enough to fill. Ayub was 
aspiring to fill the gap. However, he needed foreign support to strengthen the army to 
heighten his bargaining position.17  
                                                 
12  Ibid, p. 100. 
13 For details see, Abulḥasan Ali Nadvi, Zafar Ishaq Ansari, Qadianism: A Critical Study (Lucknow: 
Academy of Islamic Research and Publications, 1967). 
14 K.B.Saeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger, 1980), 
p.38. 
15 Interview with Senator Gulzar Khan, a veteran leader of the Pakistan Peoples Party from D.I. Khan 
(Lahore: 13-06-07). 
16 Ahsan, Desai, p.101. 
17 Interview with Senator Gulzar Khan. 
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An important theme of the time period under review was the troubled and 
often deeply suspicious relationship between the central state and East Pakistan. The 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) archival material shows that the Bengali idea of 
separation from West Pakistan was initiated during the period in focus. The 
democratic nature of the East Pakistanis propelled them towards non-alignment rather 
than support for the US in a period of global tension between the East and the West. 
Their democratic nature was taken as support for Communism. Bengalis, who had no 
fear from India and had no common borders with any communist state, were 
uninterested in US security pacts. West Pakistan, in contrast was dominated by 
Punjabis - who constituted a majority in the army and civil bureaucracy – and were 
the strongest stake holders in the country’s policy making process. Moreover, the 
Army, with a majority of Punjabis, harboured a direct animosity against India due to 
the Kashmir border issue. Because the army recruitment area also bordered with 
India, India emerged as a personal threat to the institution of the Pakistan Army. As 
the Pakistan Army was responsible for providing the security umbrella for the nascent 
country, animosity towards India was expressed in institutional rather than national 
terms.  Hence anti-India feelings in the Punjab as well as in the Pakistan Army were 
understandable. For their protection against India, they aligned themselves with the 
US sponsored security alliances. No such currents ran through East Pakistan. The 
anti-India and pro-US policies thrust from the West Pakistan to the East of Pakistan 
were not acceptable to the Easterners. Such reaction of the Easterners has been 
detailed in chapters three, four and five. To express their loyalty to the US, the 
Pakistan Army became anti-East Pakistanis and sceptical about their loyalty to the 
State. During 1947-65, immense American support to the Army (to curb communist 
trends) further biased them against the Easterners. It was the discriminatory attitude of 
the Army that compelled the Easterners to think about Bengali nationalism rather than 
a unified Pakistani nationalism. The development of a regional Bengali nationalism 
resulted in the later dismemberment of Pakistan. 
 
Research Methodology, Source material, Research Limitations 
and Compensation 
 
This research is mainly based on archival documents, public records, 
diplomatic correspondence, and oral testimonies. Official documentation on the 
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Pakistan Army and its influence on the country’s foreign policy is difficult to obtain. 
In Pakistan, the Foreign Ministry or Military related departments do not release 
confidential documents to researchers. In the US, the correspondence between the 
Pentagon and the General Head Quarters (GHQ) Karachi/Rawalpindi is not 
voluminous. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, most of the archival research 
was conducted in the National Archives London, the US National Archives, 
Maryland, and the National Archives Peshawar. Data was also acquired from the 
Library of Congress, the Harriman papers, and the US State Department’s 
documentary series, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). Colonial sources 
in the UK are held at the National Archives, Kew, and India Office Records at the 
British Library in London. The extraordinary diplomatic correspondence found in the 
National Archives, London and the US National Archives, Maryland was particularly 
useful for this study. Some invaluable material concerning the beginning of the Cold 
War, and the US and British foreign policy interaction with Pakistan was unearthed, 
including files concerning US-Pakistan Army relations, the first military take over, 
and the US and British reaction, as well as policies in the later years. In the US 
National Archives, Maryland, the CIA archival section was opened recently, and a 
number of pertinent documents for this research were consulted.  The files detailed 
the trend of US foreign policy towards the Pakistan Army via military aid and support 
to the military dictator of the time. By the time their foreign policies drifted apart, the 
Pakistan Army had established itself as a bargaining institution in the power-share 
with other political units in the country’s domestic politics. 
Diplomatic correspondence between Karachi, London and the Department of 
State and the White House was of much relevance to this work. Material located in 
the CIA Archives, British Library, and National Library of Scotland have been used to 
highlight and underscore similarities and differences of the modus operandi of the US 
policy making institutions on the one hand and the Pakistan Army on the other. From 
this documentation, a vivid view of the direction of the Pakistan Army’s way of 
thinking in its dealings with India emerged, and details of how the Army tried to use 
US military and economic assistance card against India have been highlighted. 
The Islamabad National Archives was a wonderful place to study old 
newspapers and relevant microfilms, despite deterioration of some materials and poor 
cataloguing. However, staff were unable to produce declassified documents of the 
1950s and 60s. One of the staff members said: ‘the government will not keep any such 
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historical official document that may become a source of trouble for today’s army’18. 
It was possible to counteract the lack of such documents from memoirs of concerned 
people and interviews. Some official documents found in the National Archives of 
Peshawar were also utilised in this research, particularly those regarding the 
recruitment of Pakhtoons in the Indian Army. Some of them are written in Pashto, 
others in Urdu. 
In the Islamabad Archives, I could not find anything substantive for my work 
nor could I get any archival document that could help me in proving my argument. 
The reason was that such documents did not exist there. The staff of the archives was 
very hospitable and kind to me as, according to them, I was the first researcher who 
visited them in the last six months. Upon my request to see the declassified documents 
of the 1950s and 60s, I was told that there is no such thing as declassified material in 
the archives. One of the staff members said: ‘the government will not keep any such 
historical official document that may become a source of trouble for today’s army’19. 
The director of the archives told me that the country was newly born so everything 
that is secret was like a ‘national secret and a part of national security’. The material 
that I was asking was related with the Pakistan army. He said that, over and above, 
any material related with the army was ‘O my God, it is top secret as any confidential 
paper of the army is a national secret’. His way of expression was continuously very 
sarcastic about the Army. However, the lack of such documents and witnesses 
regarding Pakistan were recompensed by studying the memoirs of concerned people 
and interviews. This helped me in linking the chain of events with archival documents 
that I secured from the UK and the US.  
After gathering the archival material, making an argument and reading the 
published material, including memoirs, and parliamentary proceedings, I turned to 
find answers to my queries via interviews. More than fifty interviews were conducted 
in English, Urdu, and Pashto. The interviewees included retired military officers, 
subalterns and retired diplomats. However, I believe the lower ranks in army 
generally followed the ethos and policy laid down by higher ranks. For acquiring oral 
witnesses on the internal politics of the country and the Army’s influence, politicians, 
journalists, clerks in the concerned ministries, political party workers, Khans of the 
                                                 
18 The fieldwork was undertaken in 2007 during the rule of General Pervaiz Musharraf, the fourth 
military ruler in Pakistan. 
19 I must mention here that I am talking about my fieldwork in 2007 during the period of General 
Pervaiz Musharraf, the fourth military ruler in Pakistan. 
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tribal area in NWFP and academics were also interviewed. In addition, a wide range 
of secondary sources, government publications, journals, magazines and daily Urdu 
and English newspapers published in Pakistan and abroad were also consulted. While 
the research focuses on the 1947-65 period, sometimes source material published after 
this period is also cited. However, the reader should judge its relevance only within 
the context of the period mentioned above. Over and above, the archival documents 
with the interviews; conducted with concerned people and memoirs are woven 
together in a completely new form to prove the thesis argument.  
There have been various methodological problems associated with using oral 
testimony and its reliability. It was indeed important to keep in view who was being 
interviewed, what was his background, his political affiliation in that specific era, his 
loyalty with the Pakistan Army and his family stakes in political crisis of the country. 
Genuine analyses were possible only by cross-checking. Therefore, numerous 
interviews were cross-examined by others’ opinion as well as archival documents.  
However, where cross-examination was not possible, oral testimony was deployed as 
an opinion of the interviewee rather than a ‘fact’. Wherever possible, it had been 
reliably cross-checked and the nature of this cross-checking was made clear in 
footnotes. Most of such opinions were analysed in the conclusions of chapters. 
The recent declassification of a number of relevant documents regarding the 
institutional interaction demands a pertinent, consistent and in depth exploration of 
the period 1947-65. It is the first time that the new CIA archival work (it has been 
very recent that the CIA documents have been declassified and placed in a separate 
archival section) is used in explaining the undue interference of the Pakistan Army in 
domestic and foreign policies of the country. The study concludes that the Army’s 
suspicious glare to Bengalis resulted in their defiance much before the debacle of 
1971. To explore further, I was very keen to visit Bangladesh and interview the ex-
army officers as well as some of their policy makers. This would have given me a 
chance of having their views vis-à-vis the Pakistan Army and its dealing with the 
Easterners (people from East Pakistan). The reason to visit them is that one of my 
discoveries in this thesis is the hostile attitude of the Pakistan army towards the East 
Pakistanis that later on resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971. However, 
due to a lack of funding and time, I could not do so. This limitation was compensated 
by the archival documents from the US archives. Diplomatic correspondence between 
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American Consulate Dhaka and the Department of State remained very useful and 
supportive to my thesis arguments.   
Searching archival materials and interviewing people who were in the hub of 
affairs during 1947-65, whilst living in the UK, and immersing myself in existing 
literature helped me to answer the questions I posed to myself. The main aim of this 
study is to provide a wider context of discussion to probe Pak-US institutional 
interaction. My research further aims to act like a mirror on the past which may 
hopefully highlight mistakes in the future and contribute to their avoidance. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter one describes how the British punished the Bengal area by reducing 
the army’s recruitment from there and rewarded the Punjab by increasing recruitment 
in the wake of the 1857 mutiny crisis. It explores the autonomous nature and 
Punjabisation of the British Indian Army. This resulting major recruitment area- the 
Punjab- is ceded to Pakistan after partition. This constitutes an important factor in the 
rise of the army as a national political actor.  
Chapter two contextualizes the civil-military bureaucracy with the rise of 
military rule and the fall of democratic institutions. It is argued that provincial politics 
weakened the Federal Government and allowed the Army to usurp political power to a 
disproportionate degree. To make the point that the existence of the military as a 
political actor persisted during the 1950s, the chapter will test the extent to which 
American policy making bodies were supportive of the military leadership, especially 
General Ayub Khan. This chapter also focuses on the sceptical approach of the Army 
towards the East Pakistanis’ loyalty to the state. 
Chapter three highlights the Pakistan Army’s influence on foreign policy in 
order to develop direct links with the US administration. It also provides evidence of 
US support for the military-oriented policies in Pakistan. This chapter further focuses 
on the Pakistani army’s keen desire to align itself with the US sponsored security 
alliances – SEATO and CENTO- and the East Pakistanis’ opposition to such 
alliances. 
Chapter four analyses the US’s increased political and regional expectations 
from the military junta in Pakistan and contemporaneous accommodation with India. 
This chapter will be supported with dichotomous opinions reflected in interviews of 
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military generals and subalterns on the institutional alliance of 1950s and 60s. Biased 
treatment of the Army towards the East Pakistanis is also discussed.  
Chapter five provides evidence for the Pak-US institutional alliance. It begins 
with oral testimonies which include interviews with high ranking army officers as 
well as subalterns. The major events – the loss of public support by the Pakistan 
Army, its estrangement from the US, and its becoming an object of censure between 
1962-65 – are discussed in this chapter. 
In conclusion, the thesis establishes that it was control over the foreign 
relations of the country especially with the US that provided encouragement for the 
rise of the Pakistan Army in politics. The increasing clout of a US-backed Army, 
whose elite officers had a bias against the eastern wing of the country, the thesis 
argues, indirectly resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan itself. The study further 
argues that the period under consideration saw a complete failure of the US policy of 
containing communism whilst at the same time avoiding war between its allies in the 
region, and that this had tragic consequences for the future of democracy in Pakistan. 
The principal aim of this study has been to provide a wider context of 
discussion to probe Pak-US institutional interactions. It is hoped that this research will 
serve as a mirror on the past which may hopefully highlight mistakes (developing 
relations with the US at the cost of regional countries, encouraging military’s 
independent relations with the US foreign policy making bodies etc)  in the future and 




Advent and Evolution:  






This chapter will seek to show the trends of organisation, regionalised 
recruitment policy, and institutional unification of the British Indian Army and how 
these trends were reproduced by the Pakistan Army after 1947. Previous studies on 
the British Indian Army such as Menezes’ Fidelity and Honour: The Indian Army 
from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century1 and Byron Farewell’s Armies of the 
Raj: From the Mutiny to Independence2 have approached the study of the British 
Indian Army in relation to the shifting relationship between the governing 
(conquering) army and the common man in the Subcontinent. Whilst they have 
provided valuable insights into the literature of the period, they have ignored the fact 
that the way the British Army worked autonomously under the British Empire was 
transferred to the post-colonial Pakistan Army. This work seeks to contextualise the 
trends and transformations from the British to the Pakistan Army and especially its 
autonomous nature within the state. It will also correlate the recruitment policy shift 
from Bengal to the Punjab after the Mutiny war of 1857 to the imbalanced dominance 
of one part of the country over the rest of Pakistan after 1947. 
 The British Indian Army was the strong armed wing of the British Raj. Its 
main purpose was to quell internal disturbances and counter external aggression in the 
Subcontinent. However, the Mutiny war of 1857 exposed many weaknesses of the 
army. This resulted in its complete change and reorganisation. More powers were 
granted to the officers to address and avoid any repetition of such an uprising in 
future. This further concentrated their influence on administration and government. 
The most drastic effect of the 1857 Uprising was the regional recruitment shift in the 
British military. Recruitment focus shifted from Bengal to the Punjab and North West 
Frontier Province NWFP of the Subcontinent. The shift resulted in the de-
                                                 
1 S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and Honour: The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first 
Century (New Delhi: Viking, 1993), pp.124-143. 
2 Byron Farewell, Armies of the Raj: From the Mutiny to Independence, 1858-1947 (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company Inc., 1989), pp.15-19 and pp.57-64. 
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Bengalization and the Punjabisation of the Indian army – a punishment for the Bengal 
region that rebelled and a reward to the Punjab that suppressed the Uprising. This era 
also heralded the colonial theory of divide and rule on the basis of martial race policy. 
Hence, the martial race policy is also contextualised in the broader framework of the 
historical debate on colonialism and ‘race’ in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The last part of the chapter deals with the Indianisation of the Commissioned Army. 
During the partition of 1947, the Pakistan army was created from the division 
of the colonial Indian army. The political role of the Pakistan army is frequently 
correlated with teething problems of Pakistan especially after the first Kashmir war of 
1948.3 Whilst this may have been true in certain cases, the assertive role played by the 
Pakistan Army during the 1950s and 60s can be traced to the evolution of the colonial 
Indian army. This chapter develops this analysis by exploring the historical 
background and evolution of the British Indian Army.  
 
1.2 The Advent of the British Indian Army 
 
Major Stringer Lawrence,4 who formed the first military units of the East India 
Company in Madras in 1748, is regarded as ‘the father of the Indian Army’.5 He 
organized the British Indian army which was divided into three presidencies: Bengal,6 
Madras7 and Bombay.8 The three presidencies formed their own armies which later on 
constituted the Indian Army: the Bengal Army (eventually developed into the largest 
army); the Madras Army (a combination of companies of doorkeepers and 
watchmen); and the Bombay Army (that arrived as a detachment when Bombay 
passed to the British as part of the dowry that Catherine of Braganza brought to her 
marriage to Charles II).9 The first British regulars, the 39th Foot, arrived in India in 
1754 under the command of Colonel John Adlercron.10 He began the amalgamation of 
the East India Company’s Indian Army (European and Indian troops) and Royal 
                                                 
3 See Ayesha Jalal, the State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp.25-48; Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, The Military Inc. 
(Karachi: OUP, 2007), pp.62-8; and Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Lahore: Vanguard, 2005), 
p.121. 
4 In 1752, he became the first army officer to be appointed Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of all the 
East India Company’s forces in India.  
5 S.L. Menezes, Fidelity and Honour, p.7. 
6 Papers relating to the Bengal Army, Public Record Office (PRO) 30/9/4/3; PRO 30/12/33/7, PRO. 
7 Ibid, PRO 30/12/30/11, PRO. 
8 Ibid, PRO 30/9/4/47, PRO. 
9  Byron Farewell, Armies of the Raj, p.25. 
10 Ibid, p.26. 
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British regulars (rented from the Crown and constituted the British Army) in India. 
Until this time all – British and Indian, Company and Royal troops – were officered 
by Britons.11 The armies based in Madras, Bombay and Bengal functioned as three 
distinct entities. Training, discipline and professionalism were the primary 
requirements for Indian soldiers. Intensive training with an emphasis on discipline and 
efficiency and their separation from the fragmented Indian society turned the Indian 
soldiers into a professional, united and autonomous fighting force. Their loyalty was 
to their ‘homogeneous military units’ for which they served ‘full time, long term’ 
rewarded with a secure pay and pension system.12 
 At the end of the 18th century, the Company started sending troops on 
overseas voyages. Due to the reluctance of the Hindu soldiers to serve overseas, the 
troops were given options for such expeditions on a voluntary basis.13 In 1846 and 
1849, two important frontier forces, the Sindh Frontier Force (SFF) and the Punjab 
Frontier Force (PFF),14 were created. The SFF was to deal with the Baluch tribesmen 
and was part of the Bombay Army. The PFF was raised for keeping order on the 
North Western border. It was to serve on the frontier and only in special cases 
elsewhere. Later on, the Gurkha Regiment was also added to the PFF. The Frontier 
Force was under the control of the Foreign Department of the Government of India 
through the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab. In 1886, this was brought under the 
operational control of the C-in-C, India, as part of the Bengal Army. It continued to 
maintain its separate character until 1903, when it was incorporated into the Indian 
Army.15 
The East India Company administered India until 1858,16 through three 
Presidencies each with its own army. These armies consisted of British and Indian 
regiments commanded by British officers. The Bengal Army (being the largest) had a 
distinct position as its C-in-C was also the head of the Company’s other armies. His 
powers were very nominal over the armies of Madras and Bombay.  He was supposed 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Stephen P. Rosen, Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1996), pp.173-77. 
13 S.T. Das, Indian Military: Its History and Development (New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1969), pp. 
83-85. Also see Raymond A. Callahan, The East India Company and Army Reforms 1783-1798 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp.12-14. 
14 S.L.Menezes, Fidelity and Honour, p.22. 
15 T.A. Heathcote, The Indian Army: The Garrison of British Imperial India, 1822-1922 (New York: 
Hippocrene Books, 1974), pp.27-29. 
16 30/29/21/7, From John Crawford’s presentation to the House of Lords… asking for direct British rule 
in place of the East India Company, 13 February 1858. PRO. 
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to exercise supervisory control over them. Prior to 1886, he had no authority over the 
Punjab Irregular (later Frontier) Field Force – known as the ‘Piffers’ – on the North 
West Frontier, which was controlled by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab.17 
Also, of course, he had no direct control over the armies of the Princely states. In fact, 
no officer exercised control over all of the Indian land forces.18  
 
Table 1: Three armies of the East India Company and their recruitment areas in 
the second half of the 18th Century.  
        Army                                       Recruitment Areas 
Bengal Army Bihar, Oudh, Agra, Punjab, Nepal. (Caste based recruitment) 
Madras Army Madras, Hyderabad, Central Provinces, Burma. (Supra-caste, 
religion & class recruitment) 
Bombay Army Bombay, Sindh, Rajputana, Aden. (An army without any distinction 
on the basis of caste, class or religion) 
 
 
From the second half of the eighteenth century, the Bengal Army recruited 
from the communities which had served the Muslim dynasty in the past.  Recruitment 
focussed on high caste Hindus, mainly from Bihar, Oudh and Agra. The Gurkhas and 
the Punjabis were also recruited. It was a high-caste ethnic army.19 The Madras Army 
concentrated for recruitment on Madras, Hyderabad, and the Central Provinces, and 
later, Burma while the Bombay Army’s focus was on Bombay, Sindh, Rajputana and 
Aden. Unlike the Bengal Army, both of these armies’ recruitment was supra-caste and 
supra-religion.20   
With the British Government taking over the reins of the East India Company, 
the shape of all the three armies was completely changed. In August 1858, the British 
Government introduced a major shift in their organisational setups. For such drastic 
changes, the Peel Commission (1859)21 and the Eden Commission (1879)22 played a 
                                                 
17 S.L.Menezes, Fidelity and Honour, p.76. 
18 Byron Farewell, Armies of the Raj, p.27. 
19 Seema Alvi, The Sepoys and the Company: Tradition and Transition in Northern India 1770-1830 
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.39,45-46,49. 
20 Many authors have given details of the armies of the East India Company including S.L. Menezes, 
Fidelity and Honour, pp. 11-12,14. 
21 (Major General) Jonathan Peel Commission Report, Report from Commissioners: 1859, 
Organisation of Army (Indian), Volume 5. (Peel was then the Secretary of  State for War) [hereafter 
Peel Commission Report], National Library of Scotland (NLS). 
22 Report of the special commission appointed by His Excellency the Governor-General in Council to 
enquire into the organisation and expenditure of the Army in India [Eden Commission]. Simla: Govt of 
India, 1879; Appendices to the report, Simla/Calcutta: Govt of India, 1879-80. 4 volumes. 
IOR/L/MIL/17/5/1687, 1879-1880, British Library (BL). 
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major role. The Commission reports stressed the need to maintain a disciplined, 
professional and loyal trained army. All three armies were retained, but the position of 
the C-in-C was braced with more powers. The strength of the British troops was 
raised to 80,000; of which 50,000 were for Bengal, 15,000 for Madras, and 15,000 for 
Bombay. They were also given total control over artillery and some other branches of 
the Army. Additionally, according to the Peel Commission, Native forces were not to 
bear a greater proportion to the European, in Cavalry and Infantry, than two to one for 
Bengal, and three to one for Madras and Bombay respectively.23 All such 
developments were the after-effects of the Mutiny War of 1857.  
The homogenous nature of the Bengal army was one of the factors that 
contributed to the outbreak of the Mutiny. Hence, in future, the British maintained 
distinction and separateness of castes and class in the army. No single caste or class 
was allowed to dominate or command another caste or class. To avoid unity amongst 
native soldiers, the Peel Commission Report recommended that ‘the Native Army’ 
should be composed of different nationalities and castes, and as a general rule, mixed 
promiscuously through each regiment’.24 However, local regiments were also limited 
to their respective areas of recruitment except in case of emergency.25  
The separation of the three armies in India was usually debated by the British 
Administration at different points. The Eden commission recommended the 
‘endeavour … to carry out the principles of segregation’.26 However, it was in the 
year 1895 that all the three armies were amalgamated to create the Indian Army, 
headed by a C-in-C. Under the C-in-C there were four commands: the Madras 
Command, the Bombay Command, the Bengal Command and the Punjab Command, 
each headed by a Lt. General.27 The former Bengal Army was split into Bengal and 
                                                 
23 Peel Commission Report, p.9. 
24 Ibid, p.14. 
25 The army in India adopted different organisational systems: 1. The general mixed composition 
system: each company in a regiment consisted of different races and castes which were mixed together 
irrespective of caste and creed. 2. The class company system: each company in a regiment has soldiers 
of one caste and social class. In this way, each company was pure; different castes and classes were 
kept separately at the company level. 3. The class regiment system: the whole regiment comprised men 
of one distinct social class or caste. At times, a regiment could have soldiers enlisted exclusively from 
one district/region.  
26 Report of the [Eden Commission]. Simla: Govt of India, 1879; Appendices to the report, 
Simla/Calcutta: Govt of India, 1879-80. 4 volumes.  IOR/L/MIL/17/5/1687, 1879-1880. BL. 
27 Memorandum by His Royal Highness the Field-Marshal Commander in Chief on the proposed 
formation of the three Presidential Armies of India into one army under one Commander-in-Chief 
divided into four Army Corps, each under a Lieutenant-General. War Office, 31 Oct 
1882.  IOR/L/MIL/17/5/1705, 1882. Also, Report by the Military Committee, India Office, 27 Mar 
1882.  IOR/L/MIL/17/5/1704, 1882. 
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Punjab Commands. The title of Indian Army began to be used officially from 1 
January 1903. In 1911, George MacMunn recalls the Indian Army as one which 
became one of the marvels of modern times, and for which the people of the 





Table 2:  Four commands of the Indian Army and their areas of recruitment in 
1895.  
Command Recruitment Area 
Punjab Punjab, NWFP 
Bengal Assam, Bengal, the United Provinces, parts of Central Provinces 
and Central India  
Madras Madras Presidency, the Garrisons in Hyderabad and Maysore,  
and Burma 
Bombay Bombay Presidency including Sindh, Aden, Baluchistan, 
Rajputana, and Parts of Central India and the Central Provinces 
 
1.3 Post-1857 Regional Recruitment Shifts – The Evolution of 
Punjabisation 
 
The 1857 Mutiny or the War of Independence was a major upheaval for the 
colonial masters. From the military’s point of view, the main responsible factor in the 
outbreak of the mutiny was the Bengali soldier. His ethnic majority in the Indian 
Army and his defiance resulted in a war between the Indian soldiers on the one hand 
and the British troops and their loyalists, such as Punjabis, on the other. Therefore, the 
British military policy needed a structural overhauling, a well-organized, systematic 
and planned British Indian Army. But for the British, the recruitment strategy needed 
a major shift from the defiant Bengalis to the loyalist Punjabis. Hence, recruitment 
from 1857 onwards shifted to the North and North Western regions of India (present–
day Pakistan) at the expense of other regions, especially Bengal. As a result, during 
the first half of the twentieth century the army was dominated by the soldiers from the 
North and North West of India. Gurkhas from Nepal, the Punjabis and the Pathans 
were preferred. The number of Punjabis increased gradually. The main ‘martial races’ 
                                                 
28 Mankind belongs to God, 
   The land to the Government,  
   And power to the powerful Sahibs. 
   See George F. MacMunn, The Armies of India (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1911), p.220. 
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of the west Punjab recruited were the Tiwanas, Noons, Gakkhars, Janguas, Awans, 
Baluchis, Khattars, Khokhars, and Sials.29 
The British Army’s senior officers believed that certain classes and 
communities in India were warrior races – Martial Races. Such classes and 
communities were believed to prove better and braver soldiers and to be more suitable 
for army service. The Eden Commission reported in 1879 that the Punjab was the 
‘home of the most martial races of India’ and that it was ‘the nursery’ of the best 
soldiers.30 Michael O’Dwyer, who was the Governor of Punjab at the time of the 
fateful Jhallianwala Bagh massacre, endorsed the praise and appreciation of the 
Punjabi soldier expressed by such authorities as Lords Roberts and Kitchener. He said 
that their argument “was … irrefutable … that if India could only afford a small army 
of seventy-five thousand British (now reduced to under 60,000) and one hundred and 
sixty thousand Indian troops for the protection of a subcontinent of over 300 millions 
of people, it would be unwise to take any but the best Indian material and this was to 
be found mainly in the Punjab”.31  
The martial race theory helped to bring about an end to the Peel Commission 
recommendation that ‘the (regional) armies must balance each other’32. According to 
Field Marshal Frederick Sleigh Roberts, the so-called ‘balance’ was discarded in the 
1880s.33 The Mutiny brought about a search for a martial race which would not turn 
against the British once again. The crux of the matter of the ‘martial race theory’ was 
that some races were superior to others.34 All natives were not equal in soldierly 
qualities.35 Roberts boldly asserted that ‘no comparison can be made between the 
martial values of a regiment recruited amongst the Ghurkhas of Nepal or the warlike 
races of Northern India (Punjab and NWFP), and those recruited from the effeminate 
peoples of the South’.36 The Punjab’s population accounted for less than 10% of 
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British India,37 but contributed over half the entire Indian army. The British 
accommodated communities like Punjabis and Pakhtoons in the Army more than 
others. It was the beginning of establishing the trend whereby the future security and 
strategy of the subcontinent would be concentrated in the Punjab and not in Delhi, the 
capital of the subcontinent. 
The reasons for the British tilt towards Punjabis were further substantiated by 
the perceived Russian threat to the British Empire. The second half of the ninteenth 
century witnessed a security and strategic peril from the North West – the Russian 
threat to North-Western India. The Russian Empire expanded in Central Asia, and, by 
1850, it was about a thousand miles from the British Indian Empire.38 Soon, it had to 
touch the tribal belt of NWFP, thus making Afghanistan a buffer between the two 
empires. Keeping Russians out of Afghanistan, or extending British influence over it, 
became a principle of British foreign policy.39 The policy became more assertive after 
Lord Lytton arrived in India as viceroy in April 1876.40 ‘The British had already 
fought two wars with Afghanistan and expected a third in which there might also 
possibly be Russian involvement’.41 According to Field Marshal Roberts, the presence 
of a ‘European army near our frontiers’ had ‘completely changed’ the position.42 Thus 
more focus was given to filling the deficiencies in the Indian Army by concentrating 
on recruitment from the areas closer to these borders, namely the Punjab.  
If the British needed the Punjabis’ loyalty in the post-Mutiny period, the 
Punjabis, for the solution of their personal financial problems, also needed the British. 
The personal economy of the peasantry contributed greatly to military recruitment 
from the Punjab. The availability of man-power, but no jobs, was an imbalanced 
equation in the region’s economy. It was an agrarian land, but due to shortage of 
water, soil fertility, erratic rainfall, and shortage of personal finances, the common 
peasant was facing acute poverty. The memories of the famines of 1753, 1759 and 
1783 were still haunting the people.43 In the meantime, the struggle between Sikhs, 
Afghans and Mahrattas in the Punjab had further aggravated the situation. The 
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desolation which Ahmed Shah’s army carried out on its route was expressed by the 
saying that was still current throughout Punjab: ‘What one eats and drinks is one’s 
own; the rest is Ahmed Shah’s’.44 During the ‘great famine’ of 1783, the country was 
depopulated, peasants abandoned their villages and died of disease and want in 
thousands; the state of anarchy was almost inconceivable. So many died of starvation 
that ‘bodies were thrown into wells unburied, mothers cast their children into rivers, 
and even cannibalism is said to have been restored’.45 In the circumstances, army 
service was a blessing in disguise. It provided them with an alternative to agricultural 
income. These peasants-turned-soldiers who until now were malnourished, under-paid 
and maltreated by the rich feudal class were more committed, hardworking, 
disciplined, and willing to take assignments with more rigor and vigour. The army 
provided everything: salary, uniform and prestige, as they were working directly with 
the colonial masters. A large number of them came from the salt range and the Potwar 
(Potohar) regions of Northern Punjab (especially the districts of Jhelum, Rawalpindi, 
and Attock) and the adjoining region of NWFP where the peasants were also facing 
serious economic problems.46 Indeed, military service provided a guaranteed salary 
while the peasant class working in the fields was faced with poverty and an uncertain 
source of income. The new recruitment policy aimed at exploiting the socio-economic 
life of the Punjab. As a result, the Raj concentrated more on the rural population and 
discouraged the urban and town-city dwellers. Recruitment focus on rural population 
was another lesson learnt from the 1857 Uprising.  
The Punjab was the first province where an Act restricting land transfers was 
introduced. It was called the ‘Punjab Alienation of Land Act’.47 Its aim was to prevent 
the money-lender from exploiting the cultivator. To gain the support of the peasantry, 
several other legislative measures were also passed. The cultivator in the Punjab was 
undergoing great hardships owing to the exploitation of the money-lender. In nutshell, 
purpose of the Act was that the peasant should get some relief. The Act limited the 
transfer of landed property only among the agricultural classes.48 Moreover, now the 
peasant could not be evicted by a civil court without the intervention of the revenue 
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authorities.49 The Act had a three-pronged effect: it restored confidence in the British 
and encouraged peasants to join their ranks; the non-agricultural class was forced to 
join the armed forces to save their prestige, while even the landowning class sent their 
sons to join the British Army.50 If they already enjoyed a high eminence in the 
society, military service granted them a more certain way of keeping their social 
status.  
Granting rewards in return for loyalty was a very traditional and old tool of 
British domestic and international policy. This contrivance was applied in the North. 
Those who joined the British Indian Army were previously peasants. For them the 
best and the biggest reward was the allotment of land. The British used to allocate 
land to the soldiers in return for loyalty, gallantry, and on their retirement. Such land 
awards made the army service an attractive profession amongst the peasant-soldiers. It 
improved their socio-economic status. The policy of granting agrarian land as a 
reward for military service also encouraged recruitment. The British Indian 
government began construction of a new work of canals, their branches and 
distributaries in the plains of the Western Punjab. This process was initiated in 1885 
and continued intermittently until the end of the British rule which brought large tracts 
inhabited by semi-nomadic peoples, under cultivation. There were nine such areas, 
called the Canal Colonies, where land with sufficient canal water became available. 51 
The British Indian government distributed this land mainly on political considerations, 
that is, to reward people and communities for services to the Raj.52 Substantial tracts 
of the colony lands were allotted to ex-servicemen, both officers and other ranks,53 
which enhanced the attraction of army service for peasants. Land was also granted for 
horses, camels’ breeding, and other animals for the supply to the army and taking care 
of them. Substantial allotments of land were made to the veterans of World War I.54 
No other field of work was pledging such a great return in the North than joining the 
Army.   
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1.4 Punjabisation with Caution – The Fallout of the Bengal     
Mutiny 
 
  The events of 1857 were unforgettable for the British officers. The south 
Indian soldiers (the Bengal army) were in the forefront in the mutiny. The Punjab had 
no such quarrel with the British. Rather the British were grateful to the Punjabis for 
their role in suppressing the rebellion.55 As a result, the Bengal Army was gradually 
replaced. One lesson learnt from the mutiny was the danger of allowing any one part 
of the army to attain a vastly preponderating strength over others. The Mutiny was the 
Bengal Army’s ‘homogeneous’ ‘fusion into one huge body of soldiers’.56 
Accordingly, ‘the post-mutiny Bengal Army was reconstituted in practically two 
separate bodies: one comprising the old Hindustani element; and the other carved out 
of the Punjabi levies which had been raised to put down and overpower the mutinous 
Bengal sepoys’.57 However, the regional recruitment shift was about to repeat the 
same mistake that was committed in the Bengal army – a vast homogeneous fusion of 
soldiers of the Punjab. Therefore, to avoid repetition of the Bengal of 1857, the British 
divided the Punjab. In 1901, the Viceroy Lord Curzon, adopting and modifying an 
idea of Lord Lytton, created North-West Frontier Province out of the Punjab. The 
NWFP was administered by a Chief Commissioner with headquarters at Peshawar 
who was responsible directly to the Government of India.58  
The post-Mutiny period saw distinct parts of the Bengal Army (Hindustani and 
Punjabi) coming gradually into closer contact with each other. The Hindustani 
regiments were distributed over the whole Presidency, and the Punjab regiments were 
employed in Bengal and the North Western Provinces. This practice was opposed to 
the policy that insisted on the importance of keeping each part of the army in its own 
country during peace time. Military service not too remote from his home was much 
more popular with the sepoy than service at a distance and in a climate to which he 
was unaccustomed.59 The policy had deeper roots in the divide and rule principle than 
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anything else. ‘If troops were brought together in peace time, class feeling and esprit 
de corps would become stronger than natural race antagonisms. However, if the two 
classes were kept apart, then, should one of them show signs of wavering in its 
loyalty, the other might be trusted to come in as a foreign and to a certain extent 
antagonistic body, and over-awe it. This was what happened in the mutiny, which the 
Punjab troops so effectively assisted the British troops in putting down’. Until then, 
principles of segregation had been more carefully observed. Similarly, the Hindustani 
and the Punjabi troops ‘chiefly served within the areas which embraced their 
recruiting grounds’60.   
In 1857, the Punjabis constituted about 44% of the Bengal Army and the 
Punjab Frontier Force, but only a quarter of the entire Armed forces. By June 1858, of 
the total 80,000 ‘native’ troops in the Bengal army, 75,000 were Punjabis.61 In 1893, 
the Punjab, which also included the NWFP until 190162 and Nepal, formed 44% of the 
entire Indian Armed Forces. This further increased to 57% in 1904.63 This is the point 
where one can see a sharp under-representation of other regions. The other castes and 
classes, as well as areas, were practically ignored in the new army recruitment policy 
adopted in the post-1857 period. So much so that in 1929, 62% of the whole Indian 
Army was Punjabi.64 Now the chemistry of conscription was such that, in Bengal, 
there were 7,117 combatant recruits out of a total population of 45 million; whereas 
Punjab offered 349,689 out of a total population of 20 million.65 One out of 28 males 
was mobilized in Punjab66; this ratio was one to 150 in the rest of India.67  
At the outbreak of the First World War, there were 100,000 Punjabis serving 
in the army, of whom 87,000 were combatants. 380,000 were enlisted during the war, 
of whom 231,000 were combatants. This made a total of 480,000 who served from the 
Punjab.68 According to another estimate, the Punjab supplied 54% of the total 
combatant troops in the Indian army during the First World War and, if the 19,000 
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Gurkhas recruited from the Independent State of Nepal was excluded; the Punjab 
contingent amounted to 62% of the whole Indian Army.69  




 Table 3: Areas of Recruitment 1929.  
Number  Area Recruits  
1. Punjab 86,000 
2. Nepal 19,000 
3. United Provinces 16,000 
4. Bombay 7,000 
5. Rajputana 7,000 
6. Kashmir 6,500 
7. North West Frontier Province 5,600 
8. Madras 4,000 
9. Burma 3,000 
10. Hyderabad 700 
11. Bihar and Orissa 300 
12. Baluchistan 300 
13. Central India 200 
14. Central Provinces 100 
15. Mysore 100 
16. Assam Nil 
17 Bengal  Nil 
18 Miscellaneous 1,900 
                                                                TOTAL 158,200 
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During the late 1920s, Bombay and Madras furnished only 13,000 troops; on 
average, the Central Province, Bihar and Orissa provided 500 each; and Bengal and 
Assam offered none at all.71 Before 1857, the British Indian Army was called the 
Bengal Army. By 1929, the same Bengal region was contributing none in that army. It 
was the revenge of the British from the region called the Regional Recruitment Shift. 
Whatever the recruitment, NWFP and the Punjab kept their numerical lead.  
During the First World War, despite the emergency, the recruitment number 
was sharply contrasted between the regions. Bengal, with a population of 45 million, 
provided 7,000 combatant recruits; the Punjab, with a population of 20 million, 
provided 349,000 such recruits.72 NWFP, with a population of 2.25 million,73 
contributed 32,181 combatant recruits. 
 




















1- Madras   51,223   41,117   92,340  
2- Bombay   41,272   30,211   71,483  
3- Bengal     7,117   51,935   59,052  
4- United Provinces 163,578 117,565 281,143  
5- Punjab 349,688   97,288 446,976 40.72% 
6- NWFP   32,181   13,050   45,231   4.12% 
7- Baluchistan     1,761        327     2,088   0.19% 
8- Burma   14,094     4,579   18,673  
9- Bihar and Orissa     8,576   32,976   41,552  
10- Central Provinces     5,376     9,631   15,007  
11- Assam        942   14,182   15,124  
12- Ajmer- Merwara     7,341     1,632     8,973  
      
                TOTAL 683,149 414,493 1,097,642  
 
1.5 The Indigenous Indian Army and the British  
 
The military is the ultimate guarantor of a country’s sovereignty and freedom. 
It is the custodian of a state’s borders and secures internal order for the rulers. 
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According to Umer Hayat Khan, a member of the Committee to enquire into the 
administration and organisation of the Army in India in 1929, ‘It [the British Indian 
Army] is the only instrument in the hands of the [British] Government to maintain 
internal peace and to cope with external aggression’.75 The British Raj, therefore, 
wanted a stable, strong and well-equipped army loyal to them. The army, though yet 
not Indianised, was shaped in such a fashion that the British kept a firm control on the 
institution with central powers in their own hands. 
Generally, an army is maintained in the country for external defence. 
However, soldiers in barracks are also regarded as the last resort to deal with domestic 
disturbances with which policemen cannot cope. However, this was not the case with 
British India. Troops were employed in the country many times a year to prevent 
internal disorder and, sometimes, to quell it. The use of the army for the purpose of 
maintaining or restoring order was always on the increase. Even after its preponderant 
position was firmly established, the army regularly undertook internal security duties 
in order to foil any bid to challenge British authority and to maintain peace and 
tranquillity.76   
Amongst the situations that the colonial rulers needed to prepare for were 
revolts, violent attacks, guerrilla activities, banditry, peasant revolts, lockouts, labour 
unrest, and Hindu-Muslim communal riots. According to an estimate, the troops were 
used for internal security duties on 46 occasions during 1860-79. The use of troops in 
such a way was increased many fold by the end of the ninteenth century, when they 
were called out 69 times between 1899 and 1901.77 Sometimes the excessive use of 
force was employed to curb the independence movement. The Jhallianwala Bagh 
incident of 13th April 1919 was one such occasion. During this incident, troops 
opened fire on a protest meeting without any warning and killed 379 people.78 After a 
couple of days, martial law was imposed in Amritsar and Lahore along with a few 
more districts of the Punjab.79 It was the first Martial Law in South Asia in the 
twentieth century.  
                                                 
75 Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for India to enquire into the 
administration and organisation of the army in India, Annexture II, Minutes by Umer Hayat Khan, 
(printed and published by Her Majesty’s Office London, 1920),  p.105, BL. 
76 Hassan Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan, p. 42. 
77 David Omissi, The Sepoy and the Raj, p. 216. 
78 Administration of the Punjab Report, 1921-22, p.30; also O’Dwyer, India As I knew It, pp.283-86. 
79 Ibid, O’Dwyer. 
 29 
With regard to external defence, India had to provide against dangers on her 
North-West frontier. This contrasted with the situation of most of the Dominions of 
the British Empire in other parts of the world. The 3000 miles of land frontier which 
separated Canada from the US were undefended by a fort or a gun, and armed conflict 
with her neighbour was unthinkable.80 Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland were 
islands; the union of South Africa was equally unlikely to be invaded. The withdrawal 
of British troops from such self-governing areas and indigenous recruitment had 
become the norm. The following table shows that only a fraction of British revenues 
was spent on maintaining local forces in these countries.81  
 
Table 5: Defence expenditure -- financial year 1927-28. 
(Pensions are not included) 


















Australia 82,121 113,847 195,968 4,733 5.8% 2.4% 
Canada 65,700 31,300 97,000 2,785 4.2 2.9 
Irish Free 
State 
31,473 - 31,473 2,264 7.2 7.2 
New 
Zealand 
24,945 - 24,945 969 3.9 2.9 
South 
Africa 
22,841 10,635 33,476 809 3.5 2.4 
 
Source. Compiled from the Reports from Commissioners, Inspectors and others: 1930 
data. 
* From the League of Nations Armaments Year Book. 
 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, and the Irish Free [Republic of 
Ireland] were all self-governing. Therefore, in the light of war preparations of 1914-
1918, they developed immensely powerful uniform armies of the highest fighting 
quality under the stress of emergency. But in peace time, these countries had no such 
organized scheme of national defence, as they had no threatening borders and no 
serious internal movements of dissent which they needed to suppress. In contrast to 
this situation, India throughout history experienced incursions by foreign invaders via 
the North West. It was the difficult and necessary role of the Army in India to guard 
against a repetition of these dangers. Therefore, 60,000 British troops and 150,000 
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Indian troops (as well as 34,000 reservists) were organized into a Field Army, into 
covering troops, and into a garrison for internal security, with this task amongst others 
constantly in mind.82  
In peace time, the duty of the covering troops, assisted by frontier levies of 
various kinds, was to prevent the independent tribes on the Indian side of the Afghan 
frontier raiding peaceful inhabitants of the plains below. Behind and beyond this belt 
of unorganized territory lay the direction from which, throughout the ages, the 
dangers to India’s territorial integrity had come. None of the states behind India 
(especially Soviet Union) were members of the League of Nations. Hence, a strong 
though expensive military presence for the defence of the British Raj was necessary. 
Indian political leaders raised the question of the enormous cost of the British Army 
in India (one British soldier was estimated to cost between three and four times as 
much as an Indian soldier). They argued that the replacement of the British by Indians 
would not only save costs but also involve the indigenous people in the defence of 
their land, making them more loyal to their land and people. Indigenous recruitment 
would result in an increase in the British Indian Army along the North-Western 
borders but at much less cost.83 
The perceived Soviet threat to India was one of the major reasons for 
indigenous recruitment from the Punjab and NWFP. Keeping a very cautious country-
Afghanistan- in view, Russia was the prime fear of the British Empire from the North 
West. The Soviet-Afghan cordiality was not only threatening to India but also to the 
entire empire.84 The Simon Commission of 1930 observed: ‘The North West frontier 
is not only the frontier of India; it is an international frontier of the first importance 
from the military point of view for the whole empire’.85 Therefore, Russians were kept 
at bay by the British by their defensive arrangements on the border and by 
maintaining Afghanistan as a buffer zone. In 1886, the Punjab Frontier Force which 
was looking after this part of the international border of India was transferred from the 
Punjab government to the C-in-C.86 A border demarcation agreement was also signed 
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with the Afghan government in November 1893; the Durand Line,87 to stabilize 
bilateral relations. Various developments showed the weakness of the Russian empire: 
the Russo-Japanese War 190588, the Bolshevik Revolution89 and the early withdrawal 
of Russia from the First World War,90 which reduced British fears from the North. 
However, they continued indigenous recruitment from the region. Later on, one fear 
was replaced by another, Marxist ideology, and hence they maintained a strong profile 
on the North Western frontier91 (two detailed security plans were designed by the 
British government to contain the ‘Russian military menace’ in 1927 and 1931. The 
first was called the Blue Plan (1927) asking for an army advance towards Afghanistan 
from the NWFP and Baluchistan to Kabul.92 The second plan was called the Pink Plan 
(1931) giving a limited military action in the bordering areas of Afghanistan93). 
Besides fears from Soviet Union and Afghanistan, the British were facing a 
series of skirmishes with Pakhtoon tribes in tribal areas of NWFP bordering 
Afghanistan. The purpose of the division of NWFP into tribal and settled areas was to 
break the backbone of such armed resistance. Lord Curzon created a separate province 
NWFP in 1901, which was divided into settled – Peshawar, Kohat, Hazara, Bannu, 
Dera Ismail Khan – and tribal areas along the Durand line. Owing to its geo-strategic 
location, its proximity with an international border (Durand Line) and the fighting 
nature of tribesmen, the tribal areas were placed under direct control of the 
government of India with very little administrative interference.94 Situated between 
the two countries, keeping tribal areas peaceful was a difficult task. Tribal areas 
are/were composed of numerous tribes- Afridis, Shenwaris, Mahsuds, Wazirs, Burkis, 
Mohmands etc- each headed by its own chieftain. In Pashto language, a dictum 
defines the tribal Pakhtoons propensity for fighting. It says: when you see an unhappy 
Pakhtoon; it means he is not fighting.95 According to one interviewee, ‘the British 
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government used different tools to pacify them like official bribery to the tribal 
chieftains, the golden and experienced principle of Divide(ing the tribes) and Rule, 
arresting one in place of another from the family, and blatant use of force’.96 A local 
militia or khasadar force was set up, contributed by the tribesmen loyal to the Raj. 
Each Chieftain had a quota of his tribe to contribute to the militia. The bigger the 
quota, the more awe of the Chieftain in the society and hence more loyalty to the 
British. 
Soon the Khasadar force became a kind of police of the area.97 The regular 
troops were limited to key strategic army fortifications for reinforcing the militia (in 
local language, the militia was/is called Khasadars).98 It was reported that there were 
72 expeditions against these tribes from 1850 to 1922, an average of one expedition 
per year.99 The major army operations included ‘Chitral 1896, Malakand 1897, the 
Waziri tribe 1901-2, 1919 and 1937, the Mahsuds 1925, and the Mohmands 1933’.100  
Army expeditions in the tribal areas demonstrate that the military in general 
and the indigenously recruited military in particular provided not only external 
security but also internal order to prolong and firm the establishment of the British 
Raj. Indeed, it was a difficult task for the civilian administration to keep order and 
stability without employing the British Army against the challengers. Hence, to keep 
order, the civilian administration had to use militarized civilian powers. An average of 
one expedition per year showed that it was not a novel practice for the civilian 
administration to control internal disturbance by the use of British military might. In 
the past, ‘the Company’s dominance in North India was based on its superior military 
power’.101 The force that kept the British in India was the army.  
 
1.6 Social and Psychological Influences on Indigenous Soldiers  
An army recruited, trained and disciplined in military ethos was a strong 
support for the British military campaigns – at home as well as abroad. Influenced and 
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impressed by the British traditions, norms and values, the recruits looked up to their 
foreign military leaders. Their mental calibre and approach to life was also influenced 
by foreign expeditions. Punjabis fought in nearly all arenas of the [first] Great War: 
France and Belgium, Gallipoli and Salonika, Aden and the Persian Gulf, 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, East Africa, North China.102 They were exposed to a new and 
different world beyond their cloistered village. They saw lands and technological 
advances that they had never envisioned. Their perspective was enlarged. This opened 
them to a new world, one greater than and different from the peasantry class under the 
Zamindar (landholder) of their villages. They saw Western civilization more closely 
during their service in Europe. The colonial master also showed himself more 
splendidly in London. Peasant-soldiers were impressed by the magnificent civic life 
of London and Paris. Their interaction with the educated class, especially women,103 
led them to reflect on the comparisons between the life of a woman in Europe and in 
their respective villages in the Punjab. High levels of cleanliness and sanitation;104 
wax statues at Madame Tussaud’s105 museum and their amazement at the London 
underground106 train network all left an impression on the Indian soldiers, as 
collections of their letters reveal. They were immersed in new thoughts and concepts 
when they returned to their bullock-cart, plough, and indebtedness after the War was 
over. They had many stories to tell. The soldiers on leave home or after retirement 
provided useful propaganda for the ‘Gora Sahib’ [Mr. Whiteman], giving a good 
impression to the civil society for the British.107 One Punjabi Muslim wrote from 
Boulogne in his mail: ‘When one considers this country and these people in 
comparison with our own country and our own people one cannot but be distressed. 
Our country is poor and feeble and its lot is very depressed… In fact they [the British] 
have a real moral superiority’.108 Their exposure to the outside world also brought 
with it prosperity and a positive change in soldiers’ lives. In a time-and-land-locked 
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social capsule, this much traveled “cosmopolitan” rose to a new social status and 
acquired a new influence in society. Folk songs of the time reflected their growing 
social status and importance: “Vasna fauji de naal, paanway boot sanay lat maaray” 
(I will live with a soldier even if he kicks me with his boot on).109 Therefore, given 
that two-thirds of the Indian Army was recruited from within [Punjab’s] borders the 
Punjabi soldier was the chief recipient of societal awe.110  
Salary, living conditions, facilities for the soldiers’ families, post-retirement 
benefits and rewards were offered with distinction (Jagirs-grants of land- were 
sanctioned annually)111 so that the military service would remain attractive to 
forthcoming generations. The British Empire in return, gained the security and control 
of the ‘Golden Sparrow’ – India. By now the primary focus of the Raj was to keep 
firm control over India, so that very little attention was given to the social and 
developmental civilian sector. As stated earlier, colonial control of India was via the 
Army. Hence, more and more funds and resources were available for the single largest 
item in India’s annual budget- Defence Expenditure.  
 
Table 6.  
The expenditures on Military Services 1914-1947 in India(in Rupees)112 
1914-15 306.5 million  
1918-19 640.7 million Rise 
1920-21 873.8 million Rise 
1931-32 517.6 million Fall 
1936-37 454.5 million Fall 
1933-34 £1,500,000 British government began to contribute to 
India’s military expenditure every year 
April 1939 £2,000,000 British contribution per year increased. 
September  
1939- 1944-45    
4583.2 million Steep rise due to World War 2 (excluding 
British Contribution) 
1945-46 3953.2 million End of the war eased the financial Burdon 
1946-47 2096.1 million Still higher than the pre-war expenditure 
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The British controlled and defended the entire Subcontinent by focusing and 
working on only one section of the society - the Army. The Army provided a security 
umbrella against any kind of threat to internal peace or external aggression. Hence, 
heavy spending on the Army was an investment for long term goals.  The  significant 
sums expended for the defence budget became a tradition that continued even after 
partition of 1947 by the successor states. India and Pakistan’s defence budgets 
continued to grow.   
  
1.7 ‘Indianisation’ of the British Army 
 
No Indian was allowed to become a direct commissioned officer until the end 
of the First World War. They could become Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers 
(VCOs) or junior commissioned officers. The highest rank an Indian could achieve 
was that of Subedar-Major.  
 
Table 7: VCOs equivalent to KCOs 
VCOs KCOs 
Jemadar Second- Lieutenant 
Subedar Lieutenant 
Subedar- Major Major 
 
 
The VCO was a promoted cadre from the lower ranks and served as a middle 
rank between the ordinary soldiers and the Commissioned officers, called King’s 
Commissioned Officers (KCOs), at the Company level, but the holder of a ‘Viceroy’s 
Commission’, whatever his experience and length of service, was lower in rank and 
command than the most newly joined British subalterns.113 Below the KCOs and 
VCOs, the Indian Army had a series of non-commissioned officer positions Rifleman 
(private), Lance-naik (Corporal), Havildar (Sergeant), Havildar Major and quarter 
master Havildars of various levels. As the British were keen to keep an Indian 
aristocratic class on their side, Lord Curzon introduced the ICC (Imperial Cadet 
Corps) or ISC (Imperial Service Corps114) in 1901, in which the sons of Princes and 
the wealthy classes more generally could assume officer ranks. It was designated ‘His 
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Majesty’s Native Indian Land Forces’.115 Their training was wholly conducted in 
India. However, they were not at par with the KCOs, which were still the domain of 
the British. By 1911, 78 Indians had joined the ICC.116 The role of the ICC was 
essentially ceremonial. These officers did not have any power of command over 
British personnel. In the Indian Army, they could not rise above the level of squadron 
or company officer.  It was not surprising that the total number was dropped gradually 
to 11 by 1914. But it was, as Bryon Farewell says, the first small step towards the 
‘Indianisation’ of the Indian Army officer corps.117  
There was no concept of an indigenous army in British India until the late 
ninteenth century. The First World War proved the worth of the Indian soldier. The 
Indianite ranks in the British Army were also a demand by political parties of India. 
The blunt demand in this respect was found in the ‘Report of the Committee 
appointed by the All-Parties Conference, 1928, to determine the principles of the 
constitution for India,’ which was commonly called the ‘Nehru Report’. Though no 
passage is found in the Report itself, or in the sketch of recommendations in Chapter 7 
of the document, the Army matter was touched upon in the introduction. It states that 
the authors recommend the transfer of control over the Indian Army to Ministers. The 
authors of the Report quoted, ‘Self-Government without an effective Indian Army is 
[an] impossibility, and no amount of protests or demonstrations or denunciations of 
the Imperial Government can avail to alter that fact’. Criticising the statement, they 
added: ‘This is true but we do not accept the constitutional position that without an 
Indian or Dominion army, India cannot obtain Dominion status. In the first place the 
Indian Army has not to be created; it exists there already. In the next place historically 
the position taken by our critics is not correct’.118  
The First World War compelled the British to take drastic steps in regard to 
the colonies. One such change was in August 1917 when the Secretary of State for 
India Edwin Montagu, in his famous statement on ‘increasing association of Indians 
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in every branch of the administration’, announced admission to the commissioned 
cadres for Indians.119 The Montagu-Chelmsford Report was written during the Great 
War. In the three paragraphs (328-330) which it devoted to the subject of the Army, 
the way in which the services of the Indian Army in various theatres of war had been 
and would be recognised was discussed. The authors mentioned the announcement of 
His Majesty’s Government that the bar which had hitherto prevented the admission of 
Indians into the commissioned ranks of His Majesty’s Army should be removed. It 
further declared that this decision had established the principle that an Indian soldier 
could earn the King’s Commission by his military conduct. This apparently referred to 
promotion from the ranks. The Report went on to say that other methods of 
appointment had not yet been decided upon, and emphasized ‘the necessity of 
grappling with the problem’. As discussed in the earlier paragraph about the demand 
of Indian leadership for the commissioned ranks for Indians, the Report stated “it is 
impossible to deal with this large question in connection with our present proposals. 
The war is yet not over… The requirements of the future will very largely depend 
upon the form of peace which is attained. We, therefore, leave this question for 
consideration hereafter, but with the note that it must be faced and settled”120.    
The authors of the Montagu-Chelmsford Report admired the services rendered 
to the common cause by Indian arms. They contented themselves with noting the 
urgency and importance of the Army question that would emerge after peace had been 
restored. However, no concrete steps were taken for the general commissioning of 
Indians. Therefore, the start of the Indianization of commissioned ranks was rather 
slow. Under the pressure of the Montagu-Chelmsford proposed reforms, ‘in 1918 a 
change was made [according to which] the Indians became eligible for the first time 
to hold the King’s Commission. Ten vacancies were annually reserved for Indian 
cadets for competition amongst themselves at the Royal Military Academy, 
Sandhurst’.121 Completion of the course here was a must to get the King’s 
Commission for an Indian. Keeping in view the colonial legacy and loyalty to the Raj, 
the Indian government selected the candidates preferring favourites of the Raj- sons of 
loyal and politically influential families. The debut Commissioned Indian batch that 
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passed out from Sandhurst was posted in Infantry and Cavalry in 1920.122 A cadet 
college was also opened in Indore in 1918 which granted permanent commission to its 
32 graduates in 1919.123 
Many factors contributed to Indians’ lack of interest in getting their sons 
admitted to or commissioned from Sandhurst. Very tough modus operandi of 
selection, huge expenses, travel to England, and a weak academic record as compared 
to the British students discouraged Indian cadets. It further contributed to their high 
rate of failure (30%) in the early years as compared to their British counterparts 
(3%).124 As there was some criticism in British circles regarding the Indianization of 
Commissioned ranks, ‘an Eight Unit Scheme was introduced by the then C-in-C Lord 
Rawlinson in 1923’.125 According to the scheme, it was obligatory for every Indian 
KCO to spend his first year with the British regiment in India before he was posted on 
a permanent basis in one of eight units selected in 1923 for complete Indianization.126 
Indian officers holding commissions in the Indian Army were to be transferred and 
posted to these eight units. In this way they could fill up the appointments for which 
they were qualified by their rank and by their length of service. The purpose of such a 
scheme was four fold: to limit Indian KCOs to these Units; in due course such units 
would be entirely officered by Indians; to keep the British Officers to command 
Indian Officers; and to accelerate the pace of Indianization. As the senior officers 
retired and junior officers acquired seniority and were promoted, the time could have 
come when each of these Indian Units would be commanded and completely officered 
by Indians. However, it was a very lethargic process based on slow progression. The 
process could not be completed ‘until the year 1946 at the earliest, since in the Indian 
Army promotion was regulated by a time scale’.127  
International relations between the two world wars brought about further 
changes in the British approach towards its colonies. It had to introduce positive 
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measures to keep the empire from disintegration. Hence, during the inter-war period, 
not only were reforms introduced but various recommendations were put forth for the 
increase of Indians in the British Army. General Henry Rawlinson the British C-in-C 
in 1921 recommended an increase in Indian Officers.128 In March 1922, a pre-cadet 
college – the Prince of Wales Royal Indian Military College – was established in 
Dehra Dun to prepare young men for Sandhurst.129 A committee was appointed in 
June 1925 under Major General Sir Andrew Skeen (at that time, it was popularly 
known as ‘Indian Sandhurst Committee’ but later on called ‘Skeen Committee’) to 
establish a military college along the lines of Sandhurst in India and to discuss 
prospects to increase the number of Indian candidates for the King’s Commission.130 
The committee visited different military institutions which included: England, France, 
Canada and the US and were given briefings from the officers and trainers alike.131 At 
the end of the study tour and following long deliberations, the committee submitted a 
report in 1926. It recommended an increase in the pace of Indianisation; induction of 
Indians to the commissioned ranks in the technical branches of the Army as well as 
the Air Force; abandonment of the Eight Units Scheme, and the establishment of a 
military college in India.132 The first two recommendations were accepted by the 
British government. Instead of the last two recommendations, the government 
increased the Indian quota at Sandhurst to twenty-five. It also created six vacancies 
per year at the Royal Air Force College, Cranwell, to train Indians as pilots, and six 
places at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, to train Indian officers for the 
artillery.133 Regarding the establishment of a military college in India, Indians were 
not yet filling all the 10 vacancies annually at Sandhurst. The following figure shows 
the annual number of Indian Cadets admitted to the Royal Military College, 
Sandhurst, since 1918, and their disposal. The result was disappointing. Therefore, the 
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recommendation for the establishment of a military college in India was declined by 
the British Government.  
 








Number of Indians 
admitted to 
Sandhurst to fill 
such vacancies 
Number of Indians 
ultimately 
commissioned 
1918 (first half) 5 5 1 
1919 (first half) 5 5 4 
1919 (second half) 5 5 2 
1920 (first half) 5 5 3 
1920 (second half) 5 5 2 
1921 (first half) 5 5 4 
1921 (second half) 5 4 3 
1922 (first half) 6 4 4 
1922 (second half) 6 6 3 
1923 (first half) 6 6 5 
1923 (second half) 7 6 6 
1924 (first half) 6 6 4 
1924 (second half) 6 5 4 
1925 (first half) 7 5 4 
1925 (second half) 8 2 1 
1926 (first half) 12 8 7 
1926 (second half) 8 8 8 
1927 (first half) 7 7 7 
1927 (second half) 5 3 3 
1928 (first half) 7 3 2 
1928 (second half) 10 7 - 
1929 (first half) 11 11 - 
1929 (second half) 10 10 - 
                   TOTAL 157 134 77 
 
Up to and including the first half of 1928, vacancies were filled by 
nomination, after that date by examination. 
 
Table 9: Summary of vacancies for Indians at Sandhurst (till 1929).135 
 Number  
Total number of vacancies 157 
Total number of admissions (including 3 VCs nominated in 1928 & 
1929 but not shown in the figure above) 
134 
Total number commissioned 77 
Died or resigned from illness 03 
Failed to receive commissions (prior to 1927) 22 
Presently, the number of cadets at Sandhurst (1929) 22 
                                                 




It was first decided to admit Indians and Anglo-Indians to Woolwich in 1928, 
and, by 1929, nine vacancies were offered. But there were only two successful 
candidates. Similarly, the first examination for Cranwell was held in November 1928 
and, by the end of 1929, twelve vacancies had been offered but only six filled.136 
Ayub Khan was also chosen for training as a commissioned officer at Sandhurst. He 
did remarkably well, securing the top position among the Indian cadets. Among his 
colleagues was General J. N. Choudhry who later became C-in-C of the Indian 
Army.137 
The demand for the Indianisation of the forces did not end with the submission 
of the Skeen report. The issue was taken up once again during the Round Table 
conference when its sub-committee on military affairs made a demand on similar 
lines, including setting up a military college in India on the Sandhurst model.138 
Finally, the struggle was accomplished in the shape of the establishment of an Indian 
Military Academy at Dehra Dun in October 1932.139 Its first batch, commissioned in 
1935, was called Indian Commissioned Officers (ICOs).140  
After the Second World War, the Eight Unit Scheme was brought to an end, 
and all the branches of the army were opened to Indian officers. Training facilities at 
Dehra Dun were expanded. A large number of officers were recruited on short and 
long courses (short and emergency commissions). By early 1947, out of 9500 
Commissioned Officers, about 500 were pre-war KCOs and ICOs.141 
Only nine Indians (five non-Muslims, four Muslims) reached the senior rank 
of Lt. Colonel during World War II. Out of four Muslim Lt. Colonels, one was 
appointed temporary Colonel and one acting Brigadier. A few days before 
independence, the acting Brigadier Muhammad Akbar Khan was promoted to the rank 
of Major General. Promotions were given on similar lines to others in the substantive 
ranks below that of Lt. Colonel. The officers recruited during the war period were in 
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junior positions.142 Ayub Khan was then a Brigadier in the Indian Army and was 
attached to the Boundary Force, under Major General Rees. In January 1948, five 
months after Independence, he was posted as General Officer Commanding (GOC) of 
14 Division in East Bengal.143  
The army was always a very special and private concern of the British in 
India. They kept it away from any kind of politics. Rather, in case of any clash 
between the country’s politics and security, they favoured the latter. Even as late as 
1946, the Viceroy’s civilian Executive Council had no powers over defence and the 
defence budget. The British Indian Army was kept free from a strong influence on 
Indian politics as there was no synthesis between the two. Defence had nothing to do 
with the politics of the country. Thus the British-Indian Army proved an autonomous 
entity. Their training (discipline and professionalism) and separation from the society 
strengthened their organisational ties and loyalty to the British authority. The army’s 
administrative and professional powers were concentrated in the hands of the Army 
chief, who after the Curzon-Kitchener dispute emerged autonomous in military 
affairs. This was the beginning of the exclusion of army matters from civilian control. 
The contest between the Mulki Lat Sahib [Curzon] and the Jungi Lat Sahib 
[Kitchener] weakened forever the once great influence of the Viceroy of India.144  
It is interesting to note here that most of the Governor Generals and Viceroys 
of India were formerly military officers. One Governor – Robert Clive145 (Dec. 1756-
Feb. 1760, April 1765-Jan. 1767) – and three Governor Generals – Lord Cornwallis146 
(Sept. 1786-Oct. 1793 and July 1805-Oct. 1805), the Marquis of Hastings, Lord 
Francis Moria (Oct.1813- Jan. 1823), and Lord William Bentinck147 (1828-35) – 
functioned as C-in-Cs. Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell, C-in-C, 1941-42, 1942-
3148 was promoted to the post of Viceroy in 1943,149 a position he held until March 
1947. At this time, few could have imagined that this trajectory would later be used by 
junior officers as a short path to become military rulers of the future state in the 
North-West of the Subcontinent.  
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Indian politicians made several demands for legislative control over defence 
forces, the defence budget and foreign policy during the 1920s and 30s.150 Any such 
control by the politicians would have been a British nightmare. Politicising the British 
Indian Army was the last thing the British could ever imagine.151 The Esher 
Committee (1919-20) maintained that the Indian Army was a unit in the security 
system of the British Empire and that its administration could not be dissociated from 
the total armed forces of the empire.152 There had been many political activities which 
proved acid tests for the army, but the Army personnel held on to their professional 
ethos and stood by the British administration. The Punjab, with its hardy and martial 
rural population of peasant proprietors, had, since its inclusion in the Empire, been 
rightly regarded as the “Shield”, the “Spearhead” and the “Sword-hand” of India. ‘It 
earned such proud titles due to its association with the British Army and help in every 
Eastern campaign from the Mutiny down to the present day’.153 A colonial army had 
to serve colonial masters. The autonomous nature of the colonial army chief and 




This chapter has provided a historical overview of currents and trends of the 
British Indian Army. These developments transformed a segment of the British Indian 
Army into the Pakistan Army. The impact of the 1857 Uprising on regional 
recruitment to the British military played a large part in the de-Bengalisation and 
consequent Punjabisation of the Colonial Indian Army; a punishment for Bengal as a 
region that rebelled and a reward to the Punjab that suppressed the Uprising. As a 
result, it is argued that this shift gave military leadership to the Punjab after the 
partition, which contributed to Punjabi dominance over other provinces following 
independence. 
The post-partition Indian security threat to the newly carved out Pakistan as 
well as the first Kashmir war of 1948 resulted in an increase in Pakistan Army’s 
strategic importance in the country. Security against India became the raison d’etre of 
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the Army. The military leadership and political administration considered it necessary 
to strengthen the army against any potential security threat. The political forces of the 
country, due to the fear of India, also accommodated the Army in the national and 
international decisions of the government. This encouraged it to increase its political 
influence. Historically, 65 to 75% of the Pakistan army was drawn during the 1950s 
and 60s from the same areas of the Punjab where the British used to recruit.154 This 
was the culmination of the Punjabisation of the Army initiated by the British during 
and after the Mutiny war of 1857. However, even after independence, the Pakistan 
Army was still following the trend set in colonial times - recruiting more Punjabis and 
discouraging Bengalis. That is one of the main reasons why despite constituting 56% 
of the total population of Pakistan, Bengalis made up less than 7% in the Pakistan 
Army during the 1960s.155 The Pakistan Army always demonstrated a lack of trust 
towards Bengalis, as had the British, and doubted their loyalty to the state. This 
further alienated them from the ranks of governmental administration.  
The Pakistan Army borrowed numerous other autonomous features from the 
British Army. Intensive training with an emphasis on discipline and efficiency and 
their separation from the fragmented Pakistani society turned the Pakistani soldiers 
into a professional, united and autonomous fighting force. However, they formed a 
force parallel with the government of Pakistan. As the country was a security oriented 
entity, any important decision taken by the initial governments of Pakistan needed a 
nod from the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ). The meeting of the Corps 
Commanders turned into a kind of a domestic and foreign policy reviewing 
committee. Sought in the name of Islam and democracy, Pakistan was moving closer 
to the trends of military dictatorship. 
During colonial rule, the swelling defence budget was a prerequisite for 
keeping a strong British Army against internal and external threats. However, this 
practice was continued by the Pakistan Army at the cost of the development of 
civilian sectors. The defence budget grew in the name of a perceived Indian threat. If 
the nation could not provide enough for development of the Army, military alliances 
were signed with the US to muster more resources. Whatever the plight of the nation, 
                                                 
154 Interview with Brigadier (Rtd.) Inam-ul-Haq Afridi, (Peshawar, 20-06-07)  
155  Air Chief Marshall (Rtd) Mohammad Asghar Khan, ‘Tareekh say kuch nahin sikha- Siyyasat aur 
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the Army remained a well-developed, well-nourished, well-trained, well-equipped, 
well-organized, united and well-off autonomous institution of Pakistan. 
 The way the British Indian Army was groomed in the province of Punjab 
ultimately enormously affected Pakistan. At the time of partition, relatively but 
significantly speaking, Pakistan had neither a bourgeoisie, nor a strong middle class. It 
lacked a business class. The Punjab was the power centre of the country, but it lacked 
an industrial establishment. Aitzaz Ahsan contends that the British intentionally kept 
the Punjab industrially backwards as it might have affected recruitment if other means 
of livelihood, except agriculture, were available to the Punjabis.156 The absence of a 
bourgeoisie increased the influence of feudal elites. The landowning aristocracy were 
in favour of the British due to the benefits they received from them in exchange for 
contributing Jawans and Sawars to the Army.157 Thus, the tradition of British military 
recruitment in the North West of the Subcontinent (Punjab and NWFP), was a major 
factor in the emergence of Pakistan as a quasi-militarized country. It was a country 
with a weak political structure, feeble political parties and politicians, but a strong 
feudal class and civil and military bureaucracy. This naturally ‘consolidated the 
linkages between the military service, agricultural land and political power’.158 Hence 
the Muslim League, due to its weak control within the newly created country, had to 
abdicate in favour of a strong giant, the Pakistan Army. With the strong support of the 
feudal class, more agricultural land under its domain, and with its organisational and 
professional culture, the Pakistan Army began to assert its political role at the hub of 
the country’s politics. The irony of fate is that it lacked political training. Hence, the 
Army ran the country like a defence establishment by increasing the defence budget, 
having defence pacts, and appointing defence services people in the policy making 
bodies of the country.  
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Weak Political Institutions and 




The military had an authoritative and autonomous role during the period of 
British rule in South Asia. The end of the colonial period in Pakistan ushered in a new 
era of hope and expectation: an era of participatory democratic governance. 
Nationalist leaders like Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan had infused a spirit of militant 
nationalism in the interests of obtaining a separate homeland in which to practice 
democratic, federal and Islamic principles. They envisioned self-rule based on strong 
political institutions and participatory governance. But the post-colonial era also 
brought fears of secessionist and separatist movements that could result in the break-
up of the newly created country. The ruling civilian elite preferred to rely on a pre-
established military bureaucracy to counter their fears of separatism. This 
authoritarian impulse found its natural ally in the military and worked to weaken 
democratic institutions. At the same time provincialism developed in reaction to the 
extreme nationalism of the Centre. Security and the centrifugal urge to keep the 
country integrated suffocated the different peoples of diverse sub-nationalities in 
Pakistan, especially in the Eastern wing. Hence the same nationalist leadership that 
was the cause of independence began to treat its own people in an authoritarian 
manner. This caused instability at the Centre in the governance of Pakistan. 
Unstable governance provided the army with the opportunity to advance its 
political interests. ‘Principally because the country was newly created, the security 
issue became of paramount importance for the government and so the military was 
accommodated within it without any official or constitutional pronouncement’.1 It was 
a time when no dividing line was drawn between the government servants and the 
public office holders of the State. Hence, when ‘the Commander-In-Chief (C-IN-C) 
Ayub Khan was appointed as the defence minister of the country in 1954’, the armed 
forces were shown the path to political power.2 
                                                 
1 Interview with Major (Rtd) Sibghatullah Khan, (Nowshera: 26-01-07). 
2 The Dawn, October 31, 1954, National Archives Islamabad (henceforth NAI). 
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 The justification for military rule in Pakistan was founded upon the perceived 
differences existing between the political parties and the elites (the party leaders) that 
ran them.3 A military-run state depends on a group of civilian collaborators. In the 
case of Pakistan during 1947-58, military leaders and a group of politicians formed a 
Gang of Four. Always fearful of the disintegration of the country, they tried to 
suppress provincial feelings and to magnify federation. As they already controlled the 
Centre, differences amongst the politicians (provincial as well as inter-Central) helped 
them prolong their government. The Gang of Four, comprising of non-elected civil 
and military officers, always tried to subvert and weaken political institutions to make 
the elected members of the government subservient to them.  
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema in his book, The Armed Forces of Pakistan says that the 
perception of the military’s organizational discipline and leadership qualities when 
compared with the inefficiency of political institutions has been one of the major 
legitimations for the army’s political role.4 Indeed the involvement of the military in 
the country’s governance was considered a mark of its contribution towards nation-
building, while its role in politics was considered a measure of the incompetence of 
the political leadership. Major General (Rtd) Fazal Muqeem Khan in The Story of the 
Pakistan Army, writes:  
The military is above politics and parties. The performance of its officers 
and Jawans and the basis of its traditions spring from their readiness to 
serve the state and the nation in the best way they can do… it [the 
Pakistan Army] has acquired a unique spirit and sense of purpose and has 
proved itself Pakistan’s greatest stabilizing force.5  
 
 However, Cheema and Khan do not explain how the situation was reached where it 
became posssible for the Pakistan Army to assume a political role. Drawing on new 
archival sources from the CIA, National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA), National Archives London, and interviews undertaken in Pakistan’s two 
provinces, Punjab and NWFP, this chapter explores the role of the Army in 
weakening civilian political institutions during the 1950s. It further examines the 
political wrangling and person-oriented political party system in the early years of 
                                                 
3 Ayesha Jalal, Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia,  pp.50-53. 
4 Pervez Iqbal Cheema, The Armed Forces of Pakistan (Karachi: OUP, 2002), pp.135-36. 
5 Major General (Rtd) Fazal Muqeem Khan, The Story of the Pakistan Army (Karachi: OUP, 1963), 
pp.239-40 
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Pakistan. In this regard, the politics of the provinces of Punjab and NWFP have been 
highlighted as case studies. It also charts the fall of democratic institutions as well as 
politicians and the rise of the military, undertaking a schematic analysis of the weak 
political institutions during the years under consideration. This will establish a first 
understanding of the Army’s links with domestic and foreign policies of the country. 
The chapter further explores how political institutions were weakened by the 
militarization of the government of Pakistan even when the army was not in power. 
Lastly, the chapter discusses the unequal treatment of East and West Pakistan by the 
military. Bengalis were purged as their democratic nature proved a growing threat to 
the military clique.    
Stephen Cohen in The Idea of Pakistan says that it was the lax control over the 
army of the founding father of the nation, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, that made the 
military more prominent than other democratic players.6 Similarly, Ayesha Siddiqua-
Agha in The Military Inc., says that Jinnah was unable to take firm control of the 
armed forces during the early days.7 However there have been instances when Jinnah 
himself declined to accept the supremacy of the army in the initial days of the creation 
of Pakistan. A conversation between an army general and Jinnah quoted in the 
biography of Air Chief Martial (Rtd.) Asghar Khan can be cited here as an example. 
According to Asghar Khan: 
 
 On 14th of August 1947, I [Asghar Khan] had the opportunity to meet 
Jinnah for the second time and to hear his opinion on some very important 
issues. The reception was given on the green pasture of the Governor 
General house in Karachi. Lt. General Akbar Khan also joined us. He 
asked me to have a chat with Jinnah. Jinnah while just moving around the 
guests also reached us. General Khan took the opportunity to talk to him, 
‘We are very happy that you have succeeded in your struggle to establish 
an independent sovereign state and we hope that under your command and 
guidance our capabilities will be fully utilised. But we are disappointed to 
know that British officers have been appointed as high ranks (heads) of 
armed forces’ and our future is still in their hands. Jinnah who was very 
calmly listening to all this raised his finger and said, ‘Don’t forget that 
you are the servants of the nation. Policy making is not your job. It’s our 
job- I mean representatives of the people. Accepting the orders of the 
elected representatives is your responsibility.8 
 
                                                 
6 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, p.102. 
7 Ayesha Siddiqua-Agha, The Military Inc., p.63. 
8 Air Chief Marshal (Rtd) Asghar Khan, ‘Tareekh say kuch nahin sikha’ , p.3. 
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This conversation clearly demonstrates that Jinnah had full command over the 
army and was never ready to surrender any part of civilian responsibilities to them. 
The irony is that the same army general was later involved in attempting to overthrow 
Liaquat Ali Khan’s government in a military conspiracy termed the ‘Rawalpindi 
Conspiracy Case’.9 The conversation between General Akbar Khan and Jinnah was 
indicative of the relationship between the civilian and military branches of 
government. Underpinning Jinnah’s policy, however, was a more general statement of 
the redefinition of Pakistan’s political institutions and the intrinsic link between the 
military and politicians in Pakistan during the 1950s and 60s. Indeed Jinnah was so 
cautious of the military’s role in the newly created Pakistan that he posted General 
Ayub Khan as General Officer Commanding in the East Bengal (East Pakistan) 
during his attachment with the Governor General due to his dictatorial nature.10 
However, after the death of Jinnah, he made his way back to the capital, Karachi, to 
become the first military ruler of the country in 1958.  
 
2.2 Indo-phobia, Islam and the Creation of Pakistan 
 
Pakistan owed its existence to a deliberate act, undertaken at Jinnah’s 
insistence,11 to keep Indian Muslims away from the Indian National Congress (INC) 
Party due to its biased policies against the Muslim League.12 The prospect of INC 
rule, based on a Hindu majority in decolonised India, in perpetuity, was so abhorrent 
to the leadership of the Muslim League that almost any sacrifice seemed worthwhile 
to escape it. The result of the fear of a majority political party over the minority was 
an Indo-phobic Pakistan. 
 In the light of the study and oral testimonies conducted during the fieldwork, 
three factors or fears are important to consider while observing a typical Pakistani 
soldier’s feelings about his country during the 1950s and 60s vis-à-vis India:  
The first factor was a continuing rejection of Hinduism. This ever-renewed 
distaste was psychologically needed because without it the immense and painful task 
                                                 
9 Hassan Zaheer, The Time and Trial of the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, 1951: The First Coup Attempt in 
Pakistan (Karachi: OUP, 1999), preface. Also Tariq Ali, Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State 
(London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1983), p.56. 
10 Interview with Major (Rtd) Sibghatullah Khan, (Nowshera: 26-01-07). 
11 His full name was ‘Mohammad Ali Jinnah’. He was called ‘Quaid-e-Azam’- the greatest leader, by 
Muslims of the subcontinent during the independence movement of Pakistan. 
12 Crispin Bates, Subalterns and Raj: South Asia Since 1600 (London: Routledge, 2007), p.174. 
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of creating Pakistan would seem supererogatory. Anti-Indianism not only justifies the 
nation’s creation but also served to block any effort that might be attempted to return 
to the Indian fold.   
The second was a continuing rivalry with India and her diplomatic 
achievements. India’s skill in extracting aid from all quarters without incurring any 
commitments; her massive industrial advance with its military implications, and her 
ability to achieve a responsible form of democracy were sufficient for the 
development of envious feelings in the Pakistani Army. The fear of Indian intentions 
to re-integrate Pakistan was just an excuse and a curtain behind which such feelings 
were masked.  
The third and last factor was a profound attachment to Islam. It was a unifying 
factor and a refuge from the appalling conditions in which the masses of Pakistan 
lived without any encouragement towards self-improvement. It also inspired a healthy 
dislike and distrust of Communism.13 But this proved a bluff in successive years when 
successive leaders sidelined Islam, avoiding constituting religion as a basic principle 
of the country’s constitution. The country, sought in the name of Islam, was governed 
as a secular state.  
All three factors contributed to institutional animosity of the Pakistan Army 
against India. However, Islam remained a political slogan only. Ayub Khan’s era 
proved the last nail in the coffin of the Islamisation of Pakistan. Islam was limited to a 
‘healthy dislike and distrust of communism’. J.M.C James, a British diplomat in 
Karachi, remarked: 
 
Pakistan like other Muslim countries was plagued by the patent 
inadequacy for modern purposes of the social side of Islam. It also 
suffered from its share of reactionary, heresy-hunting and Christian-
baiting Muslim divines – “the turbaned kind”, as Gertrude Bell once 
called them, “whom I would like to seal into a bottle.14 
 
Because Pakistan came into being as a result of a political rivalry between the 
INC and the Muslim League, and because Islam did not suit a modern state such as 
Pakistan, it was proving a hard task to construct a satisfying national identity for the 
country. Islam was kept as a slogan for the creation of Pakistan. The nascent State did 
                                                 




not care for Muslim unity of the Subcontinent or that it was not Islam which was to be 
the bottom-line of the country’s creation in future. Had it been the case, more than 
half of the Muslim population would not have been left in post-partition India. Islam 
never remained a vital sign of the country’s national character in forthcoming history. 
Pakistan proved to be a Muslim majority state with secular governance. This secular 
tendency facilitated the nation’s rapprochement with Western allies rather than the 
Muslim world. 
The refusal to accept India’s stability, and political and economic development 
was in itself a weakening factor in the political fabric of Pakistan and a strong 
argument to make Pakistan a security-oriented state with its defence of paramount 
importance. Fear of India forced Pakistan to join US sponsored military alliances. 
This resulted in the rise of military leadership as a national political actor. Army rule 
was proclaimed in 1958 due to insecurity from the Eastern borders, but it was also a 
fact that the army was already ready to rule the country having gained from the US 
military support. 
 
2.3 Civil and Military Relations 
 
Civil and military relations always remained the hub of domestic politics in 
Pakistan. A fragile political government is always at the mercy of the military. It 
needs to woo support of the military in order to bolster its political position. This 
paves the way for military interference in the political affairs of the government. Just 
after independence in 1947, the civilian government of Pakistan increasingly relied on 
the military bureaucracy to solve the problems of partition, notably the dilemma of 
how to re-settle the millions of refugees.15 The more a government is dependent on 
the military for management of the country, the less is its ability to exercise its control 
over its army. The dependency handicaps the ability of the government to take a 
political initiative. Yet weak governments always seek support of the Army to make 
political policies. This has the effect of weakening them further. 
The heavy dependency of the government on the military to sustain its 
legitimacy results in four problems. Firstly, it exposes the weaknesses of the 
government which encourages military commanders to play an undue role in the 
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policy making process. As they are the supporters of a weak government, they find 
themselves part and parcel of the ruling Junta and hence obliged to provide input from 
time to time. This, after some time, is adopted as an institutionalized practice. For a 
military leadership, such a period is like a nursery where it can learn lessons of 
governing a country. In the meantime, the security of the country becomes more 
important than its governance. Therefore, the defence budget swells more than the 
national budget. The weak governing Junta has either to submit to the strong 
opposition or to agree with the military’s diktat. In the political arena, people usually 
become egoistic, and, hence, they choose the latter. Pakistan’s first decade was the 
story of such a problem. With independence in 1947, war clouds loomed over the 
subcontinent. The first Indo-Pak war occurred in 1948. A country born along with war 
made politicians security-oriented. They invited the military to shoulder with them the 
responsibility of defending the country. The military found the opportunity to prove 
that the security of the country lay not with politicians but with soldiers. While 
working with politicians, they judged the hollowness of political institutions. With 
preference of security over governance, ‘the military [emerged] as a source of 
stability’.16 Secondly, the dependency of government on the military encourages the 
latter to take control of the country. In this way, the army runs the country according 
to the security parameters required by external defence. Thirdly, such dependency 
also gives a very inferior picture of politicians who for their vested interests remain 
busy in leg pulling. Their divisiveness and weaknesses add to the political influence 
of the army. From a soldier’s point of view, it becomes an immediate threat to the 
survival of a country.17  Fourthly and finally, as it is a matter of governance and 
endurance, the army deems it a threat and considers it their moral and professional 
duty to ‘defend the motherland’ by taking reins of government into its own hands.  
Against the background of these four problems, politicians seek support of the 
military to remove a civilian/ elected regime. This brings a weak group of people into 
the government backed by the strong national army. This weakens democracy in the 
country. In a third world country, weak democracy means more chances of a military 
takeover. The military’s position is already very strong as every state is confronted 
                                                 
16 For more theoretical details, see Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), pp.201-202; also Adam Przeworski and Fernando 
Lomingi, ‘Political Regimes and Economic Growth’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 7, 
no.3, summer 1993, p.55. 
17 Interview with Brigadier (Rtd) Inam-ul-Haq Afridi, (Peshawar, 20-06-07) 
 53 
with serious security problems. It boosts the bargaining power of the military vis-à-vis 
politicians. If the insecurity-phobia is enhanced, the military top-brass influences the 
foreign and domestic policy of the country at their whims. Hence, democratic political 
institutions are weakened, politicians are cornered and the military rules the country in 
letter and spirit. 
 
2.4 Weak Democratic Institutions 
 
Any fruitful analysis of the weak evolution of democratic institutions in Pakistan 
requires a discussion about how provincial politics proceeded with respect to the 
Central government. In this context, it is useful to explore how provincial leaders 
carried out their political activities in their respective provinces. This is done by 
following here the examples of the Punjab and the North-West Frontier Province 
(NWFP). East Pakistan is not dicussed here as it had very strong provincial 
democratic institutions. Unfortunately Easterners were discriminated against by the 
Pakistan Army. This will be discussed in the last three chapters of this thesis.  
 
2.4.1 The Punjab 
 
In Punjab, provincial politics was a blunt demonstration of stubbornness by 
local politicians. Every day, an inconsequential event shook the province. The crisis 
of instability started ‘on November 3, 1948 when the Governor Sir Francis Mudie 
suddenly announced that he accepted the resignation of the Cabinet of Punjab Chief 
Minister Khan Iftikhar Mamdot and charged him to form a new cabinet in accordance 
with the instructions received from the Governor General of Pakistan’. The 
announcement threw the Mamdot Cabinet into complete chaos as none of them had 
even contemplated submitting their resignations.18 The resignation had been forced 
upon Mamdot after three telephone calls, a sharp note and a summon to the 
Government House. In the Government House, the decision to widen and strengthen 
his team was taken, by getting rid of the notoriously corrupt and inefficient Sheikh 
Karamat Ali, the Minister of Education and Industries, and the inclusion of ‘better 
men’. However, Mamdot was too lethargic to make any change to his Cabinet. 
                                                 
18  American Consulate General Lahore to the Secretary of State, Washington DC, November 17, 1948, 
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Archives and Record Administration (henceforth NARA). 
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Karamat was the only minister who stood by him in the early summer cabinet crisis 
which resulted in the resignation of two other ministers, Daultana and Shaukat Hyat.19  
Daultana and Shaukat Hyat were very strong members of his cabinet, over-shadowing 
Mamdot’s persona as the Chief Minister. 
Instead of setting his house in order, reducing the number of men of little 
talent and getting rid of notorious people like Karamat from his cabinet, Mamdot 
started a series of journeys to Karachi.  He wanted to gain the support of the Centre 
via Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. He was accompanied by five editors from the 
leading Urdu papers of Lahore. The support of the newspapers was a very effective 
tool for blackmailing or pressurizing a public office or a political party.  His goal was 
to ease the pressure on his government. Khan Mamdot’s tactic of masterly inaction 
worked in as much as Governor Mudie was unable to keep up with him owing to the 
effects of an operation. Khan was to keep his cabinet intact except for Karamat Ali 
who would be replaced by the speaker of the West Punjab Assembly. Interestingly, 
the Speaker had already stated publicly that he would not accept a place in the 
Cabinet, preferring to remain as the Speaker, a slightly less arduous job as the 
Assembly had not met for over six months. In effect, Khan picked Chaudhry Fazl-e-
Elahi,20 a 44 year old lawyer from Gujrat in the Rawalpindi District to replace 
Karamat.21  
The Punjab was practising person-oriented politics. Khan Mamdot had a very 
strong grip on the organization of the Provincial Punjab Muslim League, and he was, 
therefore, too strong to be ignored by the wider government of Pakistan. He inherited 
such a hold on the party from his father’s friendship with Jinnah. Jinnah, until his 
death, ‘through political gratitude to the Mamdot family for early support of the 
Muslim League, continually defended Mamdot’. There was immense pressure from 
the Centre to include two new ministers, Malik Feroz Khan Noon and Mian Mumtaz 
Daultana. But they may have proved too strong, too intelligent, and too independent if 
they removed Mamdot as they would undoubtedly try to do. Both of them were from 
the business class rather than landed gentry. However, it was precisely on the 
Zamindars that the Muslim League depended for funds and support. Mamdot ran the 
party as his personal property. No one cared for party discipline within the Muslim 
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League. Every one was waiting for a mistake to be committed by the leader so that 
those in junior positions could exploit it. Noon and Daultana issued declarations 
against Mamdot to the press giving their side of the story. They also claimed to 
represent the common man by accentuating patriotism, nationalism and their love for 
Islam. Daultana compassionately stated: 
 
Six months ago I left the Mamdot Cabinet because I could not see eye to 
eye with its head about certain fundamental matters. I considered his lack 
of policy, his weakness and hesitation, his casualness in shelving vital 
matters, such as the rehabilitation of refugees, the reform of blatant 
economic injustice, etc.  
 
After a recital of the recent manoeuvres Daultana continued: 
  
Therefore it is my duty as it is the duty of every citizen of Pakistan to 
demand from their Ministry an improvement in their present slipshod, 
inefficient and unrighteous methods of work. Full pressure of public 
opinion must be exerted to remedy and suggest improvement in the 
mechanism of Government. …Masses must be enthused and organized to 
stand impregnable against any threat to their national existence. … It is 
our duty to plan boldly and with imagination and in a spirit of economic 
justice and social equality which would be worthy of Islam.22 
 
Noon in a similar tone also criticised Mamdot: 
 Iftikhar Hussain [Mamdot] as a person deserves no loyalty or cooperation 
from anyone. My having consented to serve in his cabinet [in the past] 
was inspired solely by the desire to serve the MAN IN THE STREET and 
not Iftikhar Hussain who only six months ago was told by the Quaid-e-
Azam that he was unfit to hold the office.23  
 
According to Governor Mudie, Mamdot’s only quality was ‘a sort of low animal 
cunning’. Internal wrangling and the incompetence of  leadership was apparent from 
their approach of opposition for the sake of opposition.  
    The matter of the West Punjab cabinet moved to the forefront of the 
political agenda once more at a critical moment of party elections. On November 28th 
1948, Mian Mumtaz Khan Daultana was elected as President of the West Punjab 
Muslim League. The election was fairly close and some fancy finagling had been 
done to produce the result. At the last moment Abdussatar Khan Niazi, Convenor and 
candidate of the Khilafat-e-Pakistan group (also known as The Shariat Law Party) 
withdrew his candidacy in favour of Daultana. Niazi persuaded his group to support 




him ‘as the League organization should not be allowed to play second fiddle to a 
lethargic Ministry which requires close vigilance by the parent organization’. The 
opposing candidate, Alauddin Siddiqui, claimed that the contest reflected the ‘eternal 
conflict between the rich and the poor and the regime of the feudal lords must end’. In 
any case the Provincial League Council gave Daultana 198 votes to 176 for Siddiqui. 
42 members of the West Punjab Legislative Assembly, who were ex-officio members 
of the Council voted for Daultana and only 22 legislators favoured his rival.24 
Daultana's cause was also favoured by a blast from Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, leftist 
proprietor of the newspaper the Pakistan Times.25 Mian remained the president of the 
League last year but was also blamed with the misuse of the party’s funds. Therefore, 
he called for an impartial enquiry, which of course was calculated to hit Siddiqui, who 
had been Secretary General of the League the previous year.   
Voting is only one way to measure political sympathies. It may in fact be a 
poor way under a majoritarian system where there is evidence of tactical personalized 
voting. One individual’s political stubbornness supersedes others. The election of 
Daultana decidedly moved the Mamdot Cabinet to the forefront. His election proved 
that Mamdot had lost his grip on provincial legislators and in the League council. 
Such internal squabbling was a fact but also the beginning of the loss of the 
politicians’ prestige. Everyone knew that Mandoot, Daultana, Siddiqui, and Mian 
were sycophants. Their immature aptitude gave a weak political picture. The Pakistan 
Times in its 29th November 1948 editorial gave a detailed note of their inefficiency. It 
stated: ‘If one is an embodiment of inaction and the fountainhead of inefficiency the 
other is a past master in intrigue and an artist in political chicanery’. Complaining that 
neither faction had any definite program or political objective other than personal 
preferment the editorial goes on, ‘The unsuccessful candidate had no political past of 
any description to boost of except the reflected ingloriousness brought on his head by 
the Mamdot ministry. As for the new Provincial President his conduct during the last 
year leaves the most unpredictable chameleon in the shade…’. Out of the two 
discredited factions, one was already in possession of the provincial government. And 
the other was in possession of the Provincial Party. The former made an effort to 
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capture both and failed which was a good thing. The latter managed to step into the 
breach which was a bad thing. Neither politics, nor people had a look in’. Editorial 
sums up its disgust by saying, ‘And now in the words of the philosopher-bard, 
‘Whither should thy simple hearted folk turn, O Lord?26 
 
There is much that can be criticised, not least that national politics and identity were 
more malleable than personal or provincial identity imply and that national identities 
and political behaviour did not so neatly intersect. 
 
2.4.2 The NWFP 
 
The situation in NWFP was not much different from the Punjab. NWFP was the 
province where, in the name of patriotism and loyalty to Pakistan, the opposition was 
purged on a vast scale. A bill of Frontier Public Safety (FPS) was passed by the 
Provincial Assembly on 20th October 1948. According to Chief Minister (CM) Abdul 
Qayyum Khan ‘the measure was not aimed at curtailing the civil liberties of the 
people, but to see that these liberties were properly used’. However, FPS was passed 
in order to deal with anti-Pakistan activities carried out by Ghaffar Khan and his Red 
Shirt Organization (Sur-Posh). Due to their anti-Pakistan activities and pro-Congress 
stance, Sur-Posh were arrested on a mass scale. They still believed in the one-nation 
theory and were carrying on propaganda for a united India with an autonomous entity 
of Pakhtoonistan.27 Their non-acceptance of Pakistan can be judged from the fact that 
Ghaffar Khan openly described Pakistan as a ‘bridge of sand’. Hence, Sur-Posh 
members were purged in the name of Pakistan. CM Qayyum Khan stated that as soon 
as the Government feels an appreciable change in the attitude of Sur-Posh, they would 
be brought out of jails.28  
Qayyum Khan’s hostile attitude towards Sur-Posh mustered hatred not only 
for himself but also for the entire country. The nationalist Sur-Posh conceived the 
Muslim League, Pakistan and the State as a single, unified entity which had resulted 
                                                 
26 The Pakistan Times, November 29, 1948, NAI. 
27 US Consulate, Lahore, 1949-61, NND 765024, October 29, 1948. 
28 The Civil and Military Gazette, October 20, 1948, NAI. 
 58 
in the marginalization of their political role. One of the family members of Ghaffar 
Khan (henceforth called OFMGK),29 while elaborating this point, said:  
 
Bacha Khan30 was not against the country but he had difference of 
opinion with Muslim League as a party and its leadership and it was his 
democratic and birth right to keep a difference of opinion. But 
unfortunately, recently Pakistan was created and the nationalism and party 
were the governing points of rulers. They considered the Muslim League 
and Pakistan one and the same thing. Like Bacha Khan, anyone talking 
against Jinnah was a traitor. Anyone having a different opinion from the 
Muslim League was actually differing from Pakistan and its sovereignty 
and eventually he was declared an Indian Agent.31  
 
The dominance of single party rule boosted the rulers’ confidence in relying 
upon the military. Their leaning towards the military made them addicted to the 
notion that one had to use military generals to sustain democracy. It was a paradox. 
This notion was criticised by OFMGK when he commented on his grandfather’s 
policies: 
  
Bacha Khan wanted a profound system based on democracy and evolution 
and not static as was the case with those days Pakistan and its leadership. 
He was scared that soon such a static system would collapse. National 
leaders were not mustering support from the people but from the Armed 
forces. The country was tilting more towards national security provided 
by the military than to the security provided by the democracy. Very soon 
the time came when a serving general was given a seat in the Cabinet. 
Bacha Khan was against all such mess. Look! Eventually, what 
happened? Politics was usurped by military Junta for decades to come and 
the country was broken into two pieces, later on, in 1971.32  
  
Although it could be argued that OFMGK’s statements indicate his political 
metamorphosis before 1988, when he and his family joined the provincial government 
of NWFP, his argument is an adequate commentary on the divergent political views 
of politicians. His comments are just the opposite to what Ghaffar Khan, his 
grandfather, demonstrated and practised during Pakistan’s early period. Ghaffar Khan 
opposed the creation of Pakistan, and he asked his followers to abstain in the 
                                                 
29 Interview with One of the Family Members of Ghaffar Khan (henceforth OFMGK). The name of the 
interviewee is kept concealed due to political reasons. This interview was conducted in Pashto. 
(Charsadda, 17-02-07). 
30 Ghaffar Khan was affectionately called ‘Bacha Khan’ by the people of  the NWFP. 
31 Interview with OFMGK, (Charsadda, 17-02-07). 
32 Ibid. 
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referendum held to decide whether Pathans wished to join Pakistan or India. He 
wanted a third choice: independence.33 
The nationalist Sur-Posh found CM Qayyum Khan’s denunciation of them 
vindictive. OFMGK expressed his reservation about Qayyum Khan’s intention to 
reduce the gap between Jinnah and Bacha Khan. He was of the view that the Muslim 
League tried to impose itself in NWFP where already the nationalists were in the 
majority. Leaguers were trying to convert the Sur-Posh majority into a minority- a 
sham practice against the true spirit of democracy. He says: 
 
I remember Bacha Khan saying that there was a time when Jinnah during 
his visit to Peshawar showed his desire to visit Charsadda. The spirit 
behind such desire was to have direct negotiations with Bacha Khan. 
Bacha Khan was also informed of this development. He replied ‘Pa 
Duwaro Istargo’ (Come on my both eyes), ‘Harkala Rasha’ (Most 
Welcome). ‘Arrangements of his visit got final. My Mom said that she 
had already prepared very traditional home-made food for Jinnah and his 
delegation. But no one knew what happened that at the nick of time, the 
visit stood cancelled.  
My (OFMGK) father says that ‘that was the moment of frustration’. 
  
OFMGK further says: 
It was CM Qayyum Khan who stood between Jinnah and Ghaffar Khan 
[Bacha Khan]. Had there been a breaking of ice, there would have been a 
marginal role for Qayyum Khan in the Provincial politics. The nationalists 
were in majority. In case of relaxation of tension between the nationalists 
and Jinnah, Qayyum Khan had to wind up his shop of politics. After 
cancellation of Jinnah’s visit to Charsadda, distances increased further and 
misunderstandings took birth in shape of Pakhtoonistan which furthered 
the space between Karachi and Charsadda. Thus the idea of Pakhtoonistan 
turned into a full-fledged movement. 
 
OFMGK thought that the Muslim League was a pseudo-party that had no roots in the 
masses. According to him it was the party of elites and opportunists. He says:  
 
If I speak more broadly, the Muslim League, after partition, was a party 
confined to Karachi. With the partition, League had lost its power base in 
India. East Pakistan was under the charismatic leadership of Suhrawardy. 
Punjab was a province which had always welcomed the successive rulers. 
Punjabi had the instinct to follow. He was not a good leader but a great 
follower. From the Sikhs down to the Mughals era, they always welcomed 
                                                 
33 Richard V. Weekes, Pakistan: Birth and Growth of a Muslim Nation, (New York: The Asia Society, 
1964), p.246. 
 60 
every newcomer. Therefore, I can’t say that the Muslim League was also 
famous in the Punjab. Punjabis were ready to mint as much benefit from 
the Muslim League as possible and the reason was it was not only a 
political party but also a governing party right from the inception of 
Pakistan. 
 
During the entire interview, OFMGK was very contemptuous and cynical 
towards Punjabis. He thought the creation of Pakistan a Punjabi conspiracy to govern 
and impose its rule on the rest of the Muslim-majority provinces. A somewhat similar 
opinion was expressed by the American Consulate General in Lahore in 1949 who on 
returning from a visit to NWFP said, ‘Pathans already complain that Pakistan seems 
to have been created for the benefit of the Punjabis’.34 OFMGK’s views were 
representative of the nationalists’ belief in the Punjabis’ dominance and military’s 
governance. Pakistan was composed of provinces which were not trusting each other. 
If Pakhtoons were traitors for Punjabis, Punjabis were conspiring to govern the entire 
country without giving rights to other provinces.  
Before examining the politics of the Centre in Pakistan in detail, the 
Pakhtoonistan issue needs close examination. It will be relevant to highlight this issue 
here as much of its inspiration was received from Charsadda Wali Bagh, the residence 




Pakhtoonistan35 is the idea and demand of an independent country constituting the 
Pakhtoon dominated areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan lying on both sides of the 
Durand line (the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan).36 Sur-Posh believed that 
their Pakhtoon motherland was divided in 1893 by drawing a boundary line between 
British India and Afghanistan. The ultimate demand was the union of both parts of the 
Pakhtoon areas and an autonomous status independent of Pakistan.  
During the independence movement in the subcontinent, the Pathanistan37 cry 
was first raised by Gandhi, who tried at the time of partition to persuade Lord 
                                                 
34 US Consulate, Lahore, 1949-61, NND 765024, February 25, 1949, NARA. 
35 See map of Pakhtoonistan on page 73, www.khyber.org. 
36 O’Dwyer, India As I Knew It, p.104. 
37 Pukhtoonistan, Pushtoonistan, and Pathanistan is one and the same thing. Different spellings have 
been used in different places. Therefore, they have been used as it is. 
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Mountbatten that a Pathan State should be established.38  A close associate of Bacha 
Khan and a veteran Sur-Posh leader, Baz Muhammad Khan says:  
 
There was a well-defined understanding between Gandhi and Bacha Khan 
for the establishment of Pukhtoonistan. Both leaders discussed the issue 
numerous times on several occasions. Gandhi always had this idea that a 
divided or undivided India would be accompanied by an Independent 
Pakhtoonistan. The Big Partition occurred but unfortunately, no Pukhtoon 
State was created.39  
 
Pakhtoonistan was not only a cry from Sur-Posh of NWFP. People living in 
the Pakhtoon ethnic-majority areas in Afghanistan were equally demanding a separate 
land for Pakhtoons living on both sides of the Durand line. According to them, the 
Pakhtoonistan boundary stretched to the border line between NWFP and the Punjab 
Province, i.e. Attock.40 When, in 1949, the US Consulate General, Hooker A., 
Doolittle, asked Arbab Sher Ali Khan, headman or malik of the Khalil tribe of the 
Lower Mohmads, what Afghans had in their mind for NWFP, he replied, ‘They want 
Attock’.41 Attock was and is a great bridge across the Indus River where one leaves 
the Punjab and crosses over into the NWFP. However, historically, the Pakistan Army 
always rejected such a demand. This can be substantiated by a conversation quoted 
from an archival document. While discussing Pathanistan theory in 1949 at the home 
of Major General Muhammad Yusuf, the new Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan forces 
in the NWFP, himself an Afridi from Kohat, the remark was passed amid general  
                                                 
38 Memo, Sir Zafrullah Khan Foreign Minister of Pakistan in a meeting with NEA. Mr. McGhee, April 
5, 1950, Box 12, Lot 54D341. 
39 Interview with Baz Mohammad Khan, a senior nationalist leader of Khudai Khidmatgar, (Akora 
Khattak, January 25, 2007). 
40 Interview with Musa Khan Shinwari, an Afghan asylum seeker in London, (12-12-2008). 
41 US Consulate, Lahore, 1949-61, February 25, 1949, NARA. 
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2.1 The Pakhtoonistan Map 
(This map shows Pakistan’s western border which it shares with Afghanistan. 
Gray area signifies Pakhtoon populated territory on both sides of the 
Durandline) 
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laughter that ‘Afghanistan could accede to Pakistan any time they wished’.42 
General Yusuf’s comment was the official reaction to the question of 
Pashtoonistan. Sur-Posh strongly supported the idea of unification with 
Afghanistan and the creation of Pashtoonistan, by joining Afghanistan rather 
than vice versa. They used to say, Khyber kho yo talo ratlo layara da, pakhtoon 
duwaro taraf yo da43 (Khyber Pass is merely a way but the Pakhtoons on both 
sides are the same).  
It was Ghaffar Khan’s non-violence movement and true affinity with the cause 
of Pakhtoonistan that earned him the title of ‘Frontier Gandhi’ and ‘Bacha Khan’. 
Phillips Talbot, head of the American Mission to India, on his return from a visit to 
NWFP gave his wonderful reaction about Bacha Khan: 
 
Noble-faced Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the man who taught the Gandhian 
principles of non-violence to so many rifle-carrying Pathans, directs the 
Servants of God with the peculiarly personal guidance that is 
characteristic of Indian leadership. With his brother Dr. Khan Sahib, the 
Congress premier of the Frontier Province, he long ago became the 
nationalist spokesman of the Frontier, to be seriously challenged by 
Indians only when the Muslim League grew strong. His burning statement 
against British is matched only by his devotion to Gandhi. It is odd to see 
this giant of a man, broad-shouldered, long-legged, and physically hard, 
sitting next to the little, and stooped, unhandsome ascetic. Yet probably 
the central Gandhian ideal has few more devoted supporters than the man 
who himself came to be called the Frontier Gandhi44. 
 
Pakhtoons of NWFP were nationalists but very sensitive towards their 
religion. ‘The moment communal violence erupted in India in 1946-47, League 
politicians in NWFP stimulated Muslim clannishness’. In the name of Islam, they 
turned pro-Pakistan while remaining nationalist. They had an instinct for religion. 
They believed in the fundamentalist Islamic doctrine. The whole Pathan community 
was agitated by the Muslim massacre in general and the deaths of Pathan labourers in 
particular. Stories of Muslim victims in Bengal intensified the anti-Hindu upsurge. 45 
With people in this mood, the Frontier Muslim League found a great opportunity to 
convince people against Congress – ‘a Hindu Party’. It was the religion-card that 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Interview with Khaista Khan, a veteran nationalist local leader (Peshawar, 10-02-2007). 
44  Phillips Talbot, American Mission Bahawalpur House, India (henceforth AMBHI), to Walter S. 
Rogers, Box 12, Lot 54D341, November 30, 1946. 
45 Interview with Khaista Khan. 
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played its role during the referendum of 1947 in NWFP. ‘Strangely, people, while 
remaining Pakhtoon nationalist as well as Congressite, cast their vote in favour of 
Pakistan’. In the entire province of NWFP, Pir Sahib of Manky Sharif was in the 
forefront to use religion for gaining pro-Pakistan sentiments’.46 His cry was very 
simple, but direct and blunt: Islam is in danger. Muslims will be slaves in the Hindu 
Raj. Organize before you are crushed.47 A spiritual leader like the Pir of Manky knew 
the Pakhtoons’ weakness for religion which he fully exploited for the Pakistan cause. 
He had a growing army of disciplined Pakhtoons. But unlike Sur-Posh, they were 
violent followers. ‘It was a rumour in those days that the attack on Nehru was 
organized and planned by his followers in the Malakand Agency. Khan Abdul Wali 
Khan (son of Ghaffar Khan) was a strong believer of this theory’.48  
A religious nationalist nation decided to go for Pakistan without giving any 
attention to its western borders with Afghanistan. In the referendum in 1947, the 
people of NWFP decided to join Pakistan.49 Afghanistan exploited common language, 
culture and ethnicity to attract NWFP as part of its mega project – Greater 
Pakhtoonistan. King Zahir Shah demanded that the people of NWFP be given a 
choice of independence besides options of joining India or Pakistan in the referendum 
held in 1947,50 but all such efforts from across the western border failed. None of the 
three stakeholders in the Subcontinent, Hindus, Muslims or British, were interested in 
listening to King Shah.  
When the Afghan administration failed to score marks in having a say in the 
referendum of 1947 in NWFP, they demanded ‘a reasonable degree of autonomy’ for 
the Pushto-speaking peoples of Pakistan without fragmentation of either Pakistan or 
Afghanistan. Later on, ‘it could have been accompanied by real elements of 
rapprochement and cooperation, such as Customs Union, a common system of 
defence, and the fullest degree of cultural and economic cooperation between 
Afghanistan and the autonomous portion [tribal areas of NWFP] of Pakistan. Such 
cooperation would be a strong bulwark against the advance of Soviet interests in that 
                                                 
46 Interview with Baz Mohammad Khan. 
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48 Interview with Khaista Khan. 
49 HO 421/2, NAL. Also ‘The Referendum in NWFP 1947: A Documentary Record’, Compiled by 
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area’.51 It appeared that the Afghans wanted to avoid an assimilation of Pathans into 
Pakistan. This could have been possible by the establishment of ‘Pathanistan’ which 
might eventually join forces with Afghanistan due to its proximity, common language, 
culture, and race and make the latter a strong power in the area. In this case there 
would be a complete redefinition of Afghan hegemony and interests; it was indeed an 
anti-Pakistan idea with an emphesis on a strong Afghanistan as a buffer against 
USSR. At the same time, ‘a reasonable degree of autonomous Pushtoonistan’ would 
also be a buffer between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghans had gone to such an 
extent that they wanted ‘a distinct entity and identity’ and ‘complete political and 
administrative autonomy’ for territory West of the Indus river comprising NWFP, the 
Northern part of Baluchistan, including the Khyber Pass, Peshawar and Quetta (see 
map of Pashtoonistan on page 62). They also wanted the Government of Pakistan to 
give the Pathans ‘a free hand to conduct their relations with Afghanistan’. While 
having a meeting with Afghan Representative, Najibullah, Jinnah urged the prompt 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, saying that 
any issue between the two nations could be sorted out later on via diplomatic 
channels. Najibullah still insisted on assurances that an autonomous Pathan State 
would be created eventually. Jinnah during an official meeting disclosed that 
Najibullah wanted his government to be in a position to tell the tribes that Afghanistan 
had gained a victory over Pakistan, and that the creation of a Pathan State was wholly 
due to the efforts of Afghanistan. Hence, during his meeting with Najibullah, Jinnah 
flatly rejected the idea of a Pathan State.52 Due to ethnic affiliation, any such 
Pakhtoon State would have been a parasite and a satellite state of Afghanistan. 
Strangely, a country formed in the name of nationalism was asked to rip itself apart 
for the benefit of others. The Muslim League was already very sensitive towards its 
territory and nationalism. Such demands were like a joke for them.   
Great powers had their own policies towards Afghanistan and its sponsored 
issue of Pukhtoonistan. British policy regarding the Durand Line was very clear. 53 
They considered it ‘an international boundary’ and any negotiation on such a non- 
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issue was a waste of time for them.54 However, the Americans were very hesitant to 
discuss the issue. When Sir Zafrullah pointedly asked the US Assistant Secretary of 
State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs Mr. George C. McGhee, 
‘Are you prepared to support the British view; are you prepared to express a view 
about the Durand Line?’, Mr. McGhee replied, ‘We are not prepared to do so at this 
time’.55 Similarly, on another occasion, Sir Zafrullah asked the Director of South 
Asian Affairs Division Mr. Elbert Mathews about the policy of the State Department 
as to the recognition of the Durand Line as a valid international frontier. Instead of a 
direct reply, he gave a very vague answer by saying, ‘the point of difference between 
the US and Pakistan in this connection was that the US had much greater hope that 
discussions between Afghanistan and Pakistan would lead to a good result’.56 Such an 
unclear answer reflected that the US policy makers tried to keep everyone happy to 
counter and contain their sole enemy, the USSR. At the least, they wanted 
Afghanistan to be a buffer state between Pakistan and USSR and therefore a vague 
policy on the Durand Line was the prerequisite for any such whim.  
Like the US, India had a very confusing policy towards Pukhtoonistan. 
Mostly, its support for Pukhtoonistan was a source of encouragement for ‘Charsadda 
Wali Bagh’.57 But Indian Ambassador to the US, Mr Asif Ali considered the 
controversy over the status of the Durand Line a joke. He termed it a permanent 
border dividing Afghanistan from the Northwest Province [NWFP].58  
The issue of Pakhtoonistan took a turn in the mid-fifties when Afghan 
diplomats in Karachi talked about a federation of the two countries. They expressed 
the desirability of the federation of the two countries, expressing their willingness for 
the moment to drop the Pushtunistan issue but the Afghan representative in Karachi, 
Mr. Atik, strangely asked Sir Zafrullah that the idea of federation not be made public 
and that Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to maintain a public posture of 
unfriendliness with exchange of hostile radio propaganda, etc.59 Indeed, it was 
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incomprehensible and a difficult basis on which to make real progress in terms of 
cultivating friendly relations between the two nations. On one hand, such desire in 
terms of making a federation and, on the other, continuing hostile propaganda was 
inexplicable. Eccentric Afghan demands went further when on 12th October 1954 
Prince Naim of Afghanistan met with Henry Cabot Lode, the US representative in the 
UN, and expressed his country’s desire for Afghanistan’s merger with Pakistan. Even 
a day before, Prince Aly Khan met with Mr. Lode and told him in the utmost secrecy 
that the merger of Afghanistan and Pakistan was all agreed to and would soon be 
made known.60  But in view of Pakistan’s Foreign Office, ‘it would be better to start 
with a more modest approach – for example cooperation in some joint economic and 
scientific progress. Pakistanis believed that Afghanistan still required stability for 
such a great policy step’ of federation or merger of the two countries.61  
The Government of Pakistan was ready to take any deal or to go to any extent 
to secure territorial integrity vis-à-vis Afghanistan. Pakistani PM M. Ali, during a 
meeting with the US ambassador Hildreth, said that ‘if Afghan Government would 
publicly renounce claims to territorial or sovereign rights in the Pushtoonistan area, 
Karachi might even agree to the use of the name Pushtoonistan [for the province of 
NWFP and tribal areas], as desired by Kabul’. This was in response to the Afghan 
Minister Atiq’s meeting with Ambassador Hildreth saying that ‘Afghanistan was 
willing to confirm publicly, and in writing, that it had no territorial claims on the 
area’.62 If Atiq was speaking with the authority of his government, rather than 
personally, there was hope for the settlement of this seven-year-old dispute. However, 
there is no record of any such statement in any of the papers in Pakistan’s Foreign 
Office, nor was it made directly to Pakistani government. But the concession of using 
the name Pakhtoonistan for the tribal areas clearly specified that the tribal territory 
would definitely remain under Pakistan’s jurisdiction.  
Afghanistan added a new dimension to the Pakistan Army’s threat perception 
in the name of Pushtoonistan. Issues such as Pushtoonistan and Kashmir were 
sufficient to provide a security threat to the Army. Hence, with the inception of 
Pakistan, security became of paramount importance for policy makers and 
practitioners. 
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Examples like Punjab, NWFP and issues like Pushtoonistan turned political 
harmony into turmoil. Inter and intra-provincial harmony was the needs of the time, 
but provincial leadership was shining only with provincial prejudice. Divergent and 
minor regional interests and prejudices restrained politicians from taking a unified 
stand on Pakistan. It made the political fabric too weak to combat other internal 
undemocratic forces aspiring to govern the country.  
 
2.6 FEDERATION vs. THE PAKISTAN ARMY 
 
The post-Jinnah period was dominated by Liaquat Ali Khan who drew powers to the 
office of the Prime Minister. Khan was accentuating unity, the enduring establishment 
of Pakistan, its character as an Islamic State and its defence. This was in order to 
inspire a feeling that he was the spiritual heir of the Quaid-e-Azam and that he was 
trying to instil the public with the same feelings of nationalism and loyalty to the 
nation. He was second to Jinnah. Therefore, after his death, Khan could either become 
Governor General or strengthen his office of Prime Minister. He went for the latter. 
The choice of Nazimuddin for the office of Governor General also permitted him to 
keep control of the reins of power and exercise his talent as an administrator. The role 
of Governor General became dormant after Jinnah while that of Prime Minister 
became active. Khan had the opportunity to practice political management as well. 
His top priority was defence. While visiting Lahore on 30th September 1948, during a 
meeting with Governor Sir Francis Modie, Khan gave assurances to the Armed 
Services Chiefs that, if necessary, the 70% of revenue now absorbed by those forces 
would be raised to 100%.He also told Sir Modie that ‘he had no intention of being 
pushed into any adventures by public clamour’ and that ‘before such a thing could 
happen he would resign’.63  On another occasion, Liaquat Ali Khan said: ‘the defence 
of the state is our foremost consideration. It dominates all other governmental 
activities’.64 
Liaquat Ali Khan, after assassination in October 1951,65 was succeeded by 
Khawaja Nazimuddin. By now, Khan had drawn so much political power to the office 
of the Prime Minister that Nazimuddin was attracted to it. He left the office of 
Governor General and became the PM of the country. The post of Governor General 
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was given to a Punjabi, Ghulam Muhammad. Commenting on the situation of filling 
top offices, Zahoor Butt a veteran eye-witness of the time responds:  
 
The rift between the East and West Pakistan was getting sharper. It was 
thought that the Prime Minister office, which by than had become strong 
due to strong personality of Liaquat Ali Khan, be filled by a Bengali and 
Nazimuddin, being the senior most Muslim Leaguer, was the best 
candidate at that moment. Hence, Nazimuddin himself took lead in doing 
so. But at the same time, Punjabis were also having strong stakes in the 
Centre. Therefore, Nazimuddin appointed Ghulam Muhammad as the 
Governor General. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, a close confident of Ghulam 
Muhammad, was appointed the Minister of Finance. It was the era when 
Ghulam Muhammad was enthralled by the armed forces.66  
 
Ghulam Muhammad, like the military top-brass, was a secular-minded, Indo-phobic, 
and defence-oriented man. He was a bureaucrat from the Accounts department who 
had also formed the budget for the British Army until Partition.67 Therefore, when he 
assumed the office of Governor General, he found himself closer to like-minded 
people – the Army rather than politicians. Nazimuddin, ‘by reason of his inefficiency, 
lack of interest, and tendency to defer to elements who would like to have seen 
Pakistan turned into a reactionary and theocratic Islamic State,’68 was allowing 
Pakistan to drift dangerously, against the approach of the Governor General and the 
Army. There was already a rift between the Governor General and Nazimuddin. He 
already sniffed a kind of ‘a deep contact between the Governor General and military 
officers like Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan’. Nazimuddin like his 
predecessors was a democrat, and did not appreciate intimate links between the army 
and political institutions. ‘There had been instances when, on a couple of occasions, 
they [Nazimuddin and Ghulam Muhammad] had slight grudges about General Ayub’s 
frequent visits to the Governor General house’.69 It was on April 17, 1953 that the 
Governor General took matters into his own hands and dismissed Nazimuddin, 
making Muhammad Ali Bogra Prime Minister in his place. Nazimuddin’s biggest 
handicaps were his tilt towards Islam, his failure to keep the Muslim League united 
and a personal dislike of Ayub’s close contacts with the Governor General and not 
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with himself. ‘He was also against the Ahmadiya group and disliked Sir Zafrullah 
Khan, the Foreign Minister of his own cabinet’.70  
Nazimuddin’s contempt for Zafrullah had a history. A meeting of Anjuman 
Ahmadiya, Karachi, was advertised to be held in Jehangir Park, Karachi, on 17th and 
18th May 1952, and Zafrullahh Khan was mentioned as one of the speakers. Although 
the meeting was held under the auspices of Anjuman Ahmadiya, it was a public 
meeting as any member of the public could be present to hear the proceedings. A few 
days before the meeting, Prime Minister Nazimuddin expressed his disapproval of 
Zafrullah’s intention to attend a sectional public meeting. Zafrullah, however, told the 
PM that he was committed to the Anjuman but that, if he had been advised earlier, he 
would have refrained from attending the meeting. In view of his commitment, he said, 
he felt it his duty to speak at the meeting and that if the Prime Minister insisted on his 
not attending it, he could have his resignation.71 Thus bad blood was created between 
the two at this moment. The fact that Zafrullah was competent overrode the concerns 
that Nazimuddin had over the fact that he was from Ahmediya.  
A clear groupism was developing – at one end conservative Nazimuddin and 
at the other the secular-minded and nationalist group of people supported by the 
Army: the Gang of Four-Ghulam Muhammad, Iskander Mirza, General Ayub Khan, 
and Sir Zafrullah Khan. It was not only a like-minded group but also a pro-American 
civil-Military cluster. Later on, it became clear that Nazimuddin’s dismissal was 
planned and accomplished through the combined efforts of the Army leadership 
(specifically Defence Secretary Iskander Mirza and C-in-C Ayub Khan) and the 
Governor General himself.72 When the Governor General asked for the resignation 
from the PM and his cabinet, ‘Sir Zafrullah promptly offered his resignation’.73 Being 
a member of the Gang of Four, he had to show his loyalty more than the other 
ministers of the cabinet. While speaking with the American Charge d’Affaires, J. 
Emerson, Zafrullah said:  
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I already suspected some plan in [the] mind of [the] Governor General 
when latter inquired about his constitutional prerogatives. It became quite 
clear during augmented Cabinet session last week (attended by [the] 
Governor General at his own insistence) that change of government was 
desired.74 He also emphasised that the Governor General’s constitutional 
position was quite clear, that he had the authority under section 10 of the 
Government of India Act, which was still in force, to dismiss his ministers 
since they served “at his pleasure”.75  
 
On his dismissal, Nazimuddin immediately contacted the UK High Commissioner Sir 
Gilbert Laithwaite to request the Queen to dismiss the Governor General. Sir Gilbert 
replied that he could not intervene in this situation since his responsibility was to the 
Queen as sovereign of the UK, whereas the PM’s relationship was to the Queen as the 
Queen of Pakistan. ‘If PM desired, he could get in touch with the Queen directly’. 
Nazimuddin was then reported to have attempted to telephone the private secretary of 
the Queen in London. The American Embassy staff, Paul Hoffman and John K. 
Emmerson, Charge d’Affaires say that they had learned from other sources that the 
military had taken control of the switchboard and intercepted the PM’s attempted 
call.76 Mr. Beack, the Governor General’s Comptroller, said that Nazimuddin’s first 
words to him after he was ousted were to help him ‘find a house’.77  
The tussle between the Governor General and the PM was not just an incident 
for the time being. They had a long history of grudges and jealousy against each other. 
The Governor General had been after the PM to resign, and vice versa. The Governor 
General’s Military Secretary said that the PM (Nazimuddin) questioned Churchill as 
to what had to be done to remove a Governor General. The Military Secretary and 
Inspector of Police Adul Hassan and a reporter of The Dawn newspaper, while having 
a conversation with the US embassy staff, said that ‘if the Governor General had not 
acted, he would have found himself removed at the hands of Nazimuddin’. The 
Governor General forced the issue by acting first. Immediately a heavy military guard 
was placed at the Governor General’s residence.78  
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During all this time, the US embassy staff was very content with the 
proceedings of the crisis. This is reflected in their writings that they sent back to 
Washington. In one of its telegrams, they state, ‘Frustration which the Embassy has 
reported over the past few months grew to exasperation at weakness and vacillation of 
Nazimuddin’. The Embassy also expressed its satisfaction with the declaration of 
Martial Law in Lahore. The telegram further says: ‘Without any doubt, action by 
Iskander Mirza, in concent with Ayub Khan, to declare martial law in Lahore on 
March 6 in spite of PM’s objections saved country from what might have become a 
national disaster’. Such statements prove that the Martial Law in Lahore was not 
imposed with the consent of the civilian government. Coming back to the fall of 
Nazimuddin’s administration, although the decision to oust him was taken by the 
Governor General himself, Mirza and Ayub Khan apparently remained in close 
contact with the Governor General. Mirza kept the US embassy abreast of every 
development. Perhaps no one except Mirza and Ayub knew about the change of 
government.79  
The Easterners (people from East Pakistan) were very sensitive to acquire their 
share of power in the country. After the suspension of Nazimuddin’s ministry, the 
fundamental question affecting the development of Pakistan as a country had been the 
necessity of harmonizing and preserving a balance between the interests of the West 
and East Pakistan, separated by over 1000 miles of Indian territory. The population of 
East Pakistan (42 million) was greater than that of West Pakistan (33.5 million); 
though in geographical terms East Pakistan was much smaller.80 The economic 
interests of the two parts by no means coincided, and these differences were naturally 
reflected in the political tension at the Centre. To overcome such stress, the Governor 
General selected Muhammad Ali of Bogra, a Bengali, due in part to the Government’s 
wish to demonstrate that it represented Bengal. Over and above, he was liked by 
Washington.  
Bogra enjoyed great success as ambassador in Washington which made him 
the right person to make and discharge the foreign policy of Pakistan in closer 
military and economic accord with the US. He was known for his excessive praise of 
everything American. He was so enthusiastically pro-American that during one of his 
conversations with Dulles in Karachi the new PM jokingly acknowledged the 
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common rumour that he was ‘controlled’ by Washington.81 He brought to his office 
an awareness of world problems gained from his recent ambassadorial services 
abroad. His eager entrance into American life had supplied him with a fresh sense of 
democratic practices which could point the way for the development of Pakistan. The 
only field in which he was lagging behind was in the domestic politics of the country. 
But this was a blessing in disguise for the Gang of Four. The cabinet was selected by 
the Governor General and was gifted to the Prime Minister Bogra. Bogra had spent 
most of his political career in Bengal or as an envoy abroad. There was a sense of 
alienation prevailing between himself and his Cabinet.  
On the other hand, Ghulam Muhammad was a solid man of politics of the 
Centre. The majority of the Cabinet members were Punjabis who were always around 
the Governor General. Thus many important decisions were taken by the Governor 
General and his “kitchen cabinet”.82 Later on, such decisions were communicated to 
the Prime Minister via the Governor General.83 The scheme of the division of political 
powers between the offices of the Prime Minister and Governor General that Liaquat 
Ali Khan had created was altered. Now the Prime Minister had become a ceremonial 
head of the Cabinet while the Governor General was the most powerful entity.   
Every power struggle has its reasons and its legacies; one never disentangles 
the past from the present with ease. The power struggle of the past between 
Nazimuddin and Governor General Ghulam Muhammad repeated itself again in the 
present. This time the Army played a more confident role in the crisis. Soon the 
offices of Governor General and Prime Minister were to challenge each other’s 
authority. It was very easy to see that the government was based on two tiers: One tier 
was headed by the Prime Minister Bogra struggling to strengthen his own office. The 
other was the Governor General-Military alliance – the real power-centre. Bogra 
wanted social development, while the Governor General’s group wanted a developed 
and sophisticated army to deal with the threats from Afghanistan and India. Security 
and not economy was their priority concern. 
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 According to a CIA report, there was only one instance when the Pakistan 
Army and its officers’ confidantes realised the poor economic condition of the nation 
and thus:  
 
It [the Army] planned to reduce the army strength to between 30,000 to 
40,000 men. It was abolishing some posts in the east as high as the 
brigadier level. It granted long leaves to officers at reduced pay and was 
also reducing line of communications units and installations to the danger 
point through the discharge of troops. The Combat Units had not been 
deactivated but that their efficiency had been certainly reduced. The actual 
plan was to cut the overall military strength by about 20%.84 
 
The report was a clear indication of the seriousness of Pakistan’s economic problems. 
Such a reduction of troops also presupposes a firm government decision to take no 
military action against India over the Kashmir issue or any other question which 
might not be satisfactorily settled during the forthcoming talks between PMs Nehru 
and Bogra. Such policy of lessening forces showed the government’s willingness to 
take drastic measures to improve the situation in the region. But no such plan of 
reductions in military spending was implemented. ‘Such plans never reached to the 
GHQ for consideration. A reduction of 20% of forces was like a suicide for the 
Pakistan Army in those days’. The country was governed in the name of defence 
against India. There was a parallel government in the shape of the Pakistan Army. 
‘The military as an autonomous institution did everything it liked but analysed 
anything that the Government of Pakistan asked them to do. The army accepted any 
command from the government that fitted into their frame of reference; otherwise, the 
command was ignored outright’.85 In fact, the government was sandwiched between 
the Governor General and the GHQ, pressed from both sides. The Governor General’s 
kitchen cabinet in the shape of the Gang of Four and the autonomous nature of GHQ 
were stumbling blocks in the way of running a smooth democratic government. Prime 
Minister Bogra kept democratic principles as the highest priority of the government, 
saying that ‘we are all directly responsible to the people in the absence of a 
legislature’.86 But such emotions were contrasted by his Interior Minister Mirza’s 
statements (a member of Gang of Four):  
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The masses of this country are overwhelmingly illiterate. They are not 
interested in politics. They are bound to act foolishly sometimes… people 
of this country need controlled democracy for some time to come.87 
 
It was indeed strange that a minister of the cabinet was countering his own Prime 
Minister. Mirza, a retired military officer, was representing the Army in the 
government. Though a minister in Bogra’s cabinet, he was more answerable and 
connected to the Governor General.  
Bogra’s extensive experience of dealing with Americans was not utilized. He 
was informed and not consulted in the Pak-US relations. The army’s direct links with 
the US, supported by the Governor General, were fairly noticeable. Very soon, Bogra 
realised that he was standing nowhere as far as Pakistan’s policy towards the US was 
concerned. He was cornered by the country’s foreign affairs, and the lead was taken 
by the army and its coterie of politicians – ‘a few good men’.88 On 13th September 
1953, General Ayub Khan stated that during his visit to Washington he would discuss 
a bilateral military pact and implied that Pakistan would make military bases available 
to the US.89 This raised the question as to whether or not he was speaking for his 
government. Contrary to that, PM Bogra on 22nd September told the American 
Charge d’Affaires in Karachi: ‘General Ayub has no policy mission to carry out for 
his government when he would visit Washington on September 28’.90 The Prime 
Minister merely wished Ayub to become acquainted with American officials and to 
exchange ideas with them. The military and civilian spheres of Government were 
poles apart. Such contradictory statements were inflicting injury to the credibility of 
the PM, weakening the democratic political institutions. Similarly, many decisions 
were made and steps were taken to form policy towards the US without consulting the 
PM. General Ayub’s visit was followed by Ghulam Muhammad’s visit to Washington 
where ‘Pakistan announced its willingness to negotiate an air-base deal provided the 
US will supply arms for Pakistan’s 250,000-man army’.91 Ghulam Muhammad was 
assisted, during these talks, by Foreign Minister Sir Zafrullah and Syed Amjad Ali, 
Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US – all three pro-army and pro-American politicians. 
Such a deal and cooperation was already finalized in detail during General Ayub’s 
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visit to Washington prior to Ghulam Mohammad’s arrival. If not broken, the 
confidence was shaken between the Army and the Prime Minister. Former 
Ambassador, Hamidullah says: 
 
In those days, Foreign Office kept fasting while the GHQ was working. 
We were working for policy formulation towards the entire world except 
the US and India. Relations of these countries with Pakistan were 
discussed through GHQ. Pakistan’s foreign policy towards them was 
formed by the uniformed military officers and not by diplomats like me.92 
 
The Foreign Office was hesitant to join US sponsored military pacts,93 while the GHQ 
was pressing to go for it. The beleaguered Foreign Office issued foreign policy terms 
with prior permission of the GHQ. If cooperation with the US was a dichotomous 
matter for the Foreign Office and the GHQ, there was the same problem between the 
Pentagon and the State Department. ‘Against the Pentagon’s enthusiasm for pushing 
the Alliance[s] was the State Department’s concern over the Indian reaction’.94 This 
issue will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
Future relations with the US were exclusively planned by the GHQ and 
General Ayub Khan himself. The US had first become interested in the strategic 
possibilities of Pakistan more than a year before when Adm. Arthur W. Radford, now 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Pentagon, visited Pakistan as Commander 
in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. He visited GHQ Rawalpindi, conferred with General 
Ayub Khan, and came away ‘deeply impressed’.95 The GHQ and the Pentagon 
relations strengthened with every passing day. The months of September and 
November were very important for both centres of power. General Ayub and Ghulam 
Muhammad visited Washington and reaffirmed to the Department of State and the 
Pentagon every support in exchange for a military aid package. Before leaving for the 
US, General Ayub Khan met a US embassy official and told him that he ‘was not 
going to the US for pleasure or sightseeing’. He also said that ‘he never believed in 
MEDO96 conception… but considered bilateral agreement better way’. Upon asking 
as to what would be the benefits of the Pak-US agreement of any kind, he replied, 
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‘agreement with Pakistan would be surest way [to] get Nehru on US band wagon’, 
and that ‘he could give any assurances [the US] wants, that [the US supplied] arms 
would not be used against Ind[ia] unless latter attacked Pak[istan]’. He constantly 
followed the line that ‘Pak [istan’s] best friend [was the] US’. By now General Ayub 
himself, and the US administration had learned one thing: he was ‘the strongest 
individual in Pakistan’,97 along with his group- Iskander Mirza, Ghulam Muhammad, 
and Zafrullah. He was also awarded Legion of Merit decoration.98 On his return from 
the visit, he undertook exploratory conversations with US officials on closer military 
cooperation on a personal basis. The civilian government of Pakistan led by PM 
Bogra was ignorant of any such foreign policy development. 
Easterners were the first to raise their voices against the politics of alliances-
SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later on the Baghdad Pact was renamed as CENTO)- 
and the US intimate military relations with Pakistan. ‘They were unhappy with 
Karachi due to its dictatorial policies and undemocratic nature, and over and above 
the Bengla-Urdu language controversy. The Army’s tilt towards the US was not 
acceptable to them’99, especially institutional interaction between the State 
Department, Pentagon, and the White House and the Pakistan Army. As mentioned 
before, the Easterners’ democratic nature demanded a popular foreign policy rather 
than a dictation from the GHQ. 
 Internally, the government was further weakening in Karachi. The 
overwhelming victory of the United Democratic Front in the East Bengal provincial 
elections in early March 1954 marked the first real defeat for the Muslim League 
government since it came to power in 1947. 100 The League had suffered a schism, but 
the huge defeat in East Bengal was due primarily due to local issues. The Bengalis 
resented what they felt was their ‘colonial’ status vis-à-vis West Pakistan. Bengali 
students, the driving force in the United Front’s Campaign, agitated violently against 
Karachi’s reluctance to make the Bengali language official and at par with West 
Pakistan’s Urdu language.101 They also asserted that East Bengal’s economic 
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development had been slighted by Karachi.102 Due to a sense of deprivation, any 
country that strengthened and supported Karachi was disliked by the Bengalis. Hence, 
America was on the top of the list. 
The Leader of the Awami League, Maulana Bhashani, denounced Pakistan’s 
‘slave Pact’ (a cynical term for the Baghdad Pact) with American ‘Warmongers’. He 
attacked military aid to Pakistan and interpreted the Muslim League’s defeat in the 
East as a popular rejection of these policies. However, the head of the Awami League, 
Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy, was very cautious on this question as he had to play his 
politics in the Centre (Karachi). The reason was that he aspired to the highest seat 
(Prime Minister) in Karachi. He was soft on the politics of alliances as he realised that 
Karachi was dominated by the pro-American Gang of Four. On the issue of the US 
military pact with Pakistan, he said, ‘Pakistan should remain neutral in a world war, 
but I favour military aid provided no strings were attached’.103 It was a very cautious 
statement neutralising both of its parts. Of course a neutral country could not get 
military aid and military aid could not be provided without strings. At the same time, 
the leadership of the United Front, Fazlul Haq, the coalition partner and Suhrawardy 
were the local heroes who took full advantage of ‘the ineptitude and unpopularity of 
the Muslim League’s provincial leaders’.104 Other than them, there were no known 
men with talent or experience in the Front’s administration. This resulted in their rise 
to power. Haq became the Chief Minister, an intelligent but unstable octogenarian, 
whereas Suhrawardy concentrated on national politics and left the provincial field to 
him. He was moving very carefully and gingerly. ‘Suhrawardy’s ambition to become 
the national Prime Minister of the country’ by now had become too obvious.105 With 
such ambitions he wanted to curb sentiment among his following of East Bengal’s 
secession from West Pakistan.106  
The situation in East Bengal was yet not under control. Bengalis were 
demanding greater and greater roles in the Constituent Assembly especially from the 
United Front Forum. The Front had called for immediate dissolution of the assembly 
on the ground that East Bengal’s views, as expressed in elections, would not be 
represented in the draft constitution which the assembly was due to produce in the 
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next few months.107 There were, nevertheless, strong forces which might have 
disrupted Pakistan. The biggest such force was the strain between the East and the 
West wings of the country. At the time of the East Bengal election in March 1954, 
some of the elements suggested that East Bengal was about to secede from the 
federation.108 Such rebellious statements were the over-expression of winning 
elections against the Muslim League that had controlled Central government for so 
long.  But now the overriding need of the time was to keep East Bengal part of 
Pakistan with greater control of its provincial affairs. However, rebellious centrifugal 
forces were more than matched by the forces which linked Pakistan as one united 
entity.  
It was the armed forces and the civil administrative services that provided a 
strong integrated framework to hold the country together.109 Ayub Khan had a 
persistent fear of the Easterners. He thought that as East Pakistan was engulfed by 
India from its three sides, infiltration by Indian spies was very easy. Therefore, every 
move of Easterners was suspicious to him and his other military colleagues. He 
wanted to keep both of Pakistan’s wings together strategically to keep India paranoid 
about the possibility of a two front war. The army had a military calculation that, in 
case of the dismemberment of Pakistan, the creation of a separate country in the shape 
of Bengal would be on Indian instigation and hence a satellite state of India. In such a 
grim eventuality, India would be a persistent security threat for West Pakistan (the 
remaining part of Pakistan). This would make them (the Pakistan Army) even weaker 
against India and for the rest of history they would live under a constant fear of 
India.110 Not the fear of India but the creation of an Indian sponsored separate Bengal 
state was one of the cementing factors for a United Pakistan. Therefore, the Pakistan 
Army always dealt with the grievances of Easterners sceptically and conspiratorially. 
On the other hand, more than 80% of civil administrative services were 
occupied by the Muhajirs (those who had migrated from India to Pakistan).111 They 
were well educated as compared to the rest of Pakistanis; therefore, the moment they 
migrated to Pakistan, they were placed in high posts. Keeping Pakistan united was, in 
other words, their expression of hatred and competition against India. They wanted to 
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keep Pakistan integrated, united and strong to justify their migration. Thus the armed 
forces and the administrative services of the country proved a cementing force for the 
integration of the country. In the previous eight years of its existence, Pakistan had 
become a ‘going concern’ – a country more than just a geographical expression.  
The dichotomous political fragility of East Pakistan was very carefully noted 
by the GHQ. The Army always considered the Bengali political riots and 
demonstrations as a beginning of insurrection. It was always ready to deal with them 
with an iron hand. As mentioned in chapter 2, the Pakistan Army was born from the 
British colonial army. Hence, although Pakistan was an independent state, its Army’s 
modus operandi followed colonial rules. There was a dormant tussle between the 
Army and East Pakistan. Since the labour riots on 15th May 1954, the East Pakistan 
political situation had deteriorated steadily. The federal government took steps to 
ensure peace by civilian machinery, but Ayub Khan told the American attaché that he 
had urged the government strongly to promulgate ‘governor’s rule’ – direct rule by 
the provincial governor acting on the instructions from Karachi – and to impose 
martial law in certain areas.112   
The Easterners’ democratic nature was challenged by the Army using the Cold 
War excuses. It was felt that the Ayub-Mirza nexus could govern Pakistan only under 
the pretexts of averting Communist expansion and maintaining law and order. A 
justification for such pretexts was provided by labour riots in East Bengal. Riots and 
the ‘burning of different mills especially Adamjee Jute Mills was the triggering 
point’.113 Hundreds of people died, which showed the failure of the United Front’s 
government. There had been numerous reports that the United Front was joined and 
backed by the Communists in East Bengal.114 A. K. Fazul Haq and Maulana Bhashani 
had already shown their resentment towards the US sponsored pacts. Hence, to 
appease the US administration and to show loyalty to the recently joined pacts, the 
Governor General dismissed Fazul Haq’s nascent ministry and appointed Mirza, his 
loyal friend, as the governor of East Pakistan.115 Ayub Khan’s advice given a week 
before was honoured.  
Unfortunately, Prime Minister Bogra was getting closer to the United Front. 
He was fed up with the parallel government run by the Governor General along with 
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his Gang of Four. Bogra was kept in the dark, especially with respect to the country’s 
foreign policy towards America and the joining of Pacts. At numerous times, his 
opinion was superseded by the Governor General and General Ayub Khan. One such 
example was when General Ayub Khan’s advice to impose governor’s rule was 
honoured and East Pakistan was dealt with sternly. Strangely, whenever the situation 
in East Pakistan worsened, the Army came up with ruthless statements and actions. It 
tried to suppress the Easterners’ democratic demands with the use of force. The period 
of the 1950s was like a tussle between East Pakistan and the Army. If elections were 
held in East Pakistan, its leadership was not acceptable to the Army. And if Pakistan 
was joining the US sponsored military pacts, it was opposed to by the Easterners. 
Neither was ever reconciled to each other’s existence. Therefore, the Army was ready 
to play its active political role in the backdrop of situations in the East. In Karachi on 
6th October 1954, Ayub Khan told the American Charge d’Affairs Emmerson that he 
was unhappy over the existing political situation in Pakistan. He said that the Bengali 
politicians could not be allowed to dictate to the whole of Pakistan, that ‘something 
would be done’, and that he hoped the US would understand if some military action 
became necessary.116 It was a blunt statement that reflected the Army’s intention to 
seize control if necessary by its own will.  
To counter undemocratic moves, the seat of the Prime Minister had to be a 
strong one. But behind all such dictatorial moves was the office of a civilian: the 
Governor General. Hence PM Bogra had to clip the powers of the Governor General 
first before dealing with the army and its hostile moves towards the Easterners. This 
time, it was the Gang of Four vs. PM Bogra, making the situation volatile in Karachi. 
The ball kept rolling until there was a question of power-share. Powers of the 
Governor General were much more dominant than that of the Prime Minister. To 
balance their administrative powers, an act, the ‘Government of India (Fifth 
Amendment) Act 1954’, was passed. It contained four provisions. The fourth and the 
most important but controversial one was:  
 
Wherein in this Act the Governor-General is required to perform any 
function or exercise any power, he shall until the context otherwise 
provides be deemed to perform this function and exercise these powers in 
accordance with the advice of the Ministers.117  
                                                 




It was an effort to deprive the Governor General from his independent powers and to 
remove the Damocles sword of making and breaking the governments. But Ayub 
Khan’s statement during his meeting with the American Charge d’Affaires Emmerson 
(mentioned above) was an indication that the efforts of the PM and his group to 
engineer a constitutional block to reduce the Governor General’s powers were in vain. 
The Gang of Four was much more organized and strong than Bogra alone. The 
Governor General was angered over the Fifth Amendment Act of 1954. To counter 
Bogra’s efforts to curtail the Governor General’s powers, Ghulam Mohammad and 
Law Minister Brohi had been in constant consultation –possibly on the ‘Governor 
General’s residual powers- to dissolve the government or call out the army in a 
national emergency’. Brohi, who was also minister for Information and Broadcasting, 
had held a conference with Sindh newspaper editors and had been assured of their co-
operation in case of the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. The Army appeared 
to remain loyal to the Governor General.118 There was a tussle between the two 
offices, one elected other selected; one the voice of the people and the other the victor 
of the last tussle between the PM and Governor General. Ghulam Mohammad 
dissolved Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly and dismissed PM Bogra’s Cabinet. 
The Gang of Four was not alone in derailing the democratic process of the 
country. Unfortunately, the judiciary also had a supportive relationship with them. 
The CIA reported on the day of dissolution that the ‘Governor General Ghulam 
Mohammad’s dissolution of the Pakistani Constituent Assembly and dismissal of PM 
Mohammad Ali Bogra’s Cabinet will presumably be upheld, since the Chief Justices 
of the Federal Court and High Courts, to whom any protest would be made, are said to 
be loyal to him’.119 Ghulam Muhammad was very safe in his acts of omission and 
commission. He politicised the judiciary too. A pillar of the State had become the 
pillar of the government.  
Bogra’s government however was not a representative government. Thus no 
civil disorder was witnessed after its dismissal ‘nor was any likelihood of such sort in 
the near future’. As far as foreign policy was concerned, it was already not being 
formed in the Foreign Office. Those responsible for the formulation of foreign policy 
were permanent characters on Pakistan’s political scene (Zafrullah, Mirza, Ayub 
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Khan, and Ghulam Mohammad). So there was no question of any change in its 
policies. The CIA papers also say that, despite the fact that the government was 
changed and the judiciary was in the government’s pocket, ‘Pakistan’s foreign policy 
remained pro-American’.120 
A new Cabinet was sworn-in on the same evening. The group- Gang of Four 
took open control of the government. The new cabinet included General Ayub Khan, 
General (Rtd) Iskander Mirza; M.A.H. Ispahani, a diplomat; Mir Ghulam Ali Talpur, 
a politician from Sindh; and Chaudhri Muhammad Ali continuing as the Finance 
Minister. Later on, Dr. Khan Sahib121 and two representatives from the United Front 
also joined the Cabinet. Ayub Khan also reached the Cabinet slot as a minister. But it 
was not his end. This ministry was a means to his end. His ultimate aim was to 
preside over the Cabinet meeting and to become the sole ruler of the country – surely 
a uniformed ruler.  
The new Cabinet was more like a national government after a history of 
instable governments. This time the armed forces and civil bureaucracy were 
represented in the cabinet by General Ayub and Iskander Mirza respectively. Thus it 
was expected that this government would serve and survive for long. The PM named 
the new cabinet the ‘Ministry of Talent’. Launched by the Gang, the era of ‘controlled 
democracy’ started. The day the so-called ‘Ministry of Talent’ formed, Iskander 
Mirza gave a very interesting statement that reflected the future political set up of 
Pakistan:  
 
The masses of this country are overwhelmingly illiterate. They are not 
interested in politics. They are bound to act foolishly sometimes, as they 
did in East Pakistan, and again their elected leaders did in the Constituent 
Assembly. It was thus necessary, in fact essential, that there should be 
somebody to rectify their blunders. People of this country need controlled 
democracy for some time to come.122 
 
His statement was to anticipate in future that the ‘somebody’ to rectify civilian 
blunders was the Army. The country would be governed by uniformed rulers for the 
future to come. Democracy would be both militarised and controlled.  
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The new regime seemed to come like a breath of fresh air. There was a 
widespread spirit of hopefulness that under the new government a real advance would 
be made towards its objectives: to clean up the administration of Pakistan from 
corruption at all levels and to give it a new vigour and efficiency; to put an end to the 
jealousies and dissensions between various provinces; to raise the standard of living 
of the ordinary people of Pakistan, particularly with the help of American economic 
aid; and to frame a constitution that would be generally acceptable, and then to hold 
fresh elections as soon as the situation permitted. The new cabinet knew what they 
were about and were resolutely determined to give Pakistan a fresh start along a better 
road. The irony of fate was that, even after the lapse of seven years, the country 
neither witnessed a constitution nor held general elections. ‘There was a considerable 
cynicism over the government’s promise to hold elections “as soon as possible”’,123 
but a delay in the return to parliamentary government would be compensated for by 
the benefits which a period of authoritarian rule had to offer. But raised spirits were 
dampened during several months of arguments in the Courts over the legality of the 
Governor General’s action in dissolving the old Constituent Assembly. 
First the Assembly was restored by the High Court. Interior Minister Mirza 
gave a public statement on 10th February that the Pakistani government would pay no 
attention to the provincial court’s ruling of 9th February that the Governor General’s 
action on 24th October of seizing overt control and dismissing the Pakistani 
Constituent Assembly was illegal. He even added that if the federal court upheld the 
9th February decision, it too would be ignored.124 It very directly indicated that the 
government was to remain in power regardless of the current challenge to its legality. 
The Gang of Four was ready, if necessary, to rule unconstitutionally. At the same 
time, there was no individual or political party in Pakistan strong enough to overthrow 
the gang. And the fact of the matter was that the Gang of Four was enjoying the 
support of the Army. But finally the Federal Court ruled, with some qualifications, in 
favour of the legality of the Governor General’s action. The delays in the Federal 
Court’s ruling that a new Constituent Assembly should be elected by the Provincial 
Legislative Assemblies necessarily caused a serious loss of momentum for the federal 
government. This encouraged provincial politicians to revert to the pursuit of their 
personal advantage and to seek a stiff price for their cooperation. As far as the law and 
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order situation was concerned, throughout this period of legal uncertainty, Pakistan 
remained quite tranquil. Military force was available in the background to be called 
upon if required.125 
Despite his poor health and physical disabilities, the Governor General 
retained firm control over various groups and their leaders, whom he had employed to 
achieve his ends. Zahoor Butt commented on the Governor General’s poor health and 
the work of the Gang of Four in the following words: 
 
His old age and illness did not matter much. Even later on, Zafrullah’s 
departure to the ICJ did not make any change in their [gang of four] 
agenda (he was replaced by Chaudhri Muhammad Ali as a new member 
of the gang). Ayub and Mirza were sufficient to rein politicians and the 
country. Their agenda was to control them and keep pro-American 
policies – join the [SEATO and CENTO] pacts and be as much anti-India 
as possible to defend now and govern the motherland later with an 
American pat on their shoulders.126 
 
Three men were in a very special position in relation to the Governor General, 
especially during his poor health. They formed the inner ring of ‘patriotic and resolute 
men who could not be considered ‘expendable’, as could the other members of the 
Cabinet, not excluding the PM. The foremost among the three was Chaudhri 
Mohammad Ali, the Finance Minister. In Pakistan, he towered over the rest. ‘His 
ideals for his country were fully as high as the Governor General's’. The British High 
Commissioner in Karachi talked approvingly of him as ‘ambitious for the highest 
office even though he had little or no political following’.127 The second man was the 
forceful and impetuous Iskander Mirza. He was over-fond of making deliberately 
provocative statements, especially against democracy and politicians. He was not 
without his detractors and indeed his weaknesses, but patriotism was a strong factor in 
his composition. His performance as Governor of East Pakistan in 1954 had shown 
his capacity for administration and leadership. The third member of the inner ring was 
General Ayub Khan, Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan 
Army. Physically commanding, wellbuilt, and a tough man from Hazara, he was a 
close confident of Iskander Mirza.128 It was difficult for him to keep the Army out of 
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politics or politics out of the Army by having the Ministry of Defence on one hand 
and command of the Army on the other. ‘He was continuously working in the 
background but his front-man was Iskander Mirza’.129 All three members of the Gang 
of Four held very sensitive positions in the country, which of course was not a 
coincidence. Chaudhri Muhammad Ali controlled the financial machine and 
commanded the loyalty and support of the Administrative Services; Iskander Mirza 
controlled the forces of law and order; General Ayub controlled the fighting forces. 
Thus it was not their personal traits but also the positions that they were holding 
which was making them distinctive and strong. The entire country was run by ‘a few 
good men’. 
 Four non-political and non-elected entities were governing Pakistan. It was a 
natural consequence of the prevailing trend of politics in the country. Politics in 
Pakistan was a matter of personalities rather than political parties. Groups and 
alliances were formed on personal, family or local interests as much as on questions 
of principle or policy. It resulted in uncertainty in the country. The political pattern 
could shift with dramatic suddenness. Take the case of Prime Minister Bogra. He tried 
his level best to isolate the Gang of Four by integrating the Muslim League. By 
playing one group against another, and maintaining his own balancing position at the 
top, he alienated Suhrawardy and brought with him Fazl-ul-Haq from East Bengal. 
The strongest factor that brought them together was their shared fear and dislike for 
Mr Suhrawardy.130 On the other hand, Suhrawardy was trying to win over the West 
Pakistan Muslim League members and achieve power at the Centre in alliance with 
them, leaving Mohammad Ali and Fazl-ul-Haq in the cold. ‘He openly regarded 
himself as the rightful Prime Minister of Pakistan, kept out of his rights only by the 
machinations of lesser men, and in the nature of things this attitude offended 
many’.131 But eventually, this all depended on the Governor General’s calculation of 
the balance of advantages. Politics and the politicians’ fate were decided by non-
political entities that were yet at the helm of the political scene. In the meanwhile, 
Ghulam Muhammad's health deteriorated which compelled him to take a leave of 
absence on 6th October 1955. He was replaced by Iskander Mirza as acting Governor 
General. 
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When it comes to a change in Pakistan during the 1950s and 60s, one (civilian 
as well as military) dictator would replace another. Often, a dictator was removed but 
his remnants still remained in power. Removal of a dictator did not mean a change in 
political circumstances of the country. Post-Ghulam Mohammad, Pakistan was no 
different. The same wrangling between the politicians and non-elected members of 
the country was in process. Like his predecessor, Iskander Mirza enjoyed the full 
backing of the Pakistan Army. He brought with him another confidante of the inner 
ring, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali,132 as the new Prime Minister of the country on 12th 
August 1955.133 It was the first time that both top positions of Prime Minister and 
Governor General were held by West Pakistanis. By any means necessary, they 
wanted to form a combined West Pakistan to balance or counter the Eastern Wing. 
The Army was pro-West entity not only working on the international scene, but even 
at the domestic level, it was pro-west Pakistan. This was an ideal atmosphere for the 
top slots to be occupied by the West Pakistanis.  
One of the objectives of the Gang of Four was to form a constitution. At 
numerous times, the threat of the Army or martial law was given to politicians to 
bring them together to approve the constitution and form a Western Wing.134 
Suhrawardy, the opposition leader, who too wanted to exploit the situation to his own 
favour, was sure that the Mirza-Ayub nexus wanted to cause the situation to 
deteriorate to such a level that the military would be called in and thus prepare the 
way for a dictatorship.135  
Pakistan was passing through aristocratic governance where a few privileged 
friends were deciding the nation’s destiny. Mirza-Ayub took major decisions without 
troubling to explain or consult with the masses. It was on 14th October 1955 that the 
Province of West Pakistan was formed ‘without consulting Easterners and 
Pushtoons’.136 Easterners took the matter very seriously. They considered it a 
conspiracy hatched against them to balance their numerical superiority. Fazlur 
Rahman, a member of the Constituent Assembly and an opponent of moves towards 
the creation of a West Pakistan province in the first Constituent Assembly, termed it 
the division of the country in the following words:  
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Sir, it has been stated that the greatest merit of this bill is to do away with 
distinction between Punjabis and Sindhis and Pathans and this and that, 
but you do not realize that by dividing Pakistan into two you are manifold 
magnifying that provincialism, by making it a local patriotism for the two 
regions. Then no longer the cry will be Punjabis and Sindhis but the cry 
will be Bengalis and non- Bengalis137.  
 
Similarly, there were other speakers who spoke against the Bill (of making West 
Pakistan one unit) and highlighted its volatile nature. One such member of the 
Constituent Assembly was Abul Mansoor Ahmed. He said that the purpose of such a 
Bill was to unite West Pakistan’s politicians so that: 
 
They must be able to talk to the people of East Bengal in one voice so that 
they may not use that position of numerical superiority. That is the 
unfortunate basis for the integration of West Pakistan. The very idea is 
wrong. If I were left with bringing an integration Bill I would have given 
a much better Bill which would not have been based on fear for and 
conspiracy against East Bengal.138 
 
For the smooth running of a democratic system, the culture of political parties is a 
pre-requisite. However, in Pakistan, political parties were the feeblest part of the 
country’s system. Parties were broken and formed at the instigation of dictators. 
Another party, the Republican Party, was launched by Dr. Khan Sahib and was 
enjoying the support of Governor General Mirza. The Republican Party was a 
combination of dissidents of the Muslim League. At the same time, Chaudhri 
Mohamad Ali’s government weakened due to the loss of Muslim League party 
workers to the Republican Party. Hence, he too had to resign.  
Chaudhri Muhammad Ali also developed some differences with Mirza on a 
few clauses of the draft constitution. The designation of Pakistan as an “Islamic 
Republic” and the denial of the presidency to anyone except a Moslem139 were 
important and potentially dangerous concessions to extremist religious groups. Mirza 
opposed these provisions and managed to delay the crucial second reading in the 
assembly. He also blamed PM Chaudhri Muhammad Ali for political crisis in the 
country and described him to the American Ambassador in Karachi as “a bloody 
                                                 
137 Fazlur Rahman, Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates (henceforth CAPD), Volume 1, 24 
August 1955, p.274. 
138 Abul Mansoor Ahmed, CAPD, Volume 1, 30 September 1955, p. 1423. 
139 CIA-RDP79-00927A-0007001-60001-9, March 1, 1956, NARA. 
 89 
fool”.140 But Chaudhri Mohammad Ali and other West Pakistani politicians who used 
orthodox elements to increase their power were afraid to insist on secular 
constitution.141 The Gang of Four was reduced to the ‘Gang of Three’ after Ghulam 
Mohammad’s departure and was facing internal tension. They were less united now 
than before. Previously, they were united due to variation in their posts and positions. 
But now all the three (without Ghulam Mohammad as their head) were at par with 
each other without a uniting force behind them.142 Prime Minister Chaudhri 
Mohammad Ali had little popular support. Though he seemed to be in alliance with 
the newly elected Muslim League president Nishtar and the seasoned Punjabi leader 
Daultana, he still found himself disliked by President Mirza – the king maker, but at 
least he finally got the first constitution of Pakistan approved by the Constituent 
Assembly on 29 February 1956.143 As was understood before, according to the 
constitution, the President was to replace the Governor General. Therefore, Iskander 
Mirza automatically became the President of the country. The system was changing 
but the faces were the same. It was old wine in a new bottle. 
 On the other hand, Suhrawardy’s Awami League came into power in East 
Bengal and replaced the United Front on 30th August 1956. On 12th September 1956, 
Suhrawardy formed a coalition government of Awami League and Republican Party 
at the Centre and became the Prime Minister of the country. The new government had 
taken ‘a strong stand in support of a policy of collaboration with the West. It also had 
the support of the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Civil Service, the two most important 
stabilizing forces in Pakistan’.144 Mr Suhrawardy had considerable grassroots appeal. 
There was no other political figure that commanded the public support or had political 
acumen of his stature. Suhrawardy and Mirza’s continuance in power appeared to 
improve stability in Pakistan. Americans were very cautious about Suhrawary’s 
government as he was very hesitant to support US military pacts joined by Pakistan. 
However, President Mirza told the British and Americans privately on 13th September 
1956 that ‘before calling on Mr. Suhrawardy he asked for and obtained an assurance 
from him that there would be no alteration in the main trends of Pakistan foreign 
policy. The President also obtained assurances from Mr. Suhrawardy that he will not 
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try to interfere in Army affairs and that in this regard, he will keep Bhashani (the 
extremist Awami Leaguer) in order’.145 Zahoor Butt, a very close friend of 
Suhrawardy, says:  
 
Suhrawardy had to give assurance to Mirza for a tough stance on Kashmir, 
anti-India policy and pro-US foreign policy. He also had to agree that he 
will remain loyal to the Army and its civilian associates.146  
 
Such assurances were necessary as there had already been blunt pronouncements from 
the Awami League’s forum against Pakistan’s joining of the Baghdad Pact. The 
Awami League’s Council, in a resolution on the foreign policy of the Pakistan 
government, felt that the interests of Pakistan would be better served if an 
independent and neutral foreign policy could be adopted instead of becoming ‘a 
puppet of other peoples’ foreign policy’. The council also expressed the view that 
military pacts cost Pakistan the sympathy of majority of the Muslim countries of the 
world.147 But Suhrawardy always flew while observing the tide. Whilst lunching at 
the British High Commission, he stated that ‘Pakistan’s friends were in fact to be 
found in the West and not among the neutralists’.148 It not only reassured his 
commitment to the Alliances but also expressed his contempt to India, which was 
necessary for the Pakistan Army to take note of. His party was divided over Pakistan’s 
membership of the US sponsored military alliances. Suhrawardy did succeed in 
mustering support from the West Wing of his party leadership in Karachi for both his 
government’s external and internal policies. However, in the East Wing his task was 
especially difficult due to the powerful and bold personality of Maulana Bhashani. 
Bhashani publicly condemned the policy of alliances in October 1955 and again in 
May 1956.149 He always expected exploitation by the West [wing] and that the failure 
to redress East Pakistan’s grievances might lead to its saying ‘Goodbye’ to West 
Pakistan.150 To balance Maulana Bhashani, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Secretary 
General of the party came out publicly in strong opposition to the Maulana and in 
favour of Suhrawardy. PM Suhrawardy was not ready to take a head on collision that 
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would drag the Maulana into opposition before general elections. He also knew that 
his (Maulana Bhashani) age could no longer allow him to pursue his obstructive line. 
Enjoying the full support of his party workers, and after long struggle, Suhrawardy 
wanted to remain in power now for a while.151  
Ambassador Hildreth before his final departure from Karachi reported that 
despite some progress by President Mirza and Prime Minister Suhrawardy in recent 
months a number of developments contributed to continuing political instability 
within the country. Political party factionalism continued to be widespread with no 
single political party commanding a majority in the Pakistan National Assembly or in 
either of the two provincial assemblies. The present coalition government which came 
into power in September 1956 derived its support principally from the Pakistan Army 
and the Pakistan Civil Service. The team of Mirza and Suhrawardy had to date 
worked well, although the political philosophies of the two leaders differed widely, 
with Mirza favouring a more authoritarian rule and Suhrawardy strongly supporting a 
broadly-based democratic parliamentary system.152  
The Suhrawardy-Mirza coalition was a marriage of convenience. A firm and 
strong government of Suhrawardy never favoured Mirza as it would have undermined 
his own position. Hence, Mirza’s political manipulation kept the government shaky. 
But Suhrawardy was becoming popular with his initial political manoeuvrings. He 
brought foreign policy for the first time to the Central Assembly for debate. Due to 
Pakistan’s pressing economic needs, continuing US aid had been a major help to 
Pakistan’s economy. This was realized by Suhrawardy who remained a staunch 
supporter of the US policy of containment to muster economic assistance for the uplift 
of the country’s economy. During his tenure in office, the US material support totalled 
in excess of a half billion dollars for economic aid including PL 480 assistance and 
over 282 million for military aid. The fiscal 1958 program for Pakistan envisaged 8 
million for technical assistance, 60 million for defence support and as yet an 
undetermined amount for economic development assistance.153  
 Suhrawardy always targeted the Indian slogan of neutrality. During his official 
visit to the US, he said:   
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The instability of the East Bengal was entirely the result of the Indian-
inspired subversion. If the Americans had not yet learned to recognize 
Indians in their true colors, they were bound to do so in time. India’s 
neutralism was called ‘positive neutralism’ by Nehru; but I prefer to call it 
‘offensive neutralism.154  
 
Mr. A. Hussain, Pakistan’s Secretary of Defence, then showed an intelligence map 
purporting to demonstrate that three-quarters of the Indian army was ranged along the 
border of West Pakistan facing Pakistani forces of one-fourth their strength.155  
Similarly, President Mirza laid stress on neutralism saying it constituted the 
most dangerous threat to the free world today. He characterized the so called dynamic 
neutrality or progressive neutrality as being in actuality ‘aggressive neutrality’. Mirza 
specifically mentioned India and Egypt in this context. The Pakistani administration 
under Suhrawardy also believed that Nasser was a force for evil: he was a major 
enemy; he was a great friend of the Russians and the aggressive neutralist.156 
Suhrawardy was the first Prime Minister or head of the government in 
Pakistan who took up the issue of acquiring nuclear energy plants with the US 
administration. During his visit to the US, he demanded an atomic reactor better than 
the ones delivered to other allied countries under the President’s Atoms for Peace 
Program. He met with the Secretary of State, John F. Dulles, in this regard and 
demanded more contributions towards the purchase of a modern and up-to-date 
reactor. The Secretary observed that $350,000 was the maximum contribution which 
the US made toward the purchase of atomic reactors by other countries. He voiced his 
understanding that the newly released ‘Argonaut’ reactor was a good one. The Prime 
Minister reacted strongly, characterizing experimental reactors as ‘toys’ and ‘a waste 
of money’. The Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission had advised 
him that a reactor costing $1.5 million was the cheapest one which would be of any 
practical benefit. The Secretary disagreed, pointing out that roughly 40 countries had 
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thought it sufficiently worthwhile to have experimental reactors to sign an agreement 
providing for a US contribution toward the purchase of such a device.  
Suhrawardy expressed his lack of confidence that these agreements were being 
implemented for the real benefits of recipient countries. He asked for suggestions as 
to where the exports could see projects being carried out under this program which 
could demonstrate that it could be beneficial to Pakistan. It was agreed that a 
memorandum responsive to these questions would be handed to the Prime Minister 
before his departure.157 This laid the foundation of the Pakistan’s atomic energy 
program for peaceful purposes. During Suhrawary era, Pakistan requested repeatedly 
US financial assistance in procuring a CP-5 research reactor costing approximately 
$2.5million. The US examined the situation carefully each time that Pakistan 
requested a CP-5 (large) reactor. The facts remain the same: the US was willing to 
provide $350,000 towards any research reactor project Pakistan wished to buy. This 
was the ceiling which had been established for all countries under the President’s 
Atoms for Peace Program and it would be extremely difficult to make an exception at 
this late date.158 
During his meeting with the Secretary Dulles, Prime Minister Suhrawardy 
acquainted him with his visit to Kabul in June 1957. He told the Secretary that the 
Afghans had promised to tone down their propaganda on the Pashtoonistan issue. It 
was Mr. Suhrawardy’s impression that the Afghans were ‘not paying their agents so 
much’ as they had formerly been doing in efforts to agitate the frontier [between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan].159 
 Suhrawardy proved very strong and successful in foreign policy. However, he 
failed to control anti-democratic forces in the country, including President Mirza. 
Achievements in shape of successful foreign policy and foreign investment in 
Pakistan could not strengthen Suhrawardy’s rule. His government received a serious 
blow when Mirza obtained the resignation of Governor Gurmani of West Pakistan.160 
A very strong Punjabi ally of Suhrawardy, Gurmani was a leading contender for the 
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presidency. He was a threat to Mirza in any future presidential election. The new 
governor, Akhtar Hussayn, a Shia like Mirza, was another addition to West Pakistanis 
who were already occupying numerous high positions in the government. It was a 
great blow to Suhrawardy’s government which was already facing tough time from 
Bhashani (his own party faction that was against the US military pacts as well as West 
Pakistanis’ dominance in high posts of the country). The government, formed as a 
marriage of convenience, did not last for long. When a coalition partner, the 
Republican Party, known as the party of President Mirza, withdrew its support, 
Suhrawardy wanted to test his strength on the floor of the National Assembly. He still 
believed in democracy and democratic ways of entry and exit. However, Mirza 
refused to summon the National Assembly saying that he knew the party situation. 
According to Mirza: ‘I issued an ultimatum [to Suhrawardy]: he must resign within 
two hours or I would dismiss him’.161 Hence due to President Mirza’s personal 
dislike, Suhrawardy departed from the government on October 17, 1957. The 
departure of Suhrawardy’s government was another example of the feeble 
government being out-manoeuvred by the Presidency. His government, however, 
accomplished two important tasks. He was the first head of the government who 
brought efficiency and boosted the morale of government departments and gave them 
a sense of ‘going somewhere’. He also began a concerted attack on Pakistan’s most 
pressing economic problem – that of increasing food production.162 
Suhrawardy’s government was followed by I.I Chundrigar and Feroz Khan 
Noon. But even they could not last long. The Gang of Four by now was further 
reduced to the Gang of Two: Mirza and General Ayub Khan. Ayub Khan already 
knew that soon President Iskander Mirza would assume dictatorial powers.163 Every 
successive cabinet during its tenure of office was more concerned with politicking 
than with affairs of the government and the governed. The position of every cabinet 
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162 CIA-RDP79-00927A-0015000-40001-3, November 7, 1957, NARA. 
163 CIA-RDP79T-00975A-00360049-0001-8, 26 April 1958, NARA. 
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was so shaky and based on ad hocism that it completely undermined the formulation 




In this chapter, it has been argued that Pakistan suffered from political instability 
throughout the first ten years of its existence. Two provinces, Punjab and NWFP, and 
the issue of Pushtoonistan were highlighted to give the sensitive nature of its weak 
political institutions. It was observed that the Army spread its tentacles politically to 
move into governing corridors. In fact the civilian political institutions were 
weakened intentionally by the rise of the Army in politics. When the army was not in 
power, it had a political but hidden role which resulted in the country’s sluggish 
orientation to the world. The slow domestic political pace cost the country a political 
lead. Pakistan became an ally of the US but could not muster the support that it 
needed due to its feeble institutions.  Its national constitution was put into effect only 
in 1956, and the country still had not held its first national election. In general, the 
political development of the nation was very slow.  
It has been observed that the rise of the army was at the expense of East 
Pakistan. US military aid strengthened Pakistan internally through assistance to the 
Pakistan Army, and expressed confidence in its ability to control attempts at internal 
communist subversion and other domestic commotion.164 The Easterners were treated 
like second class citizen due to their democratic nature and were denied their rights. 
The Easterners were in majority and, hence, wanted an equal share in the country’s 
governance. However, the Army considered them a threat to Pakistan’s integrity and 
followed the sternest policies against them. This not only shook the political setup of 
the country but resulted in an increase in the power of the military in Pakistan’s 
national politics. The Pakistan Army was paranoid about Pakistan’s disintegration, 
and they smelled secessionist feelings coming from East Pakistan. The integration of 
Pakistan by having two large provinces balancing each other on a dangerous 
equilibrium was a sensitive matter that could have played havoc with the nation at any 
time. Thus they wanted to keep Pakistan united with an iron hand.  
It is a fact that most of the Army was from the Punjab, as was discussed in 
detail in the last chapter. They were never ready to submit to the more populated 
                                                 
164 Congressional Papers, Country Profile, 60D545, Box 43, NND937328, 14 May, 1957, NARA. 
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province, East Pakistan, as they (the Punjabis) believed in ‘might is right’ rather than 
‘majority is authority’. To counter the province with a bigger population, they forged 
a consolidated West Wing (a province). It seems the purpose of the Army was to 
punish East Pakistan and to overcome their fears of rebellion and session. The East 
Wing was far less represented in the Army. It was a Punjabised Army which wanted 
dominance of the country, not only by the Punjab but also by the Army. The truth is 
that the Army had never accepted Pakistan’s independence. It was still acting like a 
colonial institution.  
On the other hand, Iskander Mirza firmly declared that ‘the people of Pakistan 
were not ready for democracy. The leader of the opposition [Suhrawardy] was a 
wrecker. The politicians were out of touch with the people’.165 Pakistan’s physical 
division into two parts was paralleled, politically, by two provincial governments, east 
and west, subordinated to the National Assembly. However, except for East Pakistan, 
no elections were held. The members of provincial and central governments were 
simply appointed to their positions. Therefore, the nation’s political struggle was 
based on individuals, rather than political parties or policies. There was not only 
internal political strife between the political parties, but, broadly speaking, there were 
two groups of rulers: political and non-political. Political rulers were either affiliated 
with political parties or political parties were associated with them. The non-political 
group was very united and belonged to the civil and military bureaucracy. Such civil-
military bureaucracy kept itself strong by having institutional interaction with the US. 
However, during all this process political institutions weakened and democracy 
suffered. 
 
                                                 





American Policy Making Bodies and the Pakistan Army: 




The previous chapter examined various dimensions of weak political institutions 
whose combination affected foreign policy-making. These dimensions played their 
part in the way Pakistan’s foreign policy was made during the years under study.  
There is, however, another dimension which is related to the defence of Pakistan: the 
military dimension. The small and weak military of Pakistan affected its foreign 
policy especially in relation to the country’s immediate environment- unfriendly 
neighbours. In addition, threatening statements from the Indian leadership against 
Pakistan, the issues of Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan as well as the Cold War surely 
meant that Pakistan was faced with a fundamental security problem. This problem 
forced Pakistan to enter international alliances and organizations which certainly 
imposed some policy guide lines. Hostile Afghanistan and India and the threat of 
Communism: these considerations make evident the need to look into the specific 
details of the dimension of a newly born security-oriented country in international 
relations in order to understand the particularities of Pakistan and its environment. 
These considerations also formed assumptions about the relation between the Army 
and the making of foreign policy towards the US. 
Weak democratic and political institutions accompanied by dictatorial currents 
resulted in a strong military establishment for the defence of Pakistan. On the 
domestic front, the Pakistan Army’s international connection with the US supported 
military-oriented policies in the country. In global politics, American policy making 
bodies – the Department of State, the Pentagon, and the White House – needed the 
Pakistan Army in their military schemes-institutional interaction. Institutional 
interaction was sought in order to defend their interests against the Communist threat 
in the region. However, support for the Pakistan Army would have affected Indo-US 
relations. Although people in the Pentagon wanted a military collaboration with 
Pakistan at any cost, the Department of State and the White House did not want to 
appease Pakistan at the expense of India. They applied military schemes in South Asia 
in order to contain communism without affecting Indian interests in the region.  
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Principally this chapter investigates the extent to which the US foreign policy 
makers influenced Pakistan’s military elite before the first martial law in 1958. The 
links evolved between the US policy making bodies and the Pakistani military 
through forging military pacts against communism will be the primary concern of this 
chapter. The chapter also illuminates the United States concern for India, despite the 
fact that Pakistan had joined American sponsored alliances and India had not. Over 
and above, the chapter focuses on the Pakistan Army’s keen desire to seek US support 
against India – a frustrating experience for both parties due to their opposing alliance 
objectives. It will show the basic aspects of this policy and will present the events 
upon which the assumptions of the thesis are made.  
A country born with grim memories of partition – refugees’ carnage and 
migration – Pakistan faced a war against India within a year of its independence, in 
1948. It was a country born with harsh memories of death, mass murder, slaughter, 
and, above all, with a war in the name of Kashmir.1 This gave the country a security-
first orientation and urged it to demand more for defence than anything other aspect of 
the state-run apparatus. The number of ‘Pakistani military forces during 1947-49 were 
around 137,000, barely sufficient to meet existing demands for the maintenance of 
internal security’.2 Therefore, it was natural for Pakistan to explore sources of arms 
procurement and to secure allies within the international political arena. The 
Pakistanis, with an apprehensive eye on their local problems and surrounded on all 
sides by what they perceived to be either hostile or extremely weak nations, looked 
for a dependable friend.3 To counter local animosity with India,4 they wanted global 
allies like the US. Since Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, was a great admirer of 
America and had also expressed his hopes that the Americans would help Pakistan,5 
Pakistan decided to approach the US in order to alleviate its economic and security 
concerns.6 
                                                 
1 Interview with Major (Rtd) Sibghatullah Khan, (Nowshera, 26-01-07). 
2 FRUS, 1949, Vol.VI, ‘Appraisal of the US National Interests in South Asia’, April 19, 1949, p.21 
3 Memo, NEA- Mr. Byroade, SOA- Mr. Kennedy 2/18/1953, Record of the Director, SOA Regional 
Conference and Country Files, 1951-1954, Pakistan, RG 59 GRDS, Lot File No. 57D462/ 
NND903085, NARA. 
4 On Pakistan’s issues and irritants  with India, see G.W. Choudhry, Pakistan’s Relations with India, 
1947-1966 (London: Pall Mall, 1968); also, P.I. Cheema, Pakistan’s Defence Policy, 1947-58 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan,1990).  
5 Background Memoranda prepared by the State Department, on Visit to the US of Liaquat Ali Khan, 
Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Government of Pakistan, p. 34, May 1950, Record Group 330, 
14 April 1950, NARA. 
6 FRUS, 1947, Vol. III, US Ambassador Grady to Secretary of State, pp.161-2. 
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3.2 Importance of Pakistan and the US Global Priority List 
 
 ‘Pakistan first approached the US government between October and 
November 1947 with a request for five years of financial aid’. The aid was sought to 
‘build up its armed forces’. This money was asked for in anticipation of the then 
‘perceived threats from India for a calculated minimum response’.7 The government 
of Pakistan asked for $81 million per year in military assistance over the course of 
five years. The American Government declined Pakistan’s request on the grounds of 
legal, supply and priority difficulties.8 In another report the military assistance which 
was sought was $510,000,000 for five years.9 Demand for such a huge sum was 
something like a demand for a ‘Marshal Plan’10 for Pakistan, since Pakistan had 
fought no war to defend American interests. The American government, 
unsurprisingly, was unwilling to do this. Instead, arms embargos on the sale of 
military equipment were placed on India and Pakistan ‘as a result of disputes over 
Kashmir and other issues, which was a threat to international peace’. As a 
consequence, ‘export of Arms, ammunition, and other material to India and Pakistan 
were suspended until the situation became more clarified’.11  This was done in the 
hope of preventing a major escalation in Kashmir. In this regard, head of the NEA Mr. 
Sattarthwaite made the policy clear by saying that ‘the US position should be one of 
                                                 
7 Submitted report by the SANACC (State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee, 360-14, 
April 19, 1949 in FRUS, 1949, Vol. VI, ‘Appraisal of the US National Interests in South Asia’, p.25, 
See also ‘Appraisal of US Politico-Military Interests in South Asia’, prepared by the Department of 
State, submitted to SANACC 360-10, NARA. 
8 FRUS 1947, Vol. III, ‘Background Memoranda prepared by the State Department, on Visit to the US 
of Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Government of Pakistan’. 
9 Internal Memorandum from Mathews to McGhee, Department of State, 745.45F-11/48, November 1, 
1949, NARA.  
10 The Marshal Plan was the primary plan of funding of the United States for rebuilding and creating a 
stronger foundation for the countries of Western Europe; devastated in the Second World War and 
repelling communism. It was a kind of reward for the allied countries of the US during the war. The 
initiative was named for Secretary of State George Marshall and was largely the creation of State 
Department officials, especially William L. Clayton and George F. Kennan. George Marshall spoke of 
the administration's desire to help European recovery in his address at Harvard University in June 1947. 
See Gary B. Nash, Julie Roy Jeffrey, et al, The American People:  Creating a Nation and a Society, 
Combined Volume (6th Edition), (New York: Longman, 2007), p.827. For further details also see, 
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). 
11 Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the US President, March 11, 1948, GRDS, Records of 
the Director, SOA Regional Conference and Country Files, 1951-1954, NND 903085, Lot 57D462, 
Box 02, NARA. 
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not increasing existing the military potentials of either country’.12 His US policy 
pronouncement affected Pakistan in terms of military equipment more than India. 
India had stockpiles from the Second World War whereas Pakistan had none.13 The 
post-sanction period for Pakistan was also not encouraging. When the embargo was 
lifted in June 1949, a military mission from Pakistan visited the US. This mission 
presented a long list of items that it wanted to purchase and hinted at a willingness to 
be associated with the US in military planning. The purpose of the visit was further to 
acquaint themselves with US defence officials, to visit various training establishments 
and to ascertain the training opportunities for Pakistani defence personnel.14 The 
demands of the delegation were kept at the periphery.15  
 Pakistan persisted in its request to secure arms from the US. Two 
important factors were responsible for this persistence: firstly Jinnah admired 
America and expected that she would assist Pakistan in resolving its problems. He had 
a good impression of President Truman. Secondly, the United States was already 
donating old military equipment from the Second World War to countries it perceived 
as being threatened by Soviet-sponsored Communism.16 Pakistan, though not directly 
threatened was a neighbour of the Soviet Union. The atheistic approach of the 
Communists was not acceptable to Pakistan- a country born in the name of Islam. 
American slogans for freedom and democracy attracted many civilian as well as 
military leaders of Pakistan towards the US. It was the era of Pax-Americana where 
associating with the US was fashionable and a sign of prestige for the nations of the 
world.  
Due to its vast and large needs, no other country but the US could fulfil the 
military requirements of Pakistan. However, there were many hurdles to overcome 
before the United States and Pakistan could work together. The Indian Sub-continent 
                                                 
12 NEA Mr. Sattarthwaite to Mr. Lovett, a Memorandum, November 8, 1948, GRDS, Records of the 
Director, SOA Regional Conference and Country Files, 1951-1954, NND 903085, Lot 57D462, Box 
02, NARA. 
13 Interview with General (Rtd) Kamal Matinuddin (Islamabad, 24-03-07). 
14 The Pakistani military mission included Iskander Mirza (Defence Secretary), Ghulam  Abbas 
(Military Finance Advisor), Major General Iftikhar Ali Khan, Lieutenant Colonel Saifur Rehman, and 
Major Faruki. Department of State Communication with the Secretary of Defence, Secretary of 
Defence Records, RG 330, June 6, 1949, NARA. 
15 Interview with Kamal Matinuddin. 
16 Background Memoranda prepared by the State Department, on Visit to the US of Liaquat Ali Khan, 
Prime Minister and Defence Minister, Government of Pakistan,  p. 34, May 1950, Record Group 330, 
14 April 1950, NARA. 
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was not a priority area for the US.17 It was a period when relations were judged on the 
basis of national security interests so power was most important if a country wished to 
get the attention of a super-power.18 Western Europe and Japan possessed raw 
materials, industrial infrastructure, and the technological dexterity that could be 
converted into war-making potential. Americans needed these war-making materials 
the most. The Middle East and Southeast Asia derived an importance from their 
possession of critical resources, base sites or trading relationships with core states.19 
By contrast, India and Pakistan had no strategic raw materials, ineffective industries 
and highly unskilled and under-educated workforces. In comparative terms, India and 
Pakistan were far away from the core scheme of the US national security and power 
interests.  
The CIA world analysis from 1948 gave a very gloomy picture of India and 
Pakistan in the US list of global strategic priorities. It placed South Asia fourth in 
order of potential investment and security preferences after Western Europe, the Near 
and Middle East, and the Far East.20 These regions were rated as of immense 
importance to the US. The economic dislocation, social unrest, political instability, 
and military weakness so evident in those areas, the report cautioned, were ‘dangerous 
to the security of the United States in the opportunities they afford for the further 
extension of Soviet power and influence’. In comparison, India and Pakistan ‘were 
remote from the USSR and not subject to direct Soviet aggression’.21 Initially, 
preference was given to the countries in the neighbourhood of Pakistan such as 
Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.22 Unlike these countries, there were also legal 
complications in providing aid to Pakistan. No legal authority existed for granting US 
aid to Pakistan at that time and the State Department was not willing to seek such 
authorization from the Congress.23  
 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
18 ‘It ranks first or second in world production of such critical materials of war as cotton, mica, 
manganese, monazite (a source of thorium), and beryl, and is a major source of raw materials, 
investment income, and carrying charges for the UK, thus strengthening the UK’s and Western 
Europe’s efforts toward the economic recovery essential to US security’ see CIA Reports File, Report 
No. SR-21, ‘India-Pakistan’, September 16, 1948, RG 353, NARA. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Memo by Policy Planning Staff (PPS), George F. Kennan, ‘Review of Current Trends, U.S. Foreign 
Policy’, PPS/23, 24 February 1948 in The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, 3 Volumes, 
Edited by Annan Kasten Nelson (New York: Garland, 1983), Vol.2, pp. 103-26. 
21 Ibid. 
22 FRUS, 1949, Vol.VI, ‘Appraisal of the US National Interests in South Asia’, April 19, 1949, pp.1-8. 
23 Ibid, pp.25-26. 
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3.3 US Proposed South Asian Unity 
 
Instead of direct support to Pakistan, the US policy makers initially showed 
their interest in South Asian unity to secure the region from the shadows of 
Communism.24  A factor in this was the decline in American prestige in some pockets 
of Asia due to their failed policy towards China in the late 1940s.  Their policy 
appeared to ‘support an unpopular, dictatorial, and corrupt Chinese regime – a 
complete failure’. Communist success in China exposed the whole of Southeast Asia 
to grave peril. An American diplomat, Mr. Ogburn, describing the grim situation, said 
in a policy paper: 
 
We have no reason to believe that we would or could deploy sufficient 
power in this region to stop the Communist advance anywhere short of the 
China Hills, the Bay of Bengal, the Kra Isthmus and the South China Sea. 
Communist success in taking over control of the nationalist movement 
could result in Communist conquest of the whole of East Asia, leaving 
Australia in a most precarious position.25  
 
Ogburn’s statement proposed a containment rim around the Communist world. In the 
same document, he also proposed a ‘Southern Asiatic Solidarity’ along the lines of 
‘Western European Solidarity’ to stop the expansion of the Communist Empire in 
Asia. Americans already contributed ‘over $15 billion to the Western Union’ in order 
to unite Western Europe against communist expansion. Ogburn wanted to apply the 
same West European model in South Asia. However, there were fears that any such 
Asian bloc could also turn anti-Western. But a common Asiatic front against Western 
imperialism could also turn into a common Asiatic front against Communist 
aggression. Practically speaking, this meant giving all feasible encouragement and 
support to all trends within the South Asian Unity movement, even if it should be 
anti-American. The State Department, encouraging the idea of South Asian Unity, 
hoped that a day would come when the South Asians, united in anti-Communist 
sentiments, would come to the side of the Americans. 
There were fears that the development of South Asian unity would pave the 
way for Indian domination of the region. Mr. Ogburn responded to such fears in the 
following words: 
                                                 
24 Mr. Ogburn, ‘The US attitude towards Asian Unity’, January 17, 1949, GRDS, ROSAA, 1939-53, 




Beggars cannot be choosers. And we are now beggars. If we must choose 
between Indian and Soviet domination, we can have but one choice. 
Actually, I doubt that India’s strength is such that we need be too alarmed 
on this score.26 
 
After the initial war of 1948, Indo-Pak hostility was in the offing. Friction between 
the two neighbouring countries tended to be greater than their common interests in 
determining their actions. ‘If you have six countries side by side, it is often said that 
the alliances will not range numbers 1, 2, and 3 against 4, 5,and 6, but will range 
numbers 1, 3 and 5 against 2, 4 and 6’.27 Thus the American strategy of keeping 
archrivals India and Pakistan together in an alliance was out of the question. But 
strangely, the Americans were expecting that miracle to happen. 
Due to the recent decolonization process in Asia, and especially in South and 
South East Asia, one fact had certainly become evident: the Western powers single-
handedly could not restore order in Asian countries where the situation was politically 
serious due to the threat of Communism. The postcolonial era witnessed the 
development of national identity for the recently liberated nations. For such nations, 
any alliance was considered fearful and a threat to their national being. ‘Even if 
motives of the alliance-seeking country were of the best, suspicion of their intentions 
must defeat their efforts and raise a clamour in the rest of Asia. A concert of Asian 
powers, including India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Siam, and Philippine assisted by the UK 
and the US could bring about an improvement’.28 Without regional cooperation, the 
US-British role in Asia appeared to be unrealistic. The legacy of bitterness and 
suspicion of Asian nations was too great due to their haunting memories of the 
colonial period.  
Besides dreadful colonial reminiscences, there were many other factors which 
prevented the Asian nations from getting closer to any ‘foreign imposed unity’. An 
American diplomat, Mr. Mathew, while describing the possibilities of Asian regional 
cooperation, wrote to the State Department that: 
 
The nations of the area lack sufficient resources of leadership and political 
stability indefinitely to stand unaided before the encroachment of Soviet-





supported Communist movements. Our interests would be seriously 
affected should these nations fall one by one into the Soviet orbit because 
of either internal or external pressures. It appears that there are only three 
sources of strength to which they can look for assistance: the UN, the US 
and regional cooperation. The UN is unable at its present stage of 
development to help a country confronted by the Communist 
encroachment. The US had already committed its resources to such an 
extent that it was not practicable for her to undertake unilateral support of 
such of the nations of Asia. If, however, these nations share their 
responsibilities and help each other through regional cooperation, we 
might find it within our capabilities to provide effective assistance on a 
regional basis.29 
 
Mathews statement was the start of the formation and vision of a regional alliance 
supported by the West against the Soviet Union. He defined the limited US role but 
expressed much encouragement for Asian Unity. This was the beginning of US 
sponsored security pacts in the region. 
The shift in US policy and approach towards the region was due in part to the 
negative reaction Nehru caused on his official visit to the United States in October 
1949. Just before Nehru’s visit, the Americans were keen to be friendly with India, 
especially after the Communist victory in China, and Nehru was regarded as a hope 
for anti-communism in Asia. However he seriously disappointed his hosts by refusing 
to agree to any pact or formal military agreement with the US. President Truman, 
while speaking with Avra Warren, the US ambassador to Pakistan, in February 1950, 
said that he had a ‘disagreeable’ time with Nehru and felt that his attitude on the Indo-
Pak dispute was ‘silly’.  He went on to say that he had not observed any ‘inclination 
on the part of Mr. Nehru to be reasonable in the Kashmir dispute’. Unlike Nehru, he 
liked Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan and appreciated his gift of the Holy 
Qu’ran. Truman also said that he was looking forward to the visit of Liaquat Ali 
Khan, and was considering the possibility of proposing to Liaquat that Pakistan 
should make some sort of concession in the Kashmir dispute in return for some sort of 
quid pro quo. There are no clues and explanations of what he meant by quid pro 
quo.30 Pakistan was gaining ground in the American equation of the cold war. 
Americans needed a South Asian group of states or a state at the periphery of 
Communist Russia to complete the containment ring stretching from the Baltic Sea to 
the Himalayas. But Nehru’s keen desire was to emerge as a leader of the third world. 
                                                 
29 Mathews to Satterthwhite, US toward Near Eastern and Asian Regional Cooperation, February 15, 
1949, GRDS, ROSAA, 1939-53, NND 903085, Lot 54D341, Box 09, NARA. 
30 Weil to Mathews, File 690D-760-02, Department of State Files, February 7, 1950, NARA. 
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Any US role in the region was a threat to such desires. Moreover, due to his 
intransigent attitude, he disappointed people at the Department of State and White 
House as well.  
 
3.4 Power Bloc Theory (PBT) of India 
 
To counter the American role in the region, Indians developed their own 
excuses to keep a neutral approach towards East and West. In fact, neutralism in the 
region was benefiting the Soviet Union which in itself was a kind of partiality. 
However, Nehru coined a new term. For him, it was the era of the Power Bloc Theory 
(PBT). PBT was very famous during the late 1940s. Later on, during the mid-1950s, 
the same theory became the basis for the creation of NAM. It was one of the most 
serious obstacles to a positive orientation of the governments and peoples of South 
Asia toward the US and the Western democracies. The PBT believed that the US and 
the USSR were respectively heads of clearly defined power blocs, that there was little 
difference between the fundamental objectives of the blocs, and that the role of South 
Asia should be the creation of a third ‘force’ to act as  mediator between the two 
blocs already existing. ‘Most articulate exponent of this theory was PM Nehru. His 
sister Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, the Indian Ambassador in Washington, was also 
supporting the theory in her different public addresses throughout the United States’. 
Recently, India had joined the British Commonwealth. Joining of the Commonwealth 
was another Indian indication to strengthen the third ‘neutral force’ leading to a 
virtual isolation of the two ‘aggressive blocs’ led by the US and the USSR.31 
Contrary to such assertions, the PBT was very bluntly repudiated by the US 
ambassador in New Delhi, Mr. Loy W. Henderson. He said: 
 
Cooperation among the nations for the purpose of frustrating aggressive 
tendencies of certain countries or groups of countries does not constitute 
the formation of a power bloc and that the US is not in fact a member of 
any such bloc but stands rather for mutual understanding and 
collaboration within the framework of the UN of all the countries 
genuinely devoted to the furtherance of world peace.32   
 
                                                 
31 James S. Webb, June 6,1949, GRDS, ROSAA, 1939-53, NND 903085, Lot 54D341, Box 09, NARA. 
32 Address by Ambassador Henderson before the Rotary Club, India, January 12, 1949, GRDS, 
ROSAA, 1939-53, NND 903085, Lot 54D341, Box 09, NARA. 
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Thus keeping in view the PBT trend in the Indian foreign policy, soon Americans 
realised the importance of Pakistan. 
 
3.5 US Support to Pakistan for Leadership of the Muslim World 
 
Americans wanted to make Pakistan the leader of the Muslim world due to the 
slogans associated with its creation and its ideological basis of Islam. As an 
atmosphere of friendship already existed between the two countries, the Americans 
wanted to use Karachi to improve their relations with the Middle East. They 
encouraged Pakistan to have different types of ties and agreements with Arab 
countries. On 1st May 1951, a letter was written by Mr George C. McGhee to Mr. E. 
G. Mathews titled ‘Encouragement of Pakistan Participation in Problems of the 
Middle East’. The fifth recommendation under Item 2 (“Appraisal of Foreign Policies 
of South Asian Countries”) considered by the South Asia Regional Conference reads: 
 
In the light of Pakistan’s present orientation to the West and its active 
cooperation with the countries of the Middle East, the US should 
encourage Pakistan’s participation in problems common to the Middle 
East, and its orientation towards Turkey. In addition, the US should 
consult more intimately with the Government of Pakistan on questions of 
common interest in the Middle East.33 
 
A similar conference, ‘Istanbul Regional Conference’, attended by the Chiefs of 
Mission already endorsed a similar recommendation for Pakistan. The 
recommendation was strongly supported by the US Ambassador Warren from 
Pakistan. All the missions concerned affirmed to take every appropriate occasion to 
indicate their approval of any measures designed to bring Pakistan into closer 
relationship with countries of the Middle East (such as conclusion of trade treaties or 
the strengthening of cultural relations).34   
If Pakistan was going to be a leader of the Middle East, it had its own 
stumbling blocks as well. Firstly, looking at the regional scenario that emerged 
forthwith, the biggest hindrances were the jealousies of some Middle Eastern 
countries; notably Egypt, Turkey and possibly Iran. They might resent an apparent 
Pakistani campaign to gain leadership, especially if it was obvious that the US was 
                                                 
33 Letter from Mr. George C.McGhee to Mr. E.G. Mathews, May 1, 1951, GRDS, ROSAA, 1939-53, 
NND 903085, Lot 54D341, Box 09, NARA. 
34 Ibid.  
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encouraging Pakistan in this regard. Secondly, any US effort to increase Pakistan’s 
influence with Middle Eastern countries would immediately affect the South Asian 
regional balance of power. It would be at once noticed and opposed by India, resulting 
in additional Indo-Pakistan and Indo-US discord. To quell these possibilities, the US 
tried to keep India calm with an even-handed policy in South Asia. India and Pakistan 
were treated equally despite the fact that Pakistan was a front-line ally of the US in its 
Cold War against the Soviet Union. 35 At the same time, Iran and Turkey were 
brought into the system of alliances as like-minded entities. Thirdly, the quick US 
approach to Israel in helping to solve her security problems made it difficult for 
Pakistan and other Muslim countries to join the US sponsored Middle Eastern 
Defence Organization (MEDO). Israel would always be on the side of the US, even 
though a little tardily. This would not be liked by the Arab countries and hence was a 
hurdle to Pakistan’s attempts to influence the region. 
British economic, political and military support to Israel was abhorred by the 
countries in the Middle East as well.36 Observing the British biased policies against 
the Arabs, the Prime Minister of Pakistan Bogra, while addressing the third Meeting 
of Commonwealth Prime Ministers, stated: 
 
If the United Kingdom could publicly announce the fact that she would 
never support any attempts by Israel to expand beyond her rightful 
territories, then such a statement would go a very long way towards 
removing the distrust of British intentions which is unfortunately at 
present in the minds of some Arab peoples.37 
 
There was an acute misunderstanding in the minds of British policy makers. They 
thought that, as Pakistan was created in the name of Islam, it would definitely favour 
them in the Islamic world. It was realised in London that, in a situation in which 
 
… Western democracies were opposed by the Soviet bloc but in which the 
interests of the Arab countries were not directly involved, there might be a 
distinct possibility that, under Mr. Bogra, Pakistan would support Western 
Democracies rather than follow the neutral and often unsympathetic 
policies which Arab League countries had in recent [times] often adopted, 
                                                 
35 Byroade to Henry Smith, 57D373, Box 11, NND 847209, October 14, 1953. 
36 Memo, CAB 129/62, C (53) 228, Israel and Middle East Defence: Decisions with the Americans, 
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notably in the UN, apparently as a demonstration of their dissatisfaction 
with the Western powers. So long as the Soviet Union continued 
aggressive policies, Pakistan would be less tempted to flirt with the Arab 
League and to ignore the advantages of collaboration with the West.38 
 
It was further supposed that unless there was a marked détente in British relations 
with Soviet Russia, Pakistan under Mr. Bogra, would attach more weight to support 
for the Western Powers than for the Arab League’.39 London was under the 
impression that ‘if there were a clash of interests between the West and the Arab 
League, Pakistan could not be expected to side with the West whatever the state of the 
Western relations with Russia and whatever Bogra’s personal opinion. According to 
another telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) to Washington, the 
middle level of politicians, the opposition, the press and the students would be too 
heavily against any attempt of the Pakistan government to take an anti-Arab League 
line’.40 
 On the ground, British calculations regarding Pakistan’s ideological position 
proved wrong. When it came to a practical situation during the Suez Crisis, Pakistan 
found itself at a cross-roads. It could either support the Muslim world, that is to say 
Egypt, or the West. Even the policy-makers remained confused in issuing an official 
statement regarding the crisis. It was a Catch-22. The people reacted as they were 
expected to: demonstration in favour of Egypt, but Pakistan’s government sided with 
the West. Western alliances were a guarantee of her territorial integrity. Ideological 
affinity was less important for the government than the question of her existence. She 
supported the West to uphold her security against India in the garb of anti-
communism. Those in the hub of policy making in Karachi no doubt belonged to 
Islam in terms of their religion but they were not religiously minded.  
Showing his sentiments towards the West, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary 
Ikramullah said, ‘While the countries like Pakistan were willing to accept the reality 
of Israel’s existence, they could not act openly’.41 The foreign policy of Pakistan thus 
always had a tilt towards the West.42 
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3.6 Pseudo-War Crisis between India and Pakistan 1951 
 
The Pakistan Army was doing its level best to demonstrate its importance in 
order to induce the US to take interest. Communism was a buzzword to gain US 
support. The strategic geo-political importance of Pakistan with respect to the spread 
of Communism in South Asia was always highlighted at every opportunity. C-in-C 
General Ayub Khan never overlooked a single chance to present communism as a 
haunting ideology bent upon engulfing the entire South Asian and Middle Eastern 
region. Recent Communistic penetration in Tibet, Burma, and Afghanistan, and the 
situation in Nepal were highlighted to depict the scene as precarious.43 No forum was 
missed to emphasize the importance of having an anti-Communist Pakistan in South 
Asia, friendly to the US and the Western Powers. This underlined the utility in 
providing military and economic aid to Pakistan in order to establish a bulwark 
against the current “Red” spread.44   
In order to attract US attention, in 1951, an artificial war crisis was created to 
emphasise Pakistan’s security orientation. To make matters serious, the Government 
of Pakistan entered eight National Guard battalions into the Federal Service. Four 
battalions were activated in East Bengal at an unknown date; and the other four, in the 
West Punjab on 26th July 1951. Despite this addition of 7,500 to the Pakistan Army, 
the Indian Army still had a 2-to-1 numerical superiority in both the Jammu-Kashmir-
East Punjab and the East Bengal border areas. The total strength of the Indian Army 
was 400,000; that of the Pakistan Army, 191,000. The forces of both countries were 
on the border except Pakistan’s 8th Infantry Division which had been ordered to move 
from Quetta to Multan. The reason was skirmishes on the Pak-Afghan border. 
Between 12th and 18th July, three border raids were made by Afghans in the area 
northeast of Chaman (Baluchistan). These raids marked the third series of 
disturbances on the Pakistan-Afghan border since the previous spring.45 Since it 
coincided with India’s concentration of troops in Jammu and Kashmir and in the East 
Punjab, they prevented Pakistan from giving full attention to developments on borders 
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with India. During all this time, Americans in the region were not nervous, but were 
watching the situation. In their opinion, neither side wanted trouble at this time.46 But 
the common man in Pakistan was resigned to the fact that there would probably be a 
war. The public and the Pakistan Army were over-confident about ‘defeating the 
Indian Army’.47 There was, in addition to that, a general opinion that Pakistan would 
receive outside help in the case of a war with India. Mainly ‘the public and the Army 
were looking to the United States for assistance’. One of the biggest reasons for such 
expectations was that India had damaged her position by placing troops on the 
Pakistan border, and, in this way; it would be a defensive war for Pakistan. At the end 
of the day, ‘India will be an aggressor’.48  
While talking to the American Consul General, Raleigh A. Gibson, General 
Azzam Khan stated:  
 
The Communists were working in Pakistan to convince the public that 
Pakistan’s position regarding Kashmir was correct, after they had already 
convinced the masses in India that the Indian position was correct, in 
order to force a war between the two countries. The communists want to 
take advantage of the situation…. An Indian- Pakistan war would cause a 
3rd World War, and Pakistan would be a great sufferer.49  
 
However, Mr. Zahoor Butt, rejected Khan’s assertions about the possibilities of a third 
world war. According to him the Pakistani Communists were not more than a few 
hundred in those days. Their small numerical strength was their weak point. They 
were never in such a position to influence the public to go to war.50 It was such a 
pseudo-crisis that there was fraternizing between Indian and Pakistan troops, and the 
Indian troops were crossing the Pakistan border to secure [procure] vegetables and 
watermelons. Both states were giving the excuse of ‘weather, especially monsoons’ to 
avoid taking any armed action on a large scale.51  
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3.7 Mid-East Defence Organization (MEDO) 
 
The pseudo-crisis in South Asia provided an excuse for ‘regional countries to 
acquire military hardware from the US. Pakistan, India and now Afghanistan 
indicated their respective need for the US military equipment’. Due to regional 
disputes such as in Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan, all three countries were apparently 
suffering from a sense of insecurity. Pakistan was the keenest country in seeking a 
technological superiority due to its sense of military inferiority vis-à-vis India. It not 
only wanted arms procurement but Ghulam Muhammad, the Governor General, also 
expressed a fervent interest in the Middle East defensive arc, consisting principally of 
Turkey and Pakistan. Similarly, ‘India, through procurement assistance under 408E,52 
indicated a need for arms’.53 Its sense of insecurity came from its neutral posture and 
a perceived threat from Pakistan. 
At a time when India and Pakistan were at daggers drawn, US policy makers 
were planning for a regional defensive arrangement that would, according to them, 
‘add stability to the area and provide for an integrated arms program as against the 
present country by country arrangement’. The obvious hurdles in proposing any such 
regional arrangement were the existing regional disputes: Pushtoonistan and Kashmir. 
However, the philosophy behind such a defensive alliance, being of the first order of 
importance, would ‘change perspective of these disputes and actually contribute to 
their settlement’. In a letter to Mr. Mulholland at the State Department, Mr Kennedy, 
the head of NEA, wrote that the regional issues could be circumvented by arranging 
the countries in different groupings; for example, Pakistan might be included in a 
Middle East Pact and India in a South East Asian Pact. Afghanistan might be invited 
to join the Middle East Pact and, if refused, it would not have the US to blame for 
being left out. Similarly, if India refused to join a proposed pact, it would not feel that 
the US was trying to contain India.54 According to Mr. Kennedy, any such proposed 
arrangement would orient Pakistan towards the West and India towards the East. This 
would not contribute to a solution of Indo-Pakistan problems. However, the US 
containment of the Soviet Union would materialise. It would also have created a more 
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equal balance of power between the two blocs, thus reducing an open clash of arms. It 
was another way to secure greater regional security and overcome local disputes by 
engaging the countries in matters of bigger concern: the Russian encroachments. Thus 
the method to win closer alignments with the countries of Southern Asia was to 
encourage cooperation on big issues. Through cooperation on large problems pressure 
could be exerted to overcome the smaller issues. The US was most interested in 
dragging Pakistan into its Middle Eastern defence arrangements. Pakistan had the 
potential and the desire to constitute the eastern anchor of a defence line for the 
Middle East such as Turkey constituted in the West. However, to achieve such a 
position, for the Americans, Pakistan had to overcome many serious obstacles such 
as: its less than satisfactory relations with India which diverted its resources and 
efforts from internal problems and the Soviet enemy; its heavy burden of defence 
expenditure, which it considered necessary in view of its relations with India; its 
shortage of qualified personnel capable of efficiently conducting business and 
government in depth; and its very large and troublesome internal economic 
problems.55 Similarly, Pakistan’s Foreign Office was interested in associating herself 
with Middle East defence, but the Kashmir dispute was the major obstacle. They 
wanted to resolve the Kashmir dispute first and then to join MEDO. Contrary to 
American expectations and the interests of the Foreign Office, the Pakistan Army’s 
tilt was absolutely to join US sponsored pacts at all costs. They wanted US military 
assistance that would arm them to wrest Kashmir from India by fear or by force. 
Sharif Farooq says: 
 
Army wanted to develop itself against the imminent threat of India and 
rest of all issues including Kashmir would be dealt later on. It was a short-
sightedness on the part of the Army for which they had to bear the brunt 
in shape of India’s reaction on forgetting all the UN resolutions on 
Kashmir for Pakistan’s drawing the Cold War to South Asia.56  
 
On 1st November 1950, MEDO was discussed with the Finance Minister of Pakistan, 
Ghulam Muhammad who was on a visit to Tehran in connection with the Islamic 
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Economic Conference.57 The Shah of Iran approached him about the possibility of 
Pakistan, Iran and Turkey joining together to form a defensive alliance. Such an 
arrangement already existed in the region between Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Afghanistan 
in the Saadabad Pact of 1937. However, it was not sufficiently binding to meet the 
present needs of the member countries as well as the containment of Communism. 
The Istanbul Regional Conference had also recently concluded that the ‘Saadabad 
Pact was negligible current interest to any of the signatory states’.58  
Ghulam Muhammad reacted very favourably to the Shah’s proposed defensive 
alliance, but he also showed his strong ‘conviction that the US would never do 
anything for Pakistan without assisting India in a comparable way’.59 Such parity was 
not acceptable to Pakistan. In Pakistan Army circles, ‘it was still thought that the 
moment any joint military alliance was formed between the US and Pakistan, efforts 
would be made to keep the US away from India’. Turkey had been seeking full 
membership of NATO and had shown no interest in tying herself to a defensive 
alliance with Near East countries ‘unless assured in advance that such an alliance 
would be underwritten by the US’.60 Thus the Northern Tier countries had an 
inclination to join US sponsored military alliances with, however, a few reservations. 
For a durable and trustworthy alliance, Pakistan always sought an overt US 
security pronouncement. But the State Department wanted a close-working 
relationship with Karachi without making India hostile to her policies. On the 
question of MEDO, Pakistan was anxiously waiting for the US invitation to join it. In 
February 1953, Ayub Khan had a long conversation in Lahore with Gibson the US 
Consul-General and complained that Pakistan had not been approached for 
membership by the US. He said that the communists in Pakistan were conducting a 
propaganda war against MEDO and the longer the wait the more time the communists 
would have for campaigning. He also expressed his desire to sign a bilateral treaty 
with the US, similar to the one the latter had signed with Turkey.61  
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At the same time, India was much concerned about Pakistan joining the West-
sponsored alliances. In this regard, a meeting was sought by India’s Ambassador in 
Washington DC with the US Secretary of State. During the meeting, the Indian 
Ambassador said, ‘The work of the US ambassador Bowles and of himself, which had 
been directed toward cementing Indo-American friendship, would be to a large 
measure, destroyed’.62 At this stage, Pakistan still had not been approached, but 
according to the Secretary, ‘the geographical location of that country [Pakistan] was 
such that speculation was possible as to a Pakistan contribution to the defence of the 
area’.63 
After expressing the desire for a military pact, Ayub Khan asked the military 
attaché in the Pakistan Embassy in Washington to hand over a document to the State 
Department in April 1953. The document was marked as ‘Top Secret’ and was written 
by Ayub Khan himself in December 1952.64 In this document, he assessed the Soviet 
military threat to Pakistan and the armed forces required to meet this threat. Its 
manner and attitude of the discussion seemed ‘very convincing and appealing’ to the 
Americans. It stated the case using catchy phrases such as, ‘in order to assess the 
forces required to meet the Russian threat to Pakistan resulting from her political 
ideology’. He also expressed his fear that ‘sooner or later the whole subcontinent will 
fall like a ripe but undamaged plum into the Soviet paw’. He expressed other Russian 
objectives as ‘to destroy the influence of Western Powers in the Middle East and to 
gain access to oil and raw materials’. Ayub Khan also highlighted that the defence of 
Pakistan would really be the defence of the subcontinent against communism. He also 
blamed ‘Nehru for prolonging Soviet danger by not making any commitments with 
the West in the field of mutual security’. A detailed list was then made of the forces 
required to defend East and West Pakistan.65 
At last, the first quarterly survey for 1953 prepared by the State Department 
revealed a keen positive interest amongst the top civil and military authorities for 
MEDO to include Pakistan. The survey indicated psychological factors rather than 
diplomatic achievements as responsible for the rise in US popularity. The Indian 
diplomatic offensive against American MEDO plans also increased Pakistan’s interest 
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in it.66 MEDO had become almost an obsession with the Pakistani officials. 
According to Emmerson: 
 
They [Pakistanis] take every occasion to mention it. Even a departing 
mission teacher was given the line by Zafrullah, to wit, ‘If we don’t get an 
invitation by summer, it will be too late’. Every straw is seized upon as 
having significance with respect to MEDO. The Pak[istan] embassy say 
the Secretary wants a ‘quiet chat with General Ayub’: the Foreign Office 
is immediately excited.67 
 
In mid-January 1953, ‘it was agreed between the US and the UK that they should 
envisage the participation of Pakistan in MEDO at the earliest politically feasible 
date’.68 Still they were waiting for a suitable date that would not temper their interests 
in the region. Any scheme by which such a security arrangement seemed to be 
imposed from without was not acceptable to them. However, developments were very 
favourable for Pakistan’s joining the military alliance as the next month brought John 
Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State, to Karachi as part of an unprecedented tour 
of the Middle East and South Asia. Dulles, soon after taking office, appointed Horace 
Hildreth as the new US ambassador to Pakistan. Hildreth, a professor at Temple 
University Philadelphia, was chosen for his views on American responsibilities in the 
new world order which were shared with the American leadership.69 During his visit 
to Karachi, Dulles, along with the new Ambassador, was very pleased to meet 
Ghulam Mohammad the Governor General and PM Bogra. But his most important 
talks were held with General Ayub Khan, which reflected American recognition of the 
Army as the real power centre in Pakistan.  
The Ayub-Dulles meeting took place on 23rd of May 1953 at the US 
Ambassador’s residence in Karachi. Dulles asked about the state of the Pakistan 
Army. Ayub gave a brief background of the difficulties that Pakistan had encountered 
during partition and how with will-power and determination Pakistan had developed a 
strong army in such a short time with meagre resources. However, he admitted that 
heavy armour was required, and, therefore, that the infantry was still the main striking 
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force. He expressed his gratitude for the American sale of 350 Sherman tanks as well 
as tank-destroyers. The crucial problem that he was facing now was a lack of 
ammunition and other military supplies.  His aim was to keep a six month supply, but 
the economy had not permitted that. However, despite these handicaps, he pointed out 
that the discipline and training of the Pakistan army made it a force to be reckoned 
with. Dulles asked Ayub to be specific on the military needs of Pakistan. Ayub then 
handed a shopping list to Dulles who expressed his interest and agreement with the 
thoughts in it. The topic of discussion moved on to the Air Force and air bases in 
Pakistan. Ayub stated that there were six squadrons based around the country, and it 
was an efficient service but restricted by the lack of funds. As for the air bases, Ayub 
said there were many of these, many with long runways which could yet be extended. 
The subject moved on to Kashmir. Ayub insisted that pressure  should be put on 
Nehru to resolve  the dispute. He also attempted to reassure the Americans that any 
military aid that Pakistan received would not be used against India as he felt that war 
would weaken both countries and would prove to be too expensive. Lt. Colonel Made 
from the visiting delegation participated in the conversation at this point and repeated 
the statement by Governor General of Pakistan Ghulam Mohammad to the effect that 
Pakistan was willing to go to India’s aid if she was attacked by another power and 
added that he had already informed Dulles of this fact. Ayub thanked Colonel Made 
for the reminder as well as for passing Ghulam Mohammad’s statement on to Dulles. 
Ayub further expressed his belief that, after Nehru, India might split up into separate 
states, which might become subject to Communist influences. The scenario worried 
him as, according to him, it would be dangerous for the future of Pakistan.70 During 
the meeting, both also spoke of the East and West divide. Ayub felt that the US was 
the undisputed leader of the free world and should not be afraid to assist countries that 
were ready to cooperate with them. He emphasised the potential in manpower and in 
bases that Pakistan had and said that the present government in Pakistan was 
extremely anxious to cooperate with the US. And he expressed his firm belief that, if 
the US gave Pakistan military and economic assistance, it would result in India 
dropping its intransigent attitude towards Kashmir and world security.71 Dulles 
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returned to his country with a convincing argument that Pakistan could be a reliable 
ally. He sent a message to the PM of Pakistan stating that: 
 
He [Ayub] has passed on my strong feelings that the combination of 
strength of religious feeling and martial spirit of your people makes 
Pakistan a country that can be relied upon as one of the great bulwarks in 
that area against communism… I shall continue to follow the matter, 
urging quick action, as I completely share your view that it is in our 
common interest to assist your country in this regard.72 
 
3.8 A Shift in US Policy: From MEDO to Military Alliances 
 
A strategic organization must have its roots in the area concerned itself. No 
outside countries, no matter how friendly and well-disposed, could present a blue 
print and expect the countries of a region to accept it automatically. Regional 
countries must believe that their interests are best served by getting together and by 
creating greater strength through collective action rather than by acting independently 
of each other. Europe had recognized this fact and created the Western Union through 
the Brussels Pact. This was followed by NATO which greatly increased the scope and 
strength of European defence. What was needed in the Middle East was someone to 
take the initiative with other members of the region. The Arab countries could back up 
such a grouping or an organization, but, because of the Egypt-Israel hostility, they 
were not disposed towards any such initiative. In the creation of a regional grouping, 
the moral support of the US and such material assistance as it might supply would be 
of great importance.73 Pakistan was very keen to have a US supported Middle Eastern 
military organization in the region. However, the inactive role of other regional 
countries discouraged the Pentagon, State Department and Pakistan Army from 
forming MEDO. 
 It was Secretary Dulles’ historic 1953 spring visit to the Middle East and 
South Asia that changed the entire scheme of MEDO. After his visit, ‘the focus of  
American efforts regarding the defence of the Middle East changed from the concept 
of MEDO to the idea of concentrating on the defence of the Northern tier of the 
Middle East’.74 Dulles believed that there was more concern over Soviet intent where 
borders were nearer. Turkey and Pakistan were seen as the potential guardians of the 
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flanks, with the responsibility of having to defend Iran and Afghanistan.75 Since 
Pakistan was part of the Northern Tier, the US administration, especially the 
Pentagon, began to discuss the idea of providing limited military aid to Pakistan with 
the objective of strengthening the defence capabilities of the Northern Tier. During his 
visit to Karachi, Dulles was very appreciative of his hosts. He declared ‘Pakistan [as 
a] potential strong point for us [the US]’ and that he was ‘tremendously impressed by 
the martial and religious qualities of the Pakistanis’.76 However, the documents at the 
National Archives in Washington DC clearly show that the State Department was still 
indecisive about extending assistance to Pakistan because of the likely adverse effect 
it could have on Indo-American relations.77  
As a result of numerous meetings and exchange of letters, the Intelligence 
Advisory Committee to the State Department estimated that the non-Communist 
regimes in India and Pakistan were likely to continue for some time to come. Pakistan 
was ready to provide the West with base rights and possible troop commitments in 
return for substantial military and economic aid and security guarantees. The 
Committee also recognized that the conclusion of a military assistance agreement 
between Pakistan and the US would be resented by India but would probably not lead 
to war.78 In the meantime, a Psychological Intelligence Report was sought from the 
US embassy in Karachi by the State Department to analyse South Asia’s response to 
US policy objectives. In the report, the US embassy accepted the old Pakistani line 
that the Communists were influential in India, whereas Islam in Pakistan prevented 
the spread of Communism. Deteriorating economic conditions in Pakistan were seen 
as a reason to look for external help. Even her membership of the British 
Commonwealth was given as a reason for close ties with the UK and the West. For 
these reasons, the US embassy felt that Pakistanis were not nearly as suspicious of US 
intentions as the Indians.79  
The Psychological Intelligence Report mentioned how US popularity was 
increasing amongst rank and file in Pakistan. It went on to say that Pakistani cabinet 
members were now openly pro-American, but it was hard to know ordinary persons’ 
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views because of widespread illiteracy and ignorance. The increasingly friendly 
attitude in Pakistan towards the US was seen as a result of recent positive American 
acts such as the gift of wheat grain. Bogra, whose appointment was seen as 
accelerating a more sympathetic approach to America, spoke of the US in such 
favourable terms that the danger that he might be regarded as ‘too American’ was 
mentioned. Generally a pro-American trend was inevitable the report concluded, 
unless unforeseen domestic or international events occurred, and, even then, the 
goodwill built up would not disappear overnight. The US Ambassador in Karachi, 
Hildreth, had sent a very positive message to the State Department after arriving in 
Pakistan. However, the political and military leadership of Pakistan considered that 
America had misconstrued Pakistan’s basic motive as being to improve its [Pakistan] 
military balance with India – a big misunderstanding that needed to be corrected. 
‘Pakistan’s army high-ups now wanted some form of military arrangement with the 
US’.80  
 
3.9 Institutional Alliance in the Offing 
 
The stage was ready and the circumstances were favourable for a Pak-US 
military collaboration - an institutional interaction between the State Department, the 
White House and the Pentagon and the Pakistan Army. Ayub spoke to a member of 
the US embassy in Karachi before leaving for the US.  He expressed his views that he 
never believed in MEDO as the Middle East was in a mess and because he believed 
that bilateral agreements were more effective. A bilateral agreement had to be a 
military agreement as a precedent for an arrangement like MEDO.81 His strong 
contention was that any bilateral accord would bring Pakistan closer to the US, and 
the following regional organization would be more favourable to Pakistan than to its 
other members. A prior military agreement would make Pakistan a confident ally of 
the US and hence her stakes in the forthcoming organization would be better served 
and taken care of by the US. He also asked if Americans were scared of Indian 
reaction to the Pak-US agreement or feared that Pakistan might use the arms against 
India. Further to that, he answered all these queries himself. He urged that a bilateral 
agreement with Pakistan would be the best possible way for the US to get India on 
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their bandwagon. He gave an assurance if one was required that American arms 
would not be used against India, unless India attacked Pakistan first. He also 
expressed his frustration as to why the State Department had been so patient with 
Nehru after his numerous rebuffs to Washington and his support of Communists. He 
stated that the US needed bases south of Russia, and Pakistan might be willing to 
make a contribution.82 The risk in granting weapons to Pakistan was worth taking as 
the alternatives would weaken the pro-American government and army in Pakistan 
and ‘prejudice any chance of American hopes of building her up as a bulwark against 
Communism’.83  
Ayub Khan wanted a bilateral treaty with the US, but he did not want to miss 
any opportunity to have a regional security organization backed by the US. It was 
time to highlight the weaknesses of the region and need to contain communism in the 
region and its neighbourhood. Ayub, while addressing the US National War College, 
highlighted the importance of South and South East Asia and the Middle East and 
emphasized the importance of an American role in the region. He said that the 
withdrawal of British, Turkish and Dutch empires from South Asia, the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia had created a power vacuum which eventually resulted in weak 
nations in the regions. This could be compared with the developments in Eastern 
Europe after the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. With its break up a 
Soviet Empire was built which filled the vacuum, and the resultant weak nations were 
dominated under the Communist umbrella. Keeping in view the object of communism 
as world domination, it was easy to understand the significance of the political and 
military weaknesses in Middle East, South Asia and Southeast Asia.84 He emphasized 
that the nations of the Middle East being generally so weak, so suspicious of one 
another, and so concerned with their own problems, were not aware of the real threat. 
‘While none of these nations would welcome communism, none would have the 
power to resist it’ he added.  
Ayub Khan was very positive towards resisting communism to the utter limits 
of the army’s ability in Pakistan. However, he was very sceptical about India. During 
his address to the National War College, he said that the ‘communist problem was 
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increasing in India. The power vacuum was created due to British withdrawal, but 
they displayed the foresight to get out before they were chased out by the emerging 
empire’. Ayub expected that the Americans could establish strength in this broad 
region. According to him, 
  
American strength and resources were being concentrated on the one hand 
in Europe and on the other in the Far East. These positions represented the 
two broad flanks of Soviet strength. Nevertheless, to overlook the great 
southern perimeter was dangerous. If the soviets moved suddenly, sealing 
off South Asia, and cut through the Middle East to Egypt, our positions in 
Europe would be under threat of encirclement. A similar threat into 
Southeast Asia would have a similar result with respect to our Far East 
position. 
 
Ayub was trying to highlight the military importance of the region. He knew that 
economic assistance was pouring into Pakistan, but his interest was more in military 
aid. He made this point by saying: 
 
No nation, regardless of its rate of economic development, is safe from 
communist imperialism without military power. Economic power without 
military power means nothing. Indeed, an economically attractive nation 
without military power becomes an increasingly attractive target. 
 
He expressed his belief that the US non-entry in the area was because of its fear of 
offending someone or a nation. But even if it never moved, it would still be offending 
nations of the region. Similarly, while giving an example, General Ayub said that the 
US support to Turkey gave military power to both nations.  He wanted to induce the 
same support for Pakistan. At one end, he was encouraging the US towards a bilateral 
agreement with Pakistan; on the other hand, he also targeted Nehru’s policy of 
neutralism. He argued that the neutralist philosophy of Nehru was very attractive for 
newly decolonized nations. ‘In case of world war between the US and the Soviet 
Union, Nehru’s question used to be: “what has that to do with us?”’ 
Particularising the theme of American hesitation to move into the area, he 
asserted that, with the increase of military power, Pakistan would be strengthened 
which would have only one effect in this respect: to compel India to reconcile its 
differences with Pakistan and to look to its own defences against the communist 
world. He was sure that, far from Pakistanis marching to Delhi, the Indians would 
march to Washington! The General said that this broad pattern of response would 
 122 
follow throughout the area: that wherever the US could find a reliable friend and 
strengthen it, nearby nations would be attracted. Ayub ended his address in a light 
philosophical vein by observing that,  
 
In this world in which we find ourselves we cannot always behave as 
angels. Certainly you Americans cannot behave as angels, though you 
would like to. The effect of good people on the earth takes a long time to 
soak in; the effect of evil people is immediate. The attraction to 
communism is widespread among peoples in this area primarily because it 
promises so much, and seems to demand so little. You Americans have to 
move into this area with military power eventually. If you wait until 
eventually, I have no fear that you will succeed, but it will be much more 
costly, much more difficult and much more perilous than if you were to 
take steps to move in now and to seek positive friends.85  
 
Ayub’s address was an outline of Pakistan’s foreign policy and the army’s priorities. 
His entire speech was in order of priority – starting with the US role in the region to 
contain communism, India’s sceptical behaviour, military cooperation between the US 
and Pakistan, and urging Pakistan’s role in safeguarding US interests in the region. 
The only thing that he over-emphasised was the ‘marching of Indians on 
Washington’. That was like a storm in a tea cup. No indications could prove that New 
Delhi was so annoyed by the US. Indeed, Ayub very artistically drew a sketch of a 
competition in south and southwest Asia between Satan and God, where Satan was 
the Soviet Union and God was America. And the human being was Ayub Khan 
himself to benefit from God by showing the crafty face of Satan.   
On 30th September 1953, Ayub Khan, during his US visit, met Secretary 
Dulles. Dulles opened the conversation with Ayub Khan by asking what was the 
purpose of his trip to the US. Ayub replied with enthusiasm that it was to seek 
military assistance for the Pakistan Army, to which Dulles said that, although it was 
not his business, he hoped Ayub would get what he had come for. Ayub remarked that 
everyone he had met so far had said the same thing, and he wanted to know who 
would finally decide such matters. Dulles replied that it rested with the President to 
give such instructions, saying that he could only tell the Defence Department if he did 
not want aid to go to Pakistan. Dulles then pointed out the adverse Indian reaction to 
any military aid to Pakistan, by comparing it to the Arabs’ objection to any aid to 
Israel. Ayub countered the objection by saying that no one would get anywhere if 
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everyone was to wait for all opposing factions to agree. He said that Nehru was trying 
to dominate the Middle East and South East Asia with his ‘Non-Alignment’ mantra, 
and the two obstacles in his way were American influence and the state of Pakistan. 
He believed that the way to deal with Nehru, and possibly settle the Kashmir dispute, 
was to go ahead with the strengthening of Pakistan and to restore a balance between 
India and Pakistan. Dulles then agreed that he did not consider the Indian factor to be 
fundamental to the present situation. From a political point of view, he was prepared 
to assist Pakistan. However he was not sure whether America could supply all the 
military equipment that Pakistan needed. Ayub then closed the conversation by saying 
he hoped that Dulles would tell President Eisenhower the details of the topics they 
had discussed.86 
Keeping in view the importance of the Pakistan Army, President Eisenhower 
approved military aid to Pakistan. In the beginning, the decision was kept secret. Just 
before the decision was taken, the Governor General of Pakistan, Ghulam 
Muhammad, left Karachi on 19th October for a six week tour that included America 
for ‘medical reasons’.87 As Ayub Khan was already in America, there was inevitably 
speculation on defence talks taking place. His arrival strengthened Ayub’s position. 
The American media was also speculating about the talks, exploring the possibilities 
of a military alliance between Pakistan and the US.88 Nehru’s reaction concerning the 
rumours about possible creation of a MEDO was very sharp and strong as he declared 
it ‘a step towards bringing the world war right up to our doors’.89 The New York Times 
suggested that it would be in the interests of India to have a strong Pakistan as its 
neighbour, but recognised the fact that, while the unresolved Indo-Pakistan dispute 
over Kashmir lingered on, any attempt to strengthen Pakistani defence capabilities 
would obviously cause uneasiness amongst the Indians.90 Despite all such rumours 
and media discussions, according to Donald Kennedy, ‘The US had [yet] reached no 
position on the question of military aid to Pakistan till November 1953’.91 However, 
contrary to Kennedy’s report, the Pakistan Army had a very special place in American 
calculations. Just the day after the Ayub-Dulles meeting, the historic political decision 
to grant military aid to Pakistan was approved formally by President Eisenhower on 
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31st September 1953. The decision was so novel that even Admiral Radford of the 
National Security Council was unaware of it when Dulles mentioned it to him.92 As 
the decision was not mentioned in any of the talks with Ayub Khan, it shows that the 
Americans did not mention the decision to Ayub and continued to talk to him as if no 
firm line had yet been decided. Thus the Americans had reached a decision of 
granting aid to Pakistan but were not ready to share the news with their Pakistani 
counterparts.  In October 1953, ‘the US embassy in New Delhi had indeed presented 
strong arguments against letting General Ayub know that the decision had been made 
in principle to extend military aid to Pakistan’.93 At this crucial time, one can 
understand and read the American minds by reading the diaries of a reporter for the 
New York Times, Mr. Sulzenberger. Sulzenberger noted on 23rd November that 
Eisenhower looked grim and said that Pakistan wanted to help the western cause but 
needed military aid to do so. Eisenhower said the Pakistanis were ‘vital, brave people 
like the Turks and the Greeks’. The President’s patience with Nehru was obviously 
wearing thin as he described the Indians as simply being a ‘nuisance’ and resented the 
delay that their attitude was causing the US in giving aid to Pakistan. Byroade also 
met Sulzenberger and declared that the US did not want any bases in Pakistan and 
only wanted to build up the defence of a friendly state. Byroade did not mention that 
the US had seen bases in Pakistan as vital to the defence of the free world for decades, 
and, once military aid was given to Pakistan, the latter would find it hard to refuse any 
requests for bases.94 
Ayub Khan’s return visit to America started with a meeting with Byroade on 
21st October 1953. The decision to grant military aid to Pakistan was still not made 
public, but what Ayub wanted to know was what the US wanted from Pakistan in 
return for possible military assistance. The Defence Department officials said that 
America’s primary interest lay in strengthening Pakistan’s defence capability and its 
association with the West and in accepting the political assurances contained in the 
agreement. No specific military commitment to provide troops outside the area was 
involved. Byroade mentioned that the US might be interested at a later stage in 
developing some regional defence groups, and he hoped Pakistan would discuss her 
participation in a ‘friendly and cooperative spirit’. Ayub said that this would of course 
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be the case.95 His priority was still the same: first a bilateral military treaty and then a 
regional defence accord. 
Before leaving the US, Ayub Khan wrote, on 2nd November, to Bedell Smith, 
the Under Secretary of State, saying what a great pleasure the trip had been for him 
and hoping that Smith would ‘keep an eye on things’ from his angle as he, Ayub, 
would do the same.96 On his return from the US, he sent a letter to the Military 
Attaché at the Pakistan embassy in Washington, Brigadier Jilani on 3rd January 1954. 
A copy of this message was found in the State Department files. The message read: 
 
Please tell Mr. Keyes on my behalf that delay over the decision matter I 
discussed with you is doing no good to your or our interests. A lot of good 
will exists in this country for your country. This [is] liable to evaporate if 
no confirmation [is given] from your side. Also India [is] very busy 
poisoning Middle East and South East Asian countries against us and you. 
All this will come to an end once an agreement between Pakistan and US 
is reached. See that this is done quickly. Therefore events will take course 
as predicted and told you.97   
 
The fact that the letter was found in the State Department files is a manifestation of 
American interception of Pakistani mail. This expresses how conscious they must 
have been of Pakistani policies and plans. On the other hand, it also shows how 
desperate Ayub Khan was for foreign military aid. By now, Pakistanis had burnt all 
their boats for regional cooperation with neighbouring communist countries in 
exchange for US military support. This annoyed all – India, China and Russia. The 
military alliance between the US and Pakistan had become the talk of the town in the 
region. Therefore, for Pakistan, the US delay in announcing military assistance was 
disappointing. Horace Hildreth, while expressing Pakistanis’ feelings over the delay 
in granting aid, wrote to Donald Kennedy that ‘the delay in giving military assistance 
to Pakistan was putting Pakistan in an awkward position’.98 
In the meanwhile, India expressed concern that Pakistan’s military ties with 
the US might provoke the Russians, but she was more concerned that an increase in 
Pakistan’s armed strength might lead to a disturbance in the balance of power in the 
sub-continent. ‘[The] Prevailing notion in the British Commonwealth and Foreign 
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Office was that India might even seek to prevent Pakistan joining such an 
organization by threats of military action’.99 Such a position, amounting in fact to 
neutralising Pakistan indefinitely, could not be tolerated between Commonwealth 
members. In a note by PSO to the secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, it 
was hoped to prevent this issue arising by keeping India informed of the progress of 
events in the MEDO.100 It was on 25th February 1954 that Eisenhower declared that 
the US was ready to aid Pakistan militarily. 
   
3.10 The British displeasure over growing Institutional 
Alliance. 
 
The British were not happy with the Pakistan Army and US contacts concerning a 
military arms deal. They wanted a collaboration between the governments of the US 
and Pakistan rather than an institutional alliance between the Pakistan Army and the 
US policy making bodies. The reason was not that they did not trust the US policy-
making bodies but that they were sceptical about Pakistan’s armed forces. Mr. Beeley, 
the Counsellor of the British Embassy in the US, wrote in a memo:  
 
Broadly speaking, London did not like the US proposal [of offering 
military equipment to Pakistan]. The UK would like to see Pakistan 
strengthened militarily. However, there was the problem of Indian 
reaction. India would consider that the US was bringing the East West 
conflict to the Sub-Continent and that the US had decided actively to 
support Pakistan in the Kashmir dispute. Indian reaction would be sharp, 
and Indo-British relations would suffer. Certain British military facilities 
in India of importance to Western defence might be lost.101  
 
British policy makers further hoped that any US military aid to Pakistan would come 
as a result of a formal request from the Pakistan government made after careful 
consideration by the Pakistan Cabinet and not as a result of any proposal made by 
General Ayub Khan.102 But on the ground, the situation was just opposite to British 
expectations. The Army was more interested and in haste than the Cabinet to join the 
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Western defence alliance. The British mistrust of Pakistan and its armed forces can 
also be judged from a British Cabinet paper that says,  
 
It is true that Pakistan produces some of the best fighting material in the 
world. But the value of her army must be dependent on the goodwill of 
the politicians who control it. And, by and large, the present generation of 
Pakistani politicians is inexperienced, somewhat parochially minded and 
lacking in the generous and pro-British temper characteristic of certain 
Muslim leaders in India in earlier days. Moreover there is an element if 
not of anti-British feeling, at any rate of indifference to the 
Commonwealth tie, in the Pakistan Navy and Air Force, and it would fall 
to us to provide and perhaps pay for, much of the arms and equipment of 
the Pakistan Armed Forces. In any case it is only if friendlier relations 
with India can be reached and maintained that the Pakistan Armed Forces 
would be available for use in other directions.103 
 
The rise of American involvement in Pakistan resulted in the loss of British prestige 
in Karachi. The British High Commissioner in Karachi, Gilbert Laithwait, wrote to 
the Commonwealth Relations Office that: 
 
The British position in Pakistan was weak and getting worse because of 
the difficulty of seeing what can be done effectively to remedy it. 
Financially and in terms of supply, we cannot, unfortunately, hope to 
compete with the US. Pakistan recognizes that it is not we, but the 
Americans who now have something to give, and who are ready and 
anxious to take political, diplomatic, and military initiatives which for 
good reasons are not open to us.104    
 
If on one hand the British were losing Pakistan covertly, on the other hand Americans 
had less aid to give overtly to Pakistan. This was frustrating for ‘Karachites’. They 
realised that US aid was insufficient to fulfil their requirements. They had become a 
target of neighbouring hostile countries for such meagre assistance. Previously, they 
maintained that it would make them safer. On not receiving enough aid, they were 
very insecure. On receiving less aid, Hildreth, in his dispatch of 8th April 1954, 
recalled an earlier incident in which he had asked some Pakistani government officials 
to remember the atmosphere of November 1953 when Nixon was visiting. The delay 
in giving military assistance to Pakistan was putting Pakistan in an awkward position. 
The Pakistani officials made the statement that ‘if military aid were now not 
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forthcoming, they would feel “like the girl led down the primrose path and deserted 
under the spotlight”. Ambassador Hildreth replied that he did not think that was fair 
because actually the situation was more in the nature of the girl pursuing the US down 
the primrose path instead of being led down the primrose path. The official laughed 
and said, yes, he guessed that was true but the result was the same’.105 Hildreth 
recalled that for a similar situation Muhammad Ali had given an alternate analogy that 
was of a man going to borrow a gun to shoot a mad dog, and was given a needle and a 
thread to repair a hole in his trousers instead. Zafrullah had added, ‘Especially if the 
mad dog was intelligent enough to know you had gone to borrow a gun’.106 
It was on 19th May 1954 that a Mutual Defence Agreement was signed in 
Karachi.107 The main terms of the agreement were that the US would furnish Pakistan 
with arms and services which the US felt Pakistan needed. The arms were to be used 
for internal security, self-defence and collective defence of the region. No aggressive 
acts were permitted. Pakistan in return was to make a full contribution to the ‘defence 
strength of the free world’.108 However, while expressing his desire for the US 
alliance, the PM of Pakistan Mohammad Ali said to Dulles that ‘Pakistan would 
welcome anything which assured the security of this region’.109 He accentuated the 
point by remarking that ‘there were three countries which stood as obstructions to 
Russian ambitions in this area. These were Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan and they 
stood between the Persian Gulf and the Soviet Union’.110 At the same time, Pakistan 
was interested in any additional aid that could help fulfil its requirements domestically 
as well as internationally. During a meeting with the Governor, FOA, Stassen, 
Zafrullah said that, ‘It was Pakistan’s belief that the ‘beggar’s bowl’ should never be 
concealed. He said that he and his country adhered to what he perceived to be the 
European principle reflected in the story of the lady who wished to have her portrait 
done by a prominent portrait artist in Europe and who specified in advance that the 
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artist’s rendition must do her full justice. The artist in Sir Zafrullah’s story replied, 
“Madam, what you need is not justice but mercy”.111 
 Pakistan’s military and military-backed political leadership was now satisfied 
by becoming an ally with the most powerful country in the world. In America, the 
friends of India, including Chester Bowles and Senator William Fulbright, expressed 
serious doubts about the wisdom of arming Pakistan.112 But only a few elements in 
Pakistan and more specifically in East Pakistan expressed their resentment.113 During 
the successive culmination of the agreement, Vice-President Nixon was a very blunt 
and vocal supporter of Pakistan. He wanted the agreement at all costs. He had a very 
good memory of his visit to Pakistan. In his memoirs he says: 
 
I practically enjoyed talking to General Ayub Khan because, unlike most 
of his countrymen, he was not obsessed by the Pakistan-India problem. He 
did indicate his total contempt for the Hindus and his distrust of the 
Indians, but in his conversation, he was more anti-communist than anti-
Indian. He was seriously concerned about the communist threat, both 
ideological and military, and about the danger that the Soviets would use 
India as a cat’s paw for establishing a major presence in South Asia. At 
that period in his career he was strongly pro-American and believed that 
Pakistan and the United States should be allies and friends.114  
 
The pro-American tilt of Ayub Khan was very motivating for Nixon. The more he 
was anti-communist, the more he was mustering American support. His anti-Indian 
feelings were satisfied automatically. Any material support that Ayub was acquiring 
against the Soviet Union was in fact equally applicable against India. Hence, it was 
like killing two birds with one stone, containing the Soviet Union for America and 
India for Pakistan. It was not a big deal to become anti-Soviet to satisfy America’s 
strategic thirsts and to acquire military support that could be and, rather, was used 
against India.  
The Americans were hesitant to disclose their grant aid to Pakistan to India. 
To begin with, Nixon had a bitter recollection of his meeting with Nehru. During their 
meeting, Nehru was continuously talking against Pakistan, declaring it the most 
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hostile country for India. He never mentioned Communism or the Soviet Union. This 
irritated Nixon the most. Giving his reaction on aid to Pakistan he maintained: 
 
Pakistan is a country I would like to do anything for. The people have less 
complexes than the Indians. The Pakistanis are completely frank, even 
when it hurts. It will be disastrous if the Pakistan aid does not go 
through.115 
 
 The aid got through for Pakistan, but the US administration was very sceptical about 
Indian reaction. The Department of Defence (DoD) was so frightened of India’s 
reaction that it was specifically notified not to hold any ceremony for the first 
shipment of military aid to Pakistan. The DoD merely issued a short factual press 
release shortly before the ship sailed. It was urged not to highlight this event in the 
press so that no undue emphasis would be given to the event.116 President Eisenhower 
proposed a conciliatory statement being issued to India clarifying that the US aid was 
‘not to help Pakistan against India’. Along with the President, Dulles, Defence 
Secretary Wilson and Mutual Security Administrator Stassen also thought to offer a 
similar pact to India. It was just a tactical approach as everyone knew that India would 
not accept any such offer.117 ‘Americans knew that it was impossible for them ever to 
expect Pakistan to like the US economic assistance to India and vice versa’.118 But ‘a 
pat on the back was inexpensive and yet sometimes vastly effective’.119  
With the US aid pouring into Pakistan, different departments of the 
government of Pakistan began racing against each other to accelerate the work of their 
respective ministries in order make best use of the opportunity. To downplay the 
internal race, General Mirza, Secretary of Defence, formed a committee to deal with 
the US military mission and laid down the law for ministries.120 The law was ‘to act 
sensibly and not to make fools of themselves competing with each other for the 
enhancement of their particular service’.121 He also wanted ‘the progress under 
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military aid, though slow, but sound and consistent and not an impetuous rush 
amongst ministries to see who could get the mostest fastest’.122 It was his planning 
and sensible acts that had earned him much respect in the eyes of Americans. Dulles 
while talking to Stassen, Director FOA once said that, it would be difficult for 
Pakistan to find “another person of his [Mirza’s] capabilities”.123 
With the debut of military and economic assistance, the Americans’ tone 
towards Pakistanis turned cynical. They had a very low opinion of Pakistani policy 
makers or the ones who were in the hub of Pakistan’s policy-making bodies. Donald 
Kennedy, writing to the US ambassador Hildreth, says:  
 
Colonel House, Woodrow Wilson’s great friend, once reportedly said that 
a man does one of two things when he gets into the White House: he 
either grows with the job or he swells with it. I fear there are plenty 
Pakistanis in high places who, when their country becomes linked with a 
great Power, will swell rather than grow. New responsibilities and tests of 
statesmanship will accrue to Pakistan as time goes on, but that small-
minded contingent of Karachi may not rise to the occasion. Indeed it may 
well grow more irresponsible, perhaps even arrogant, particularly in the 
conduct of their government’s relations with India and Afghanistan. I 
believe that we should be alert to this phenomenon and that we should 
counter it immediately, effectively and amicably whenever it becomes 
manifest. Military assistance to Pakistan may risk relations between 
Pakistan, India and Afghanistan due to Pakistan’s association with the US. 
We should not allow the narrow-gauge boys to increase that risk. This is a 
time for Pakistanis to lean over backward to behave in the most proper 
and friendly manner in their relations with their neighbours.124 
 
The Americans were not only becoming cynical. After the granting of military and 
economic assistance, US policy became so interfering in nature that even the 
Ambassadors of Pakistan used to be changed on indication of its likes and dislikes. 
This could be witnessed in the same letter that Donald Kennedy wrote to Ambassador 
Hildreth in which he further said: 
 
The fellow [Ghazanfar] in New Delhi is a bad news wherever he is. We 
made it plain to Mohammad Ali [PM of Pakistan] when he was 
ambassador here that we thought Ghazanfar’s appointment as Ambassador 
to Ankara was incredibly bad. It is my intention to talk to Amjad Ali 
[Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US] about Ghazanfar and to suggest that a 
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man of broader calibre and different character might serve Pakistan better 
in New Delhi. J.A Rahim Foreign Secretary may also fit the description of 
being small-minded. 
 
His opinion about Sir Zafrullah was also very critical. He considered him ‘vindictive, 
inordinately proud, and perhaps not on the closest of working terms with his Governor 
General and PM’.125 
The mutual defence agreement was signed, but there were still many gaps to 
be filled. If Pakistan was to protect the Middle East against Communist forces, it had 
to be powerful enough to defend itself until help arrived. For that matter, it needed an 
army much stronger and larger than it could afford. This meant more US non-
productive investment in Pakistan’s armed forces. Creation of any such force even 
had to have the capability of taking on its erstwhile enemy, India. This meant some 
potentially gruesome consequences which the Americans did not want. Their plan was 
to woo India simultaneously to contain China. The scheme was a confused one. Over 
and above, Pakistan was the country that had military aid, though less than required, 
and a possible guarantee of security from the world’s richest and most powerful state 
against communism. It is a fact that a small country always applies pressure on its 
larger counterpart to get as much benefit as possible.126 So Pakistan sought to cash in 
on its new alliance with the US.  
International politics in the 1950s and 1960s was a game of self interest in 
which national gains might only be achieved from conflict between the great powers. 
With such expectations, the Pakistan Army received Brig. General William T. Sexton 
in the summer of 1954 to head the newly established US Military Advisory Group. To 
the greatest shock of the Pakistan military leadership, General Sexton promised a 
military aid of $30 million. General Ayub was ‘dejected’ and ‘broken hearted’. He 
communicated to the PM Bogra that if Pakistan was to get no more from US than 
General Sexton had indicated in the nature of military assistance, it would be better 
for Pakistan not to be involved in a defence arrangement with the United States.127  In 
October 1954, PM Bogra visited the US along with General Ayub Khan, and during 
his meeting with Dulles, he complained that the promised $30 million aid was too 
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little for assuming responsibilities in the Middle East and Southeast Asia against the 
Communist world. Secretary Dulles replied that he thought Pakistan was undertaking 
its anti-Communist stand because it was right and not just making itself eligible for 
certain sums of dollar aid.128 Poor Secretary Dulles was playing the game of politics 
internationally but was still thinking personally. Pakistan’s entire edifice of politics 
and joining of alliances was constructed just for one purpose: military and financial 
assistance to make the country strong against India and against a perceived threat of 
Communism. America was in need of a country like Pakistan to contain Communist 
Soviets, and Pakistan was determined to take advantage of this. Washington increased 
economic assistance to $105.9 million and gave a secret aide-memoire of military aid 
of $50 million for the coming fiscal year. The memoire also committed the US to 
equip 4 army infantry and 1.5 armoured divisions, to provide modern aircraft for 6 air 
force squadrons, and to supply 12 vessels for the navy. The total cost of this military 
program was $171 million.129 Super-power rivalry was showering fortune on 
Pakistan. By then, the Indians were moving heaven and earth to find out the 
magnitude of the American military program to Pakistan. Their problem was that they 
did not know the character or amount of aid.130 
With such a stock of military and economic aid, soon Pakistan joined the 
South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization 
(CENTO) – all a part of what became the ‘politics of alliances’ in subsequent decades. 
Pakistan was so desperate to join Western alliances that Sir Zafrullah asked the US 
Secretary of State to include East Pakistan within “the line” to be drawn defining 
South East Asia. Zafrullah suggested that Pakistan would like to join Thailand, the 
Philippines, and any others who might form the proposed SEATO. Over and above, 
Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US, Amjad Ali remarked that until recently the 
government of Pakistan had been concentrating its attention on the Middle East, but, 
he said, it had come to realise that the threat to Pakistan from the East was more 
immediate than from the West.131 Strangely, Ayub Khan in his memoirs says that the 
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defence of the East lay in the defence of the West,132 but when it came to joining US 





Map 3.1 Northern Tier and the Middle East.133 
 
Both organizations were formed on American terms and against communism. 
Pakistan tried its level best to include other aggressor countries like India. However, it 
was clearly told to the Pakistani authorities that India was not covered in the treaty 
area and that a Pakistani attack on India would not be the concern of SEATO.134 
Despite all such oddities, Foreign Minister Zafrullah signed the SEATO agreement.135 
PM Bogra was very upset about agreeing to join SEATO in haste as he had sent 
Zafrullah to attend the Manila Conference merely to observe the proceedings. A final 
green signal was to be given from Karachi. Bogra was more interested in 
understanding the pros and cons of the treaty before signing it. On the other hand, 
Zafrullah understood that the treaty did not offer anything substantive to guard 
Pakistan against India; ‘he signed it under pressure from the US and the Pakistan 
Army’.136 Soon he had to cash in the reward for it. Within a month of signing the 
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treaty, Zafrullah was elected to the ICJ with British, American and French help. He 
seemed to know that his political career was over in Pakistan, and, hence, he did not 
even return to Karachi but went straight to America from Manila. Major Sibghatullah 
Khan, while elaborating his views, said that  
 
Thus it proved that the SEATO was signed not by Pakistan as a State but 
by an individual Zafrullah supported by an institution of the country- 
Pakistan Army. Probably, the interests of Pakistan army were different 
than the interests of Pakistan.137 
 
As the formation of these organizations is not within the scope of this chapter, only 
the relations between the army and different departments of the US are highlighted. 
The politics of alliances was thus very satisfactory for the Pakistan Army. In return 
for joining SEATO, senior commanders in the Pakistan army enjoyed the opportunity 
to rub shoulders with the US army and its leadership. They became closer to them, 
which was helpful for the planning of future military coups. It also provided them 
with training centres which prepared hundreds of Pakistan army jawans (Army men) 
for battle under the scheme.138 It was the period, as discussed in the previous chapter 
in which, due to weak political institutions, Governor General Ghulam Mohammad 
dissolved the Constituent Assembly. The recent cabinet changes in the government at 
Karachi and dissolution of the Pakistani Constituent Assembly had placed in power 
‘men of proven friendliness to the US’, with General Ayub C-in-C of the army 
assuming also the duties of Minister of Defence and General Mirza becoming 
Minister of Interior139. These were men from whom American could expect 
continuing co-operation.140 ‘The two most effective forces for stability in the country, 
namely, the Army and the Civil Service, were behind the Governor General’.141 What 
was known to the Americans was the fact that the group now ‘holding power was 
anxious to further the present friendly policy of Pakistan toward the US and the West 
and may be expected to continue a policy of cooperation along these lines’.142 The 
Commander-In-Chief Ayub Khan was responsible to himself now as he was Defence 
Minister and had absolute authority to deal with security pacts and the politics of 
                                                 
137 Major (Rtd) Sibghatullah Khan, (Nowshera, 10-06-07). 
138 Ibid.  
139 A Report on Pakistan, Record of the Director, SOA Regional Conference and Country Files, 1951-
1954, Pakistan, RG 59 (GRDS), Lot File. 57D373/NND847209, NARA. 
140 Memo, 57D462, Box 03, NND903085, November 1, 1954, NARA. 
141 A Report on Pakistan, (GRDS). 
142 Ibid.  
 136 
alliances. In his biography, he says that Ghulam Mohammad had offered him the role 
of martial law administrator, as the army had already gained the confidence of the 
people during ‘1952 martial law in Lahore’,143 but he declined this offer.144 Probably 
the time was not yet ripe for a military take-over. But, given the circumstances and 
their direction of change, it was inevitable in future.  
SEATO opened direct links between the army and the US administration. At 
the same time, Ayub Khan, being C-in-C and Defence Minister, was more at the hub 
of politics, both domestic and international. The decision to join CENTO or ‘the 
Baghdad Pact’ was made purely on the directions of Ayub Khan who negotiated with 
Turkey, Iraq and the British administration on behalf of the government of Pakistan. 
In CENTO parleys, Ayub was more concerned with Pakistan’s role in the case of a 
war in which Turkey was involved as a member of NATO. Adnan Menderes, the 
Turkish Prime Minister, replied that although there would be no question of any 
automatic action being taken, there ought to be an understanding amongst parties to 
see what kind of help could be provided in case of war. PM Nuri Said of Iraq and 
Menderes consoled Ayub by saying that some kind of link would be provided 
between the pacts in Western Europe and Asia. After receiving this answer, Ayub 
admitted that he was asking a question and hesitating to accede to the pact not as a 
politician but on behalf of himself. From a military point of view, he wanted to know 
what the extent of Pakistan’s commitment would be before joining the pact.145 Soon 
after, Ayub sent a telegram to Karachi from the Pakistan embassy in Istanbul 
recommending that Pakistan should now join the Baghdad Pact.146  
Back in Pakistan, Mirza was consoling the newly arrived British ambassador 
Symon in Karachi by assuring him that Ayub’s visit to Istanbul was of an exploratory 
nature. He told Symon that before his visit, there was heated debate in the cabinet 
meeting over the question of joining or not joining the pact. He, as an Interior 
Minister, tried to get a resolution adopted that Pakistan must adhere to the Turko-Iraqi 
initiation. Mirza said that he could not succeed, but that it should not be considered 
Pakistan’s final decision over the issue.147  
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On the domestic front, due to his feeble and poor health, Ghulam Mohammad 
was replaced by Iskander Mirza as acting Governor General with the conviction that 
he would take this job permanently once Ghulam Mohammad officially retired on 6th 
October. Mirza was too pro-west to be a Pakistani. On 12th August 1955, when Mirza 
as acting Governor General, met with British Ambassador Symon, he promised to do 
all he could to join the Baghdad Pact.148 It was on 23rd September that Pakistan 
formally joined the Pact. The Pact’s membership was completed when the Shah of 
Iran joined on 11th October of the same year. The concept of the Northern Tier, once 
developed in the minds of US policy makers, was at last materialised for the defence 
of the Middle East. At this moment, Ayub Khan, in his autobiography Friends Not 
Masters, defined Pakistan as ‘America’s most allied ally in Asia’.149 Pakistani leaders 
attached great importance to the assurances contained in the Department of State’s 
November 29, 1956 statement regarding the Baghdad Pact countries’ security. They 
interpreted it as a US guarantee of the territorial integrity of all Baghdad Pact 
powers.150 
Besides its military objectives the US military assistance program for Pakistan 
had certain clearly defined political advantages. The initiation of US military 
assistance to Pakistan probably did more than anything else to strengthen Pakistan’s 
support for the side of the free world in the Cold War struggle. A logical sequel to 
strengthened ties with the US and the West was Pakistan’s adherence to SEATO and 
the Baghdad Pact. Conversely any serious Pakistani disappointments with regard to 
US military aid would very probably lead to a slackening of Pakistani interest and 
support for the two pacts.151  
The military aid program contributed to the US political objectives in Pakistan 
by strengthening the Pakistan Army and improving its morale. In doing so, Americans 
reinforced, as they saw it, the most important element in Pakistan making up for 
internal stability. Thus the army had apparently demonstrated on a number of 
occasions its capacity to exert a stabilizing influence in situations where civil order 
threatened to deteriorate or had actually broken down. At the same time, however, 
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Map 3.2 Baghdad Pact Nations: The Northern Tier in 1956.153 
 
On two occasions within two or three months of May to August 1956, 
President Mirza expressed to the US Embassy representatives in Karachi his 
satisfaction with the rate of military deliveries. While there were indications that 
General Ayub was not fully satisfied with every aspect of the program as it was 
developing, Americans believed that on the whole the program was proceeding in a 
manner to have a favourable political impact in Pakistan. Perhaps the most serious 
problem in connection with the program [MDAP] was the question of its ultimate 
economic effect in Pakistan. The US government was about to express general 
concern over the economic implications of Pakistan’s growing military machine.154 
However, no such witness is available expressing US concerns over the Pakistan’s 
swelling defence budget or its disproportionate expenditure on the military. 
 
3.11 Offers and Pressures from the Soviet Union 
 
With the joining of pacts, Pakistan came under extreme pressure from the 
Soviet Union. In a press interview on 6th February 1956, the Russian PM Bulganin 
offered extended trade and technical aid to Pakistan. He also said that the USSR was 
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willing to buy Pakistan’s agricultural produce and cattle exchange for Soviet 
agricultural and industrial machinery. He went to such an extent that he indicated his 
willingness to share with Pakistan, the Russians’ technical knowledge concerning the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy.155 Although previously Karachi could use Soviet 
support for India and Afghanistan in its quarrels with Pakistan as an excuse to reject 
Bulganin’s approach, this could not be expected from the present government. The 
country was run by army sponsored and pro-American politicians like Mirza and 
Suhrawardy. The nexus between the Army and the US Department of State and 
Pentagon was so strong that no mild attitude from the government of Pakistan was 
acceptable to any of the poles – the State Department, the Pentagon or the Pakistan 
Army. Soviet advances were therefore rebutted forthrightly. There was a popular 
sentiment in Pakistan that the complete commitment to the West had not been 
productive.156 But who cared about popular sentiment in a third world country 
governed at the whim of the army? The popular cry was against the alliances, but the 
government was not popular. Hence American allies and foes were borrowed. SEATO 
and CENTO alliances were the outcome of an institutional understanding between the 
State Department, the Pentagon, the White House and the Pakistan Army. 
Soviet pressure on Pakistan continued by promoting and highlighting Indian 
interests in the world. According to a CIA report, 26th January1956, Moscow re-
emphasised its ties with New Delhi. It stressed that the importance of India was the 
foremost of the neutral states and as the “sixth great power” in world affairs. 
Khrushchev declared that “India is our special friend” and that the Soviet Union 
acknowledged “India’s rights as a great power”.157 The same CIA report also 
mentioned that Moscow might be planning to promote India for a Security Council 
seat along with Communist China. However, Indians themselves had already 
indicated that they regarded the Chinese seat as belonging to Peiping (Beijing).158  
The first Deputy PM of USSR, Mikoyan’s visit to Karachi in March 1956 was 
aimed at campaigning to pry Pakistan away from its political and economic ties with 
the West. On 23rd March 1956, he suggested that Pakistan must replace its 
membership of alliances with adherence to the “five principles”. While meeting with 
PM Chaudhri Mohamad Ali, he strongly attacked the alliances and said that the USSR 
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was determined to maintain the “neutrality” of Afghanistan. He spoke very 
confidently of Soviet strength, emphasizing that the USSR feared no power and that 
the USSR was determined “to break” pacts directed against it. At the same time, 
Mikoyan threw a trump card by making it clear that Pakistan’s withdrawal from its 
western commitments was not an essential condition for Soviet assistance and 
friendship.159 Side by side, his conversations in Karachi were supported in Moscow 
by Foreign Minister Molotov’s hint that the USSR might be willing to construct a 
steel mill for Pakistan along the lines of the Soviet project in Bhilai, India. All such 
offers were so attractive that even pro-American President Mirza commented that “a 
change” had come over Russians during the last two months: “they used to be very 
cold. Now they are very warm”.160  However, the power centre lay not in the office of 
the PM or Governor General, but with the military hierarchy. The politics of alliances 
were joined not by politicians but by the civil-military bureaucracy. The Soviets were 
knocking at the wrong door. A public institution like the Foreign Office was formally 
responsible for foreign policy. However, the real power was with the Army GHQ.   
 
 
Figure 10. Organizational chart of Baghdad Pact, February 6 1958.161 
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3.12 Pak-US Cooperation with Other Middle Eastern Countries 
and Egypt’s Aspiration of Muslim Leadership 
 
The US-sponsored regional organizations boosted the Army’s morale. By now 
the US administration was fully convinced that ‘the power of Pakistan’s central 
government rested with the Army’.162 Now, the Americans were interested in 
absorbing more Middle Eastern countries into its politics of alliances. Egypt was at 
the top of the list. However, Pakistan and Egypt were both aspiring for the leadership 
of the Muslim world. In recent years, the emergence of Pakistan as the world’s largest 
Muslim state, and one that was created explicitly on the basis of Islam, made her a 
natural contender for leadership, but in Egypt, after the end of the caliphate system at 
the hands of Mustafa Kemal, King Farouk of Egypt developed ambitions to become 
Caliph. In anticipation of this added dignity, he had proclaimed himself a “Sayyid”, or 
descendant of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), which by custom and tradition any 
caliph of Islam must be. In view of Farouk’s known Albanian and Turkish ancestry, 
the claim was so patently spurious that it resulted in nothing but ridicule and derision 
and was soon dropped.163 Gamal Abd-al-Nasser was more systematic and organized 
in taking lead of the Muslim world than Farouk. Nasser, in his book, says that Egypt 
had to move in three circles: the Arab world, Africa, and the world of Islam.164 He felt 
challenged by Pakistan in two of his supposed circles: the Arab and Islamic worlds.  
He abhorred the politics of alliances and Pakistan’s keen desire to involve Arab 
countries from the Middle East. He opposed any move which might result in the 
appearance of a rival in his pan-Arab circle. This was the reason that he was strongly 
opposed to Hashemite plans for a Fertile Crescent or Greater Syria. Similarly, his 
violent opposition to Iraq’s participation in the Northern Tier and his vigorous efforts 
to prevent the adherence of any other Arab states stemmed not only from his neutralist 
leanings and desire to keep the Arab countries out of the arena of great power rivalry, 
but also from a strong hatred to see any Arab state rejecting Egyptian leadership.165 
Added to these factors was Nasser’s resentment over Turkey’s attitude towards the 
Israeli problem. Egypt had her neutral antipathy toward strengthening the position of 
                                                 
162 Operations Coordinating Board, Washington DC, Progress Report No. NSC 5409, (South Asia), 
File No. 48, CIA, February 23, 1955, NARA. 
163 CIA-RDP78-02771R000500030002-9, 18th September 1955. 
164 Gamal Abdul Nasser, Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution, (Washington: Public 
Affairs Press), Washington DC, 1955. 
165 CIA-RDP78-02771R000500030002-9, 18th September 1955. 
 142 
Pakistan, her only real competitor for Islamic leadership.166 As the US was not on 
good terms with Egypt, it wanted to see Pakistan as leader of the Muslim world. 
Having Pakistan in its politics of alliances was like a window of opportunity towards 
the Muslim nations. Pakistan’s support for the US in such alliances had a two folded 
result for the US: to contain Communism and to counter anti-western sentiments in 
Muslim countries like Egypt. 
British Foreign Secretary Eden, in his telegram to Dulles, stated that ‘if we 
cannot win the active support of all the Asian countries of the area, it is important that 
we should, at the very least, secure their benevolent neutrality’.167 Any such neutrality 
could be synthesised with the pro-Western stance of Pakistan. However, Nasser 
reacted strongly to the pro-West policy of Pakistan. He got closer to India in spite of 
the fact that India had recognized Israel, but he never forgave Pakistan’s entry into the 
Baghdad Pact which harmed Egypt in the long run. The politics of alliances joined by 
a strong Muslim country like Pakistan curtailed Egypt’s bid to become a Muslim 
world leader. Pakistan’s role reduced Egypt’s anticipated role vis-à-vis the US and the 
West. Hence, Nasser not only refused to accept Pakistan’s contingent as part of the 
UN Emergency Force at the end of the Suez War, but welcomed an Indian Contingent 
instead. In the meantime, he remarked: ‘The Suez Canal is to Egypt what Kashmir is 
to India, and Pakistan with its communal basis is as artificial a state as Israel’.168 Such 
sentiments earned a bad reaction from the Pakistan Army. However, the public in 
Pakistan still believed in the concept of Muslim brotherhood. During the Suez War of 
1956, the people and leadership of Pakistan were therefore on opposite poles. People 
were out in the streets demonstrating against Britain, France and Israel for their joint 
attack on Egypt, and newspapers, like Dawn, were declaring Israel ’gangsters’. But 
President Mirza was assuring US Ambassador Hildreth that ‘in any crisis the US 
could expect complete support from Pakistan for its policies’. He also hoped the ‘US 
government and West would at least let Nasser and Egypt get kicked around for a 
while before [the US] rescued him’.169 PM Sohrawardy also showed his full support 
by telling Ambassador Hildreth that the government of Pakistan would back the 
present US stand in the UN. He added that it was though politically necessary to 
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permit demonstrations to be held.170 The Baghdad Pact was thus not only for defence 
planning against the USSR but was also an instrument to contest Egypt’s bid to 
dominate the Middle East.171  
In the Baghdad Pact, Iraq was the most vulnerable and weak country. It was 
under continuing pressure from the Arab world to abandon the alliance, especially 
after the Suez War. At the same time, very bleak support was granted to the member 
countries by the West. There was no unified military command which was the 
prerequisite of every such organization.172 Therefore, according to the CIA reports, it 
was predicted in 1955 that Iraq would probably not be able to resist and might give in 
to Egyptian pressure.173   
Due to the lack of concrete Western support, the Turkish leadership was much 
frustrated. PM Menderes blamed the US and Britain for failing to fulfil the conditions 
of the Pact. He said that the rest of the four countries were losing confidence in their 
western allies because of their hesitation in supporting the pact. He was very vocal 
when he said, ‘events are surpassing US capabilities and the US seems to be getting 
dizzy’ and that ‘the USSR is dynamic and working very hard and the US does not 
know what to do’.174 
During the Suez War, the attack on Egypt by Britain and France placed them 
‘on the wrong side of a moral issue’. The Anglo-French attempt to re-assert their 
control over the Suez Canal compromised any chances for widening Asian 
participation in the Pact. Asian members of the organization found it difficult to 
defend both domestically and internationally their participation in SEATO.175 On the 
other hand, the communist world was very swift to encourage the neutralist bloc. The 
Soviet leader Khrushchev hinted that he would urge a great-power guarantee of the 
neutralization of at least part of the Middle East and an agreement on non-intervention 
which would include an embargo on arms shipments to the area.176 Before that, he 
stated that their policies in the Middle East would conform to ‘six principles’177.178 
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Pakistan was much more interested in the politics of alliances than in any bunch of 
principles, but the Americans had noted the Soviet tilt towards Pakistan. According to 
a National Security Council Paper, ‘The USSR was engaged in a vigorous and open 
diplomatic, propaganda, and economic campaign to increase its influence in the 





It is questionable whether it is realistic to consider military assistance to Pakistan in 
terms of small sums like thirty or fifty million dollars a year. The risks to US security 
interests created by any US military assistance to Pakistan would be so profound as to 
appear to rule out such assistance except on a vast scale including massive defence 
support expenditure. Any assistance would have to be on the premise that Americans 
had considered India’s cold war and hot war importance and had decided that the 
smaller and much weaker country of Pakistan was more useful to the US. Further, 
Pakistan’s expectations would be on a grand scale. Pakistan was to swell rather than 
to grow. This was manifested when Nehru claimed that Pakistan had recently 
increased its agitation against India and that Karachi had told Soviet leaders that arms 
received from the US were for use against India.180  
On the other hand, India was a power in South Asia. The Americans had to 
make it their ally rather than cause it to be hostile to them. Pakistan was distressingly 
weak. In the first week of September 1953, the Pakistani Finance Minister made it 
clear to the Americans that Pakistan needed large-scale economic assistance from the 
US for the next five years before it could be hopeful of continuing on its own.181 The 
extension of military aid would probably lead to attempts by Pakistan to saddle 
America with a large measure of its economic problems.   
The security relations with the US helped Pakistan overcome its inferiority 
complex vis-à-vis India. The modernization of its forces and American weapons 
boosted its defensive strength. Although America always hesitated to give any 
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security commitment to Pakistan against India, it still worked for Pakistan and 
contributed to India’s embarrassment in the region. The regional security order was 
completely altered as it brought Pakistan for the first time close in terms of military 
capability to that of its rival, India.   
The security pacts and military alignment were beneficial to the US for its 
motives and Pakistan for its own purposes, but only Pakistan had to pay the price of 
such commitments. Pakistan was dragged into a superpower rivalry in letter and spirit. 
The Soviet Union openly supported India in all regional and international forums on 
contentious issues like Kashmir against Pakistan. She fully backed Afghanistan in its 
Pakhtoonistan dispute with Pakistan. In exchange Pakistan wanted overt and 
unconditional American support for its bold stance for the West. Unfortunately, the 
Soviet Union proved what its representative Mr. Malik had said to Pakistan’s Foreign 
Secretary Ikramullah three years previously; that in the Kashmir dispute the UK-US 
and the UN would not support Pakistan’s position. Mr. Malik declared that the USSR 
would not use its veto power, but he also said that the USSR was going to give 
Pakistan an object lesson regarding what help it would get from the UK-US-UN’.182 
He reflected that the West was taking Pakistan for granted.  
The irony of fate is that Pakistan and the US, despite their common 
organizations and security pacts, did not wholeheartedly and openly support each 
other’s objectives. Both were trying to drag each other towards their own motives for 
less in return. America was more concerned for its global war against communism 
whereas Pakistan was worried about the regional security paradigm. Countering India 
was not an American concern just as containment of the Soviet Union was not 
Pakistan’s primary interest. Their cooperation was based on an ambiguity that, 
perhaps, no party was ready to resolve.  
With diverse objectives in their cooperation, the result of the Pakistan and the 
US military cooperation was to strengthen the Pakistan Army in the domestic politics 
of the country. International agreements and alliances increased the Army’s 
bargaining position further. It reached such a level that within the next year, the Army 
entirely took control of the reins of government. It was easy for the US now to deal 
with the country and the dominant institution of the country simultaneously. 
                                                 
182 SOA: Mr. Kennedy, SOA: Mr. Simons, Pakistan and the Middle East, A conversation with Mr. 
Ikramullah, the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, October 30, 1951, GRDS, ROSAA, 1939-53, NND 




Military rule in Pakistan and 





In the previous chapters, the historical process of the institutional interaction between 
the US policy making bodies and the Pakistan Army and the developments which led 
to the fall of democratic political institutions were presented. In both cases, the 
Pakistan Army, headed by General Ayub Khan, had to respond to various factors 
present in the set of rules for the whole gamut of domestic politics and the immediate 
international environment in the shape of growing US-India intimacy. On the 
domestic front, the democratic currents were purged. On the international front, 
developments during the 1950s gave rise to security problems which were countered 
by institutional interaction and the formation of military pacts. However, it had not yet 
provided Pakistan with a complete security umbrella against India. During the period 
under consideration in this study, the entire foreign policy-making process was 
overwhelmed by a wave of anti-India feelings. US policy makers were not ready to 
buy into any such feelings. Therefore, the growing Indo-US relationship to curb 
communist currents in Indian society, as well as to contain China, set off the sequence 
of events of the late 1950s and early 60s which seriously affected Pak-US institutional 
interaction. In order to understand US policy towards India and its impact on Pakistan, 
one has to look first to dimensions of the domestic policy of Pakistan’s military 
regime. This will help to provide an understanding of Pak-US institutional interaction, 




From the creation of Pakistan, relations between the Pakistan Army and the US 
remained very cordial. Military cooperation between the General Headquarters 
(GHQ) and US policy making bodies – the Department of State, the White House, and 
the Pentagon – strengthened the Pakistan Army’s bargaining position in domestic 
politics. Their collaboration resulted in the weakening of political institutions and 
prolonged military influence over the political leadership of the country. This 
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relationship was shaped by a couple of very important developments in South Asia in 
the late 1950s: the military coup in Pakistan in 1958; and the growing US interest in 
and support for India to curb communist trends and to deal with the Chinese threat. 
The military coup increased US expectations of Pakistani support for India against 
China. Pakistan’s C-In-C and Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) Ayub Khan 
was keen to cooperate with the US but not with India. American support for India 
against China was frustrating for the Pakistani Army. It disturbs the South Asian 
strategic balance that Pakistan had created at the cost of losing the support of 
neighbouring countries by joining US sponsored alliances. The improvement of Indo-
US relations compelled Pakistan to strengthen its ties with China. Hence, the period of 
1958-62 denoted a shift in the balance of power in South Asia. This chapter explores 
military rule after the Coup; thoughts of the Army Generals and Subalterns (low 
ranking military officers) on GHQ-State Department proximity; and the feebleness of 
Pakistan-US relations which were further weakened with the Sino-India war in 1962. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will chart the development 
of the declaration of martial law by President Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan 
and the succeeding differences between these two leaders. It will also focus on the 
purging of politicians as well as the encouragement of ethnic division under the 
military regime. The second section will look at India as a factor that strained Pak-US 
institutional interaction. 
 
4.2 I: MILITARY RULE IN PAKISTAN: 1958-62 
 
A year before the military coup of 1958, the US administration was very hopeful for 
Pakistan’s democratic future. American diplomat in Karachi Arthur A. Gardiner wrote 
in his mail to the State Department:  
 
I do not think we have any evidence for believing that any preparatory 
steps are being taken for the establishment of authoritarian rule. I am even 
willing to bet that you will see elections in Pakistan next spring; even 
money.1 
 
                                                 
1 American Embassy Karachi to Department of State, NND 847209, Box 22, 62D43, June 26, 1957, 
NARA. 
 148 
Mr Gardner lost his bet as Pakistan would not witness its first general elections for the 
next 13 years.2 The following year, the Army was in full control of the country’s 
foreign and domestic policies. Martial Law could have been declared much earlier 
than 1958,3 but the Ayub-Mirza nexus was waiting for a suitable time. Between 1956 
and 1958, four different governments and coalitions were formed and broken by the 
nexus. The shortest surviving government was of seven weeks’ duration (by Prime 
Minister I. I. Chundrigar). But by then, President Mirza’s manoeuvrings had annoyed 
all political parties and he would have been pushed into isolation if general elections 
had taken place. The general elections were tentatively scheduled for February 1959. 
The expected results were dramatic; political parties would have their own alliances 
and the re-election of Mirza as president would be difficult, if not impossible.4 
President Mirza did not have much faith in the democratic process.5 At the same time, 
General Ayub Khan had asked for the extension of his tenure of service for another 
term. The civilian Defence Minister Mr. Muhammad Ayub Khuhro was not keen on 
this as Ayub Khan already had an extension since 1954. Ayub Khan and President 
Mirza were forecasting the end of their Gang of Two’s visible and invisible rule. 
Thus, martial law was declared, and the central and provincial assemblies were 
dissolved and political parties were suspended. Being very cordial, obedient, and 
personal allies of the US and Britain, Ayub and Mirza expected their (the US and 
Britain) support for martial law. So much so, the only person who knew in advance 
about their intentions was the US ambassador to Pakistan, Mr. James Langley. Being 
a very close friend of Langley, Mirza confided that he would soon be assuming 
dictatorial powers with the help of the Pakistan Army.6 Upon learning of the 
declaration of Martial Law, the British High Commissioner in Karachi Sir Alexander 
Symon praised the military takeover. In a diplomatic mail to the Commonwealth 
Relations Office (CRO) London, he wrote: ‘the Army moved in throughout the 
country with clockwork precision’. His reaction was ‘one of profound relief that the 
                                                 
2 The first general elections in Pakistan took place in 1970. For details, see, Air Chief Marshall (Rtd) 
Mohammad Asghar Khan, ‘Tareekh say kuch nahin sikha- Siyyasat aur Afwaj-e-Pakistan’, (Karachi: 
OUP, 2005), p.24. 
3 Ayub Khan, told American Charge de Affairs Emmerson in Karachi on 6th October 1954 that he was 
unhappy over the present political situation in Pakistan. He said that the Bengali politicians could not 
be allowed to dictate to the whole of Pakistan, that ‘something would be done’, and that he hoped the 
US would understand if some military action became necessary; see CIA-RDP 79-T00975A-
00170013-0001-8, October 8, 1954, NARA; chapter four. 
4 Interview with Sharif Farooq, (Peshawar, 18-02-07). 
5 Ambassador James Langley to DOS, NND847209, Box 22, 62D43, September 9, 1957, NARA. 
6 FRUS, 1958-60 Vol. XV, pp.664-65. 
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rascally politicians had been so summarily disposed of’. He was very hopeful for an 
‘efficient, honest, and loyal army to provide a last chance to achieve stability and 
progress’.7  The CRO in London was also very supportive of Army rule. In its return 
mail to Sir Symon, it wrote: 
 
New regime promises to replace a weak and discredited team of 
politicians by a stable Government which will provide a decent, practical 
and constructive administration and restore Pakistan’s badly shaken self-
confidence.8 
 
Mirza had a fear that if he did not act authoritatively to declare martial law, Ayub 
Khan would do so and, hence, he would be marginalised in the power-share.9  Retired 
Air Chief Marshal Asghar Khan, in his autobiography, says that at 9:00pm on 7th 
October 1958, he was called into the presidency where Ayub Khan and Brigadier 
Yahya Khan were already present along with other military officers. He further says: 
 
He [Mirza] told me that the constitution was suspended and after 
imposing Martial Law, the government had been handed-over to the Army 
headed by General Ayub Khan. He asked me to remain in the presidency 
for the next few hours for the completion of the entire plan.10  
 
General Ayub Khan as CMLA had all the required powers for running the 
government smoothly, but soon came to dislike Mirza’s presence. Appetite comes 
with eating. Such was the case with Ayub Khan. He was CMLA, but now he was 
aspiring to be the president of the country. Colonel (R) Saleem Zafar gives an 
insightful understanding of a soldier’s nature and Ayub Khan’s intention: 
 
A man cannot share two things – woman and power. An army-man 
worships power. He is either above or below in a hierarchy. Equality is 
out of question. Previously, Ayub Khan was below Mirza. Now he wanted 
to be the sole custodian of the State.11 
 
With his rule, Ayub wanted total power and to become an absolute ruler 
without anyone sharing in power (not even Mirza). Iftikhar Bhatti, a clerical staffer in 
the foreign office at the time, says that very soon Mirza also came to dislike Ayub 
                                                 
7 DO 134/26, Sir Alexander Symon to CRO, Hume, October 24, 1958, PRO. 
8 DO 134/26, CRO to British High Commission, Karachi, October 23, 1958, PRO. 
9 FRUS, 1958-60 Vol. XV, p.669. 
10 Air Chief Marshall (Rtd) Mohammad Asghar Khan, ‘Tareekh say kuch nahin sikha’, p.10. 
11 Interview with Col (Rtd) Syed Saleem Zafar, (Peshawar, 22-02-07). 
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because of his dominating nature. Two cooks spoil the broth. Until then, Mirza had 
been the sole powerful ruler of the country and Ayub was behind the scenes, but with 
the declaration of Martial Law, Ayub wanted an un-shared power which was not 
appreciated by Mirza.12 Lack of trust dominated the political environment, and soon it 
became clear that they could not tolerate each other’s existence. It became so obvious 
that, during a reception at the presidency, the Canadian High Commissioner Mr. 
Moren asked Ayub Khan, ‘Mr. Prime Minister! When are you taking your next step?’ 
Ayub at once asked, ‘What do you mean?’ The High Commissioner smiled without 
uttering a single word, but everyone present besides Ayub Khan knew what Mr. 
Moren meant.13  
Mirza smelt the danger of Ayub’s rivalry. They had been close friends in the 
past and, hence, knew the traits and weaknesses of each other very well. During the 
third week of October (1958), Military Intelligence (MI) intercepted a telephone 
conversation between Syed Amjid Ali (Finance Minister) and President Mirza. Their 
pro-American stance compelled them to convert their synonymy of supporting the US 
in Pakistan into a relationship. Mirza’s daughter had to marry Amjid Ali’s son. Ali 
was asking to fix a date for the marriage ceremony but Mirza replied that he was busy 
in the forthcoming days. ‘The moment the situation comes on routine, we will fix the 
date’ Mirza replied. Ali asked if it would take long for the situation to settle down. 
Mirza responded, ‘I will fix Ayub Khan in the next few days and then everything will 
be alright’.14 The conversation between Ali and Mirza was an alarming moment for 
Ayub Khan. Now was the time for the execution of his action plan: the removal of 
President Mirza. Asghar Khan says that he was called by Ayub Khan at 10:00 pm. 
Ayub told him, ‘Iskander Mirza wants to dethrone me from the Prime Minister-ship. 
To avoid panic resulting from such [a] silly act, I have decided to remove him from 
the presidency’.15 At that very time, Major General Burki, Major General Azam 
Khan, Major General Sheikh, Brigadier Malik Sher Bahadur and Brigadier Yahya 
Khan were also present in uniform. On Ayub’s orders, all five left to seek Mirza’s 
resignation. In the meanwhile, Ayub was very tense. The moment all the five military 
officers returned, Ayub at once stood up. They told him that ‘Mirza was in his 
                                                 
12 Interview with Iftikhar Bhatti, a clerk and librarian in the Foreign Office of Pakistan during 1960s 
(Islamabad, 25-03-07). 
13 Mohammad Asghar Khan, ‘Tareekh say kuch nahin sikha, p.11. 
14 Ibid, p.12. 
15 Ibid, pp.12-3. 
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bedroom. His servant went in to call him. He appeared in his night-gown. While 
coming down the stairs, he asked if we had brought the paper to sign. The moment the 
paper was presented; he immediately signed and left for his bedroom’. Ayub after 
hearing this became calm. He said: “Iskander Mirza must be treated well and may be 
taken to Quetta early next morning”.16 
To gain international legitimacy for the coup, Ayub Khan had to take foreign 
diplomatic missions in Karachi into his confidence. ‘It was 11.30 pm that Ayub called 
a meeting of ministers and foreign ambassadors. American Ambassador Langley was 
very worried about Mirza’. He asked numerous questions about him and his security. 
His reaction reflected the extraordinary US interest in the state of affairs. Mirza’s 
friendship was fully reciprocated by the Americans. It also showed that the US 
government was ignorant of the development that resulted in the ousting of Mirza. 
 Despite the Ambassador’s reaction, the American government was very 
happy with the change. President Eisenhower and his republican administration were 
fond of dictators. Dictators had played a very positive role in the achievement of their 
objectives to contain communism. Furthermore, they knew Ayub Khan very well. 
‘Ayub had been to Washington numerous times. He used to visit America almost 
every year. He was not only on good terms with Pentagon, but was also a very good 
friend of Allen Dulles – the CIA chief. Alen Dulles was the brother of John Foster 
Dulles – the US Secretary of State. It was an accepted fact that he had to meet with 
Allen Dulles on his every visit to Washington between 1951 and 58’.17 After taking 
charge of the entire country, Ayub met American Charg`e d’Affaires Ridgeway B. 
Knight and told him that US aid was a ‘matter of life and death’ for his nation and that 
he expected Pak-US relations to be warmer than ever.18 American foreign policy’s 
road to Pakistan was passing through the Army’s General Headquarters (GHQ). 
The initial period of military rule was invested in purging politicians from the 
national politics of the country. As the entire dictatorial rule of Ayub Khan is not my 
purpose here, only specific areas of his governance pertinent to the topic are 
highlighted. After strengthening his position, Ayub took a shift towards a 
constitutional regime. During the transition to constitutional government, Ayub 
Khan’s political position at home had undergone a drastic change. Forty-four months 
                                                 
16 Ibid, p.13. 
17 Ibid. 
18 DO 134/26, Sir Alexander Symon to CRO, October 30, 1958, PRO; Charge d’Affaires Ridgway B. 
Knight to DOS, October 31, 1958, FRUS, 1958-60, 15:681-82 
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after the 1958 military coup, Ayub brought martial law to an end on 8th June 1962. 
The first test of his constitutional and post-martial law regime was the approval of the 
national budget. The budget was presented to the National Assembly elected under a 
new constitution.19 In the process, however, his domestic political position weakened. 
The difficulties which put Ayub on the defensive were the constitutional issue and the 
democratic nature of Bengalis led by ex-Prime Minister Suhrawardy. These were, in 
brief, the same fundamental problems that had pressed every Pakistani government 
since 1947. ‘Ayub’s constitution, presented to the public as an act of personal fiat on 
March 1 1962, established a presidential and federal form of government. 
Administration was decentralized for efficiency’s sake, but power was centralized for 
the sake of stability’.20 For example, the constitution gave the legislature almost no 
say in preparing the budget and none at all with respect to important appointments. 
The courts lost their power to declare laws unconstitutional and to hear cases 
involving fundamental rights. The initial electorate that chose the members of the 
National and Provincial Assemblies of East and West Pakistan was limited to the 
80,000-odd members of the Basic Democracies System (BD System). Ayub’s 
principle aim in this constitution was to devise a system which would permit him to 
run the country and carry out the Five Year Plan with little interference by the 
legislature and judicial branches of government. The elections for the three assemblies 
(East, West and Central) established by the constitution were held under a martial law 
regulation making any political activity an offence. It appeared to arouse little public 
interest in elections. In the absence of organised political activity, the elections 
consisted of a series of unconnected factional interests in which the main aim of many 
contestants was to validate their personal claims to status and official preferment.21  
Controlled elections and pseudo-democracy was challenged on all fronts by 
the Easterners (People of East Bengal). A group of nine Bengali politicians issued a 
clear-cut statement on 25th June 1962 to contest for democracy. They declared Ayub’s 
constitution unworkable. In their view, ‘a constitution can’t be durable unless it is 
framed by the direct representatives of the people. A “special body” should be elected 
as soon as possible for this purpose. In the interim, the Bengali group urged the 
                                                 
19 CIA-RDP80B01676R001700040017-4, Recent Changes in Ayub’s Political Position, Bureau of 
Intelligence  and Research, Department of State, (Henceforth RCAPPBIRDOS) RNA-36, September 
14, 1962. 
20 CIA-RDP80B01676R001700040017-4, RCAPPBIRDOS, RNA-36, September 14, 1962. 
21 Ibid.  
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release of political prisoners including Suhrawardy and the revival of the judiciary’s 
authority to hear cases involving fundamental rights’. The statement characterized 
political parties as the “very breath” of representative democracy and stressed the 
importance of regular and periodic elections. Opposition to the constitution was so 
well established in East Pakistan that Ayub appeared to be virtually without support 
there, at least amongst those who could claim to be representative leaders.22 
Ayub sought to tame the National Assembly by divide-and-rule tactics, but 
achieved success only at the cost of sacrificing elements of his presidential system and 
the release of Suhrawardy for a short time. He obtained the support of a group of 
Bengali representatives by amending the constitution to permit cabinet ministers to 
keep their seats in the National Assembly. This step was in the direction of orthodox 
parliamentary practice. It was followed by the establishment of debating rules which 
allowed for the questioning of Ayub’s ministers, thereby re-establishing a system of 
interpellation. A disciplined political party was needed by Ayub Khan. Despite the 
restricted electorate, energetic and knowledgeable opposition members were present 
in sufficient numbers to keep Ayub’s handpicked ministers looking defensive and 
ineffectual. Ayub needed a party to bear the onus of imposing the additional taxes 
required by Pakistan’s commitments to the international lenders’ consortium. Over 
bitter opposition, the Assembly passed legislation to permit a controlled party system 
to develop.23 
Ayub tried to gain the support of the Muslim League under the guise of 
organizing a broad-based national party. A convention was held to this end, but a 
national party did not emerge. The core of the Muslim League appeared to be those 
same conservative landlords whom former President Mirza, in his day, had corralled 
into the so-called Republican Party in order to disrupt the Muslim League after the 
1956 Constitution was adopted. Ayub appeared to have even less support among 
Bengalis than Mirza had then.24 
 In East Pakistan the trend throughout the year had been markedly negative for 
Ayub’s fortunes. The re-arrest of ex-PM Suhrawardy on 30th January 1962 triggered a 
series of anti-government demonstrations; opposition to the regime had since become 
the dominant feature of the province’s political life. The students were in the forefront 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid.  
 154 
of this upsurge; they tore Ayub’s pictures to shreds, booed his ministers off platforms, 
and burned copies of the constitution. Most important of all, the students had 
unintentionally provided a leader (Suhrawardy) who could act as a personal focus for 
the country’s anti-Ayub forces. General Azam, an ambitious Pushtoon, resigned as 
East Pakistan Governor under circumstances which made it appear to the public that 
he had refused to carry out Ayub’s orders to open fire on the students.25 Thus the 
Easterners’ desire for a true democracy proved a hard nut to crack for the military 
junta.  
Democratic currents in the East were much stronger than in West Pakistan. 
Ayub Khan knew that the Easterners were more opposed to his martial law than the 
Westerners. Hence, right from the beginning, while observing Suhrawardy’s anti-
regime activities and pro-democracy movement, he was arrested, and, under EBDO,26 
was put in jail and banned from participating in politics for seven years. Mr. Zahoor 
Butt, a close friend of Suhrawardy, gives a very interesting narration of how Ayub 
tried to be friendly with Suhrawardy to curb civil-disobedience but later on backed-
out: 
 
With the BD system, as usual all the West Pakistan members of the 
assembly were ready to join the cabinet. However, the Easterners 
demanded and insisted on the release of Suhrawardy. They were not ready 
to cooperate with Ayub Khan without his release. Ayub had no option but 
to write a letter to Suhrawardy praising his competency, intelligence, and 
genius nature. He also wrote about the circumstances that compelled the 
declaration of martial law. He sought Suhrawardy’s cooperation to end 
Easterners’ non-cooperation movement. This letter was typed in English. 
At the end of the letter, “yours sincerely” was written. Ayub cut 
“sincerely” with his pen and wrote “affectionately” in its place and signed. 
Foreign Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra took this letter on behalf of Ayub 
Khan and handed it over to Suhrawardy in Multan jail. In the mean time, 
due to intense pressure by the members of the National Assembly, 
Suhrawardy was released. Now after the release, Ayub got worried about 
the letter. He thought Suhrawardy might use it politically against him. 
Hence again Bogra was given the responsibility to get the letter back from 
Suhrawardy in Lahore. Many friends of Suhrawardy including myself 
advised him not to return the letter or at least to keep a copy of it for the 
heydays. But Suhrawardy replied: ‘Look! Curtsey is something. He is 
writing me “affectionately”.  How come I show that coldness [by not 
returning the letter]?’27  
                                                 
25 Ibid.  
26 Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance. 
27 Interview with Zahoor Butt, (London, 17-03-08). 
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The letter was returned to Bogra. It was a clear depiction of how the military junta 
contrasted with few good men in Pakistan’s politics.  
Mr. Butt also describes the cause of Suhrawardy’s death related to a telegram 
written by Ayub Khan. He says:  
 
During 1960 when Suhrawardy was being trialled under EBDO, Egyptian 
President Nasser visited Pakistan. After nationalising Suez Canal, Nasser 
had emerged as a Muslim hero and a moral victor for the entire world. 
Ayub Khan also wanted to take political advantage of his international 
stature and popularity in Pakistan. He took him to different cities of 
Pakistan and expressed his profound friendship with Nasser. Ayub also 
assured him that the statement given by the then PM of Pakistan 
Suhrawardy against Egypt during Suez war of 1956 had nothing to do 
with him. Rather such a statement was given without taking the Armed 
Forces Chiefs into confidence. On his return, Nasser called a press 
conference in Cairo and stated that the former PM who had supported the 
British and French during the Suez war was standing like a convict in 
Pakistan’s court of law today. This hurt Suhrawardy who returned to 
Lahore along with a telegram and addressed his close friends: So… now if 
I speak, Ayub Khan will complain that I was trying to ruin Pak-Egypt 
relations. It was the same telegram that Ayub had written in the capacity 
of C-in-C of Pakistan’s armed forces during his visit to Washington to the 
then PM of Pakistan Suhrawardy. He used very bad language for Nasser 
in the telegram. He also wrote: ‘Pakistan’s defence forces are very 
dependent upon English and French weapons and jets’. Hence ‘from 
Pakistan’s defence interests’ point of view, we have to support Britain and 
France rather than a “mad man” like Nasser’. Officers in the Foreign 
Office were also of the same view. Even Suhrawardy was supposed to 
address the UN within weeks and had to seek Western support for a 
resolution on the Kashmir issue. Therefore, he gave the statement against 
Nasser. In Pakistan, the public circles showed their strong reaction against 
such a pro-western stance of the government. But Suhrawardy did face 
such criticism. 
 
Mr. Zahoor Butt now discloses that the same telegram would become the cause of 
Suhrawardy’s death. Had it come into the hands of the opposition leadership at the 
time, it would have exposed Ayub’s intentions towards the Muslim world, especially 
Egypt, and, hence, his government would have faced difficulty. This would also have 
damaged relations between Egypt and Pakistan. According to Butt, Ayub Khan’s 
Secretary for Interior Affairs A.B Awan told him that Ayub Khan had ordered him, I 
want that telegram at any cost; even if at the price of the gold of entire fort Nakis (the 
hub of gold mines in Pakistan). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto also mentions the incident of how 
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the telegram was acquired from Suhrawardy in his book “If I am assassinated”. 
Bhutto witnessed the burning of the telegram at the hands of Ayub Khan just after 
Suhrawardy’s death in Beirut. Thus Zahoor Butt thought that the death of Suhrawardy 
was due to this telegram.  
 
4.2.1 Military Rule and Ethnic Problem 
 
The death of Suhrawardy was a bad omen for the future of an integrated Pakistan. 
Pakistan was in quest of an identity based on the common ground of nationalism. 
However, ethnic and regional tensions reignited, especially in the absence of unionists 
like Suhrawardy. The years 1961 and 1962 had already witnessed a tremendous 
increase in ethnic tension in Pakistan. Ethnic rivalries surfaced within the power 
structure of Pakistan, including the armed forces, in a way that was ominous for the 
future of the Ayub regime.  
Pakistan was a geographical expression where the far-flung remote areas – 
Baluchistan, Sindh, the Frontier, and East Bengal – were daggers drawn with Punjab, 
the core power centre. Punjabis dominated the Ayub regime, while the other regions 
felt themselves politically disenfranchised, economically exploited, and the victims of 
cultural programmes which were intended to destroy their national character and self-
respect. As the Army and political class were dominated by the Punjabis, more and 
more economic benefits were diverted to the Punjab province. Urdu and Punjabi were 
given more air-time on the radio than other regional languages. A local Pukhtoon 
nationalist leader Baz Muhammad Khan says: 
 
Everyone was branded as traitor but Punjabis. Pakhtoons were traitors as 
they were talking about provincial autonomy. Bengalis were not loyal as 
they were asking for parity between the East and West Pakistan. Sindhis 
were defectors as they were compelled to submit to a recently arrived 
minority from India – the Urdu speaking Mohajirs. The only ethnic group 
that had taken the contract of loyalty to Pakistan was Punjabi. Pakistan 
was run like Punjabistan – the land of Punjabis and not Pakistanis. In a 
way, they were right as Punjabi was in majority in the Army as well as in 
bureaucracy. We felt as Farangi (English colonial master) was replaced 
by Punjabi and we, the rest of Pakistan, were under their neo-colonial 
rule.28  
 
                                                 
28 Interview with a local senior Pakhtoon nationalist leader, Baz Mohammad Khan, (Akora Khattak, 
25-01-07). 
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When I asked, ‘But Ayub Khan was a Pathan?’ Mr Khan replied with a decisive ‘No’. 
He said: 
 
Every Khan is not a Pakhtoon or Pathan. Ayub was from Abbottabad-
Hazara. People from Hazara are like Punjabis and not like Pakhtoons. Our 
tradition, culture, and language, everything is completely different from 
Hazara-people. Hence the government and the Army of Pakistan was 
governed and led by Punjabi only.29 
 
Inter-provincial rivalries were not limited to domestic affairs. Foreign policy was the 
reflection of domestic policy. Likewise, foreign policy was influenced by the 
provincial and Central governments’ jealousies. A friendly policy towards 
Afghanistan was regarded as inherently anti-Punjabi because it tended to strengthen 
Pukhtoons as a competing group. On the other hand, nationalist Pukhtoons of the 
Frontier province were looking towards Afghanistan to muster support against 
Punjabi domination. They were under the impression that any foreign support for 
them would strengthen their bargaining position vis-à-vis Punjab in the federation of 
the country.30 The sudden shift in Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan in August 
1961, when Afghan consulates in the Frontier region were closed on the pretext that 
they were being used for subversive activities,31 had significant regional implications. 
The dissatisfaction in the area, which the  Afghans were able to exploit, was directed 
primarily against the Government’s policy of administering all of West Pakistan as a 
single province (the One Unit) and of prescribing cultural and educational policies 
designed to create a uniform national character for Pakistan. Ayub wanted American 
diplomats32 to ‘beat some sense into [the] bloody minds of the Afghan Royal family’ 
to live decently in the neighbourhood.33 Nationalist Pakhtoons led by Bacha Khan 
were also very swift in making moves to encourage Afghanistan’s interference in the 
Frontier province. The harsh measures employed by the regime to dominate the 
Frontier province had clearly failed to achieve their objective. Although the region 
was depressed, the will of nationalist Pukhtoons to resist remained strong. Pakhtoon 
                                                 
29 Ibid.  
30 Interview with the editor of the Pushto daily newspaper, Wahdat,  Pir Sufaid Shah (Peshawar, 14-02-
07). 
31 FRUS, 1961-63,  Memo from Philips Talbot to Secretary Dean Rusk, September 6, 1961, Vol. 19, 
pp.87-88,90-92. 
32FRUS, 1961-63, Kennedy sent a special envoy Livingston Merchant for détente between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan., US embassy, Kabul to the DOS, September 20, 1961, Vol.19, 101-06. 
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nationalists were united under Ghaffar Khan, the imprisoned “Frontier’s Gandhi”34 
who appeared certain to be the unintended beneficiary of Ayub’s actions. There was 
also evidence that these tensions were beginning to weaken the cohesion of the army. 
In May 1962, a leading Pushtoon officer, Major General Jillani, expressed great 
dismay over Ayub’s policies toward Afghanistan and India and over the removal of 
popular Pushtoon generals from the army.35  
There was a grave suspicion and contrast in the military’s attitude. General 
Jillani, a very close associate of General Ayub Khan, was not happy with the way the 
Pakhtoon nationalist Sur Posh were treated by the military regime. He opposed the 
purging of Pakhtoons on ethnic grounds. The disgruntlement of General Jillani was 
but one instance of the dissatisfaction evident among senior Pushtun officers.36 A 
general falling-off of regard for Ayub Khan within the Army and contacts of an anti-
Ayub nature between military officers and politicians was reported in the CIA files.37 
There were disparities amongst the top-brass leadership of the Pakistan Army, but 
such differences were only at the top level and had no trickling down effect on junior 
or non-commissioned officers of the army. By now the Pushtoon subalterns were very 
happy with Ayub. They had perks and privileges and increased pay resulting from the 
American support for the Army. They were leading a contented life. They knew that 
the top-brass had difficulties between Pushtoon and non-Pushtoon, but no such 
mutiny, based on ethnic lines, was in the pipeline against the Army’s central 
command. Subedar Major (Rtd) Akram Khan says: 
 
When it comes to [the] Pakistan Army as a whole, it works like a family. 
The head of the army is the head of the family where the family values 
and norms are very strictly honoured and respected. In [the] Pakistan 
Army, there is no one by the race or caste of Pukhtoon, Punjabi, Sindhi, or 
Baluchi. They are the soldiers of the Pakistan Army and that’s it. That is 
one of the big reasons that the siblings of the army officers inter-marry 
without any distinction of biraderi, caste or any ethnic background. I, 
being a Pukhtoon officer, was under the chain command of the army and 
not under Pukhtoon officers only. So the question of mutiny by the 
Pukhtoon did not arise. There might have been differences between top-
brass Pukhtoon and non-Pukhtoon officers but it never affected low 
ranking officers and soldiers.38  
                                                 
34 Due to his Khudai Khidmatgar non-violant movement, he was also called Frontier’s Gandhi. 
35 CIA-RDP80B01676R001700040017-4, RNA-36, September 14, 1962. 
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Kashmir was another issue which was affected due to provincial and ethnic 
bias. It was an issue taken up by the ruling Junta of Pakistan- Punjabis and Urdu-
speaking people (Muhajirs) of Karachi. Anti-Indian feelings were strongest in the 
Punjab and Urdu speaking parts of Karachi; moderate in NWFP; weak in Sindhis and 
weakest of all among the Bengalis.39 However, no ethnic-based feelings were found 
amongst army officers for Kashmir. Colonal (Rtd) Rafiq Ahsan Abbasi says: 
 
People of Pakistan might have different opinions about Kashmir. 
However, the Pakistan Army was and is united and very sensitive towards 
the disputed land. During the 1960s, Kashmir was the alpha and omega of 
our foreign policy. Love for Kashmir was stronger than hatred towards 
India. Our feelings for Kashmir were not based on our ethnic background. 
We knew that Kashmir was the life-line of Pakistan and not of one 
specific ethnicity.40  
 
4.2.2 Military Rule and the Country’s Legal System 
 
Ayub’s arbitrary approach to the law made his restrictions on the authority of the 
courts a vital issue. The two opposing sides on this issue were Ayub and his inner 
circle of advisors on the one hand, and the professional, educational and intellectual 
groups on the other. Such members of civil society had expanded rapidly in the urban 
areas since 1947. Mr. Hakeem Saeed, Mr. Z.A. Sulehri, Mr. Agha G. Abdi, Mr. Fida 
Hussain and Mr. Habib Jalib favoured English concepts of law and justice.41 They 
favoured fundamental rights safeguarded by the constitution which should be made 
justifiable in the courts, and that political leaders should not be barred from 
participation in public life by summary legislation and star-chamber methods. The 
arrest of Suhrawardy helped to dramatise this long-standing difference in outlook. The 
lawyer community and Bar associations insisted Suhrawardy’s trial take place in open 
court. Soon Ayub issued a special amendment to the Criminal Procedure Code to 
prevent a Habeas Corpus action for Suhrawardy. This unleashed another series of 
protests in favour of Suhrawardy.42  
                                                 
39 CIA-RDP80B01676R001700040017-4, RNA-36, September 14, 1962. 
40 Interview with Colonel (Rtd) R.A Abbasi, (Peshawar, 26-06-07). 
41 Interview with Pir Sufaid Shah, Chief editor and owner of Wahdat, (Peshawar, 14-02-07). 
42 CIA-RDP80B01676R001700040017-4, RNA-36, September 14, 1962. 
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Ayub was not in the least bothered about the fundamentals of British justice.43 
Rather, he went further in his legal actions to curb opposition to himself. In February 
1962, he issued an ordinance which authorized the Governor to extend the Frontier 
Crimes Regulations (FCR) to other parts of West Pakistan besides the Tribal areas.44 
This extraordinary measure was adopted due to a sharp increase in armed robberies 
and murders in the rural areas. It was made applicable to cities like Karachi and 
Lahore. FCR for decades was an object of opprobrium in the Frontier Region and 
Tribal Areas, authorizing collective fines, preventive arrest, and the uprooting of 
villages, with no provision for an appeal to the courts.45 Afzal Shinwari from Landi 
Kotal Khyber Agency, a businessman and once a Mujahid who fought in the first 
Kashmir war of 1948, says: 
 
FCR [was] a black law. It was a colonial tool of Angraiz (Englishmen) to 
punish the family members of an absconder. According to the FCR, if a 
family member was a wrong-doer and an absconder, another member of 
the family could be arrested to punish the wrong-doer. Even after the 
departure of Angraiz, it continued to be exclusively applied to tribal areas. 
During Ayub era, this black law was applied to other parts of West 
Pakistan as well. We were very happy for its application in other settled 
areas of the country. We wanted the other people to experience the 
inhuman nature of such insulting law.46  
 
Ayub’s unjust methods of suppressing the legal system and the voice of the people 
remained successful for some time. After martial law, the government freed a number 
of political prisoners including former Prime Minister Suhrawardy. However, Ayub 
did not grant fundamental rights and expressed his own conviction, reflected in the 
constitution, that the National Assembly, and not the courts, served as the guardian of 
the public interest.47 In order for his views to be powerfully represented within the 
Judiciary, he appointed his chief legal and constitutional advisor, ex-Foreign Minister 
Manzur Qadir, as new Chief Justice of the West Pakistan High Court. Ayub’s public 
speeches and confidential CIA reports show that ‘his natural self-assurance had turned 
to arrogance’.48 Easterners were demanding an amendment or change in the 
constitution. He had appointed a Franchise Commission to study the effectiveness of 
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the BD system in reflecting public opinion. Ayub thought that the BD would lead to 
the growth of a form of democracy which was sensible, workable and suitable to the 
people of Pakistan.49 However, Suhrawardy’s cooperation was unlikely. It appeared to 
the Easterners that any relaxation towards them was another version of the unwritten 
maxim of Pakistani domestic politics that a Bengali must never be permitted to run 
the country. Easterners in the Army were also in a marginal position. Sceptical 
notions prevailed about their physique and loyalty to the nation. East Pakistan’s 
population was 56% of the total population of Pakistan and still its share in the army 
was just less than 7%. The reason for their lower number in the army was that the 
Bengalis did not fulfil the criterion of corporal standards for recruitment. Mostly the 
recruiters were Punjabis; they looked at Bengalis with prejudice.50 
Political victimization was not limited to East Pakistan only. Any democratic 
entity and a strong figure of the past governments had to bear the brunt of Ayub’s 
discrimination. Former Defence Minister Mr. Khuhro was convicted by the Special 
Judge under Martial Law Regulations Nos. 5 and 26 and was sentenced to five years 
rigorous imprisonment and to a fine of Rs. 150,000.51 His conviction had been 
confirmed by the Martial Law Sub-Administrator of Karachi. The charge against Mr. 
Khuhro was that he attempted to sell a new car (a 1958 model “Biscayne” Chevrolet), 
which he had purchased out of the public quota, on the black market for Rs. 49,000 
instead of at the controlled price of Rs. 23,700.52 He had to pay the price for declining 
Ayub’s further extension in his service while being the Defence Minister during 1958. 
Ayub Khan had already had an extension in his tenure of C-In-C since 1954 from the 
then Governor General Ghulam Muhammad. In January 1959, he had wanted another 
extension from the then Defence Minister Khuhro. According to Khuhro’s biographer, 
his daughter, Hamida Khuhro, the General actually applied for a four-year term, but 
he was given only two years of extension by the then Defence Minister. Hence he felt 
‘snubbed’.53  However, Mr. Khuhro’s case was further filed against the decision in the 
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Supreme Court of Pakistan. He was represented by former PM Suhrawardy. The 
Supreme Court held the sentence as void.54 
In addition, Ayub’s assignment of his political “dirty work” to social elements 
with a criminal reputation was also diminishing his prestige. In NWFP, Mangay 
Khan, a notorious gunda (wicked) from Mardan, was hired to deal with Ayub’s 
political adversaries.55 
 
4.1.3 Military Rule and the Plight of Foreign Services of 
Pakistan 
 
A ruthless dictatorial domestic policy was the reflection of the supra-civilian foreign 
policy of Ayub Khan. Pakistan’s foreign policy was always influenced by the GHQ. 
Therefore, the foreign affairs of the country were totally in the hands of the president. 
He was more articulate in pronouncing the policy guidelines and the nature of 
relations Pakistan was going to pursue in future. Mr. Iftikhar Bhutti aptly stated: 
 
What Foreign Office and what is its foreign policy? The presidency was 
the foreign office. No Foreign Minister was competent enough to give a 
policy statement without having a nod from Ayub Khan. Then Ayub being 
the head of the forces was also enjoying the confidence of military Junta. 
Thus the Foreign Office and the GHQ were concentrated in the 
Presidency.56 
 
It had come to the point that, at times, the Interior Minister used to accompany the 
President on foreign visits. The Foreign Minister would remain behind to deal with 
the internal problems of the country. President Ayub visited Iran on 11th January 1960 
and was accompanied by the Minister for the Interior, Lieutenant General Sheikh, two 
principle Joint Secretaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Chief of 
Protocol. Mr. Manzur Qadir, the Foreign Minister, did not go with him as he was busy 
dealing with constitutional matters on behalf of the regime.57 He was too pre-occupied 
with ‘Basic Democracy’. There was ‘really no Foreign Minister in Pakistan’.58 
Foreign embassies were worried about their dealings with the ministries. The biggest 
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problem was with the heads of the foreign missions in Pakistan. They did not know 
who they should meet and who they should contact for a summary of the foreign 
policy of the country. The British High Commissioner was reported to have said that 
it was not a problem for him as he could have a meeting with the President on any 
matter of sufficient concern. ‘There was no doubt that these happy-go-lucky 
arrangements’ for the conduct of Pakistan’s official business with other countries 
were causing disgruntlement among the representatives of other Commonwealth and 
foreign countries. ‘They all regarded this as bad for Pakistan’s prestige in the 
world’.59 It clearly reflected a weak and shabby formulation of Pakistan’s foreign 
services. In the absence of a parliamentary forum, ministerial press conferences were 
the medium through which Pakistan foreign policy was being explained to the public. 
Interestingly, such conferences were addressed most of the time by the President.60 
The Presidency was the fountain of power and it did not matter much which minister 
was doing what.  
Independent foreign policy was not the only problem of the new-born 
Pakistani nation. The Foreign Office was also functioning poorly. Personal greed and 
interests were given priority in foreign postings. Mr. Khuhro and Mr. Daultana of the 
Muslim League attacked what they described as the total ineffectiveness of Pakistan’s 
representation abroad. Khuhro drew a very gloomy picture of the Pakistan Foreign 
Service: 
 
Pakistan Foreign Service officers [were] living in six- or seven- bedroom 
houses, enjoying weekends from Friday to Tuesday and treating Pakistan 
nationals (Students, tourists, etc.) “like dogs”.61  
 
Daultana said that the wrong people were being sent abroad as representatives of 
Pakistan. They were often, he said, ‘play-boys’, ‘hotel-owners’, or ‘hide-bound 
officials’ from Karachi. As a result, the Foreign Ministry was ‘dangerous’ in that it 
gave to the world a false picture of Pakistan. Pakistan’s destiny was tied up with 
countries like India, Burma and Ceylon, etc., but the best among her diplomats only 
wanted to go to Europe where they could enjoy themselves.62  
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Despite all the frictions in domestic politics and its role in international 
relations, Pakistan was a profound ally of the US. Military rule in Pakistan was 
strengthened by US military aid and financial support. During Ayub’s rule, American 
foreign aid strengthened his domestic position vis-à-vis adversaries as well. His 
bargaining position against political parties increased, and thus, indirectly, the US aid 
to the Pakistan Army unbalanced the equation between the military and democratic 
forces. 
 
4.3 II: INDIA AS A FACTOR IN STRAINING PAK-US 
INSTITUTIONAL INTERACTION: 1958-62 
 
4.3.1 The US Fear of Communism in India 
 
The Cold War and Indo-phobia respectively brought the US and Pakistan to a point of 
cooperation. The cordial relationship between the two countries was threatened from 
the day the US realised there was a communist threat from India. India and Pakistan 
were two extremes of regional politics. Love of one was the hatred of the other. 
Indeed, it was not possible for the US to have cordial relations with both arch-rivals 
simultaneously. The communist threat was sufficient for the US to turn from one 
extreme to the other. The American administration differentiated between India and 
Pakistan due to these countries’ mutual differences, bitterness, hatred, and disruption 
caused by the partition. The former, due to its size, population and resources 
superseded the latter’s potential strategic significance. Its size, population and 
financial discontent compelled the US to fear that India might fall to Communism. 
Consequently, American foreign policy was inclined toward India throughout the late 
1940s.63 Generally, countries with high levels of poverty were attractive for 
Communism. Therefore, the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas, 
through US technical assistance and economic cooperation, was one of the declared 
objectives of US foreign policy.64 Whereas regional cooperation would not provide 
automatic assurance of the establishment of economic stability throughout the area, it 
would provide an effective channel through which stability might be gained. Just as 
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this cooperation might be an instrument for possible military cooperation, so might it 
also become an effective mechanism for minimum but constructive economic 
cooperation. India’s vast territory, weak economy, poverty, and huge population 
divided along ethnic lines were the main factors for US concern that India may fall 
victim to communism.65 Academics have continually argued that with the outbreak of 
the Indo-China War in 1962, India became a very important country in the US fight 
against communism.66 However, in reality, this was not the case. The Soviets’ 
intensification of communist activity in India, Burma and Ceylon was noticed even in 
1948.67 Though Americans were more interested in the formation of an Eastern Bloc, 
such a bloc might not be inspired by the hope of preventing, or standing aloof from, a 
conflict between the US and the Soviet Union.  
 
It would in fact be impossible for the US to maintain such isolation and it 
was therefore essential that such a potentially important country or group 
should not be allowed to drift by default into the Soviet orbit. However, in 
diplomatic correspondence, the Russians were reported to have been a bit 
heavy-handed with the Indians of [the] late 1940s with the result that 
Soviet-Indian relations had become noticeably less cordial than was the 
case a few months ago.68 
 
The US question was how to take advantage of such opportunities without assuming 
excessive obligations. 
As mentioned in chapter three, during tensions between India and Pakistan in 
mid-1951, the Kashmir question brought out deep-seated differences between 
‘communal Pakistan and secular India’,69 and remained a point of friction which both 
countries feared would lead to war. The NIE published a report on September 14, 
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1951 stating that the consequences of war between India and Pakistan would be 
devastating: 
 
 …By far the most important probable development, however, would 
be internal deterioration in India and Pakistan. Although the outbreak 
of hostilities might initially strengthen the respective government’s 
control, any extended fighting would so weaken both countries as to 
make maintenance of orderly government a matter of question. There 
would almost certainly be vast communal disturbances and a resulting 
increase in the severity of refugee problem. Such conditions might 
permit the Indian Communist Party (ICP) to take over various local 
areas, and there is a possibility that it would be able, with Chinese 
help, to assume control of the government. Outright Communist 
control is extremely unlikely in Pakistan, but a state of internal chaos 
and immobilization would be probable.70  
 
The security information cited above overstates the capabilities of the ICP. The ICP 
was too small (its membership was not more than 30,000 in a country of 
350,000,000), too weak, and too disorganized to be able to capitalize in any 
significant degree upon chaotic conditions within India unaided. This judgement was 
not even relevant in the short-run. However, external assistance could have made it 
possible for the ICP to take over large parts of India, if not all of India, in the event of 
a war with Pakistan. Foreign assistance would have to be substantial in order to quell 
the rise of communism.  The quote above also implicitly reflects the weakness of the 
Indian economy. Pakistan, by contrast, was ‘a largely self-sufficient peasant 
economy’ with much greater capacity to accommodate economic problems. 71 Over 
and above, ‘in 1950-51, India’s food grain import requirements rose from about 2.5 
million tons to 5.3 million tons as a result of domestic crop failures’.72 If the strains of 
even a limited war were placed on India’s precariously balanced economy, famine and 
suffering on an enormous scale would have undoubtedly followed. Such figures also 
show that even in the absence of a war, India was barely able to avoid localized 
famines. India was more vulnerable to Communism than Pakistan not due to the 
popularity of ICP but because of deteriorating economic conditions.73  
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Imagining Communism in India was a nightmare for the American policy 
makers. This can further be confirmed by a memo of a meeting between Mr. Glen 
Overton, the head of the Overton Machine Company, Michigan and the Under 
Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter in 1957. Mr. Overton during the meeting said 
that he had been closely associated with India for several years. In 1947-48 he had 
visited India at length and had stayed with the Chief Minister of West Bengal in India, 
Dr. B. C. Roy. He had thus been in India during the riots and bloodshed occasioned 
by partition. During the more recent trip to India he had seen the first Indian students 
depart to study in the Soviet Union. He had also seen a Soviet drilling outfit arrive to 
assist the Indian Government in its oil exploration activities. He was fearful that if the 
present trend continued India would go the way of China. He was afraid that the US 
aid program was not sufficient to keep India from going Communist.74 Mr. Overton 
further said: 
 
 The political climate in India was not ideal from [the] American point of 
view. Nehru was neutralist. Moreover, some people called both Dr. Roy 
and Nehru as “dictators”. We had to live with the situation as it was, 
however, and make the best of it. Perhaps we could take comfort from the 
fact that the Communists in India were not Russian Communists; they 
were Indian Communists.75 
 
The proximity between the US and India in the name of curbing communist 
trends in India was destined to deepen. 
 
4.3.2 Growing Indo-US relations 
 
The domestic and economic issues of India compelled the US to follow a pro-
India policy right from the beginning. The Pakistani administration wanted to be the 
ally of the US in order to counter India, but, conversely, the US did not want to favour 
Pakistan against India. Rather, they wanted to oppose Communism only. They were 
not the friends of Pakistan but the enemies of Soviet Russia. For Americans, Pakistan 
was the ‘smart’ country from where they could wage a counter-war against 
Communists and India was the ‘big’ country which would have to be protected from 
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falling victim to Communism. This was what Pakistani policy makers did not 
comprehend.  
The Pak-US institutional interaction against communism was at its peak until 
India faced an economic crunch. The cracks appeared in the Indian economy during 
1957 when ‘its food production fell and the defence budget rose due to American 
arms supply to Pakistan. It was facing an acute foreign exchange deficit. Different 
working groups of the State Department approached these issues from different angles 
and all agreed on the need to help India’.76 Frederic P. Bartlett, Director of SOA, in 
the State Department stated:  
 
No American wants to see communists takeover India. If assistance given 
in time and in the right amount can substantially contribute to forestalling 
this, it would be a reasonable investment from the point of view of the 
national security of the United States. [But] once a country, like China, 
comes under Communist control it is lost to the free world; no amount of 
dollars can buy it back.77 
 
Secretary Dulles was already in favour of supporting India.78 Any recommendation 
from the State Department’s working groups was an additional encouragement for 
fulfilling his whim. During a National Security Council meeting, he expressed his 
desire to make generous economic assistance to the developing world. He also 
expressed his fear that, if the US did not help them, they would be compelled to 
follow Soviet examples and methods. ‘So large were these under-developed areas that 
if they turn to the Soviet Union, the area of the Free World will shrink by another 
two-thirds’, he added.79 New Delhi’s foreign exchange gap had grown to over $1 
billion. It raised the fear of the second five-year plan falling considerably short of its 
goals.80 The communists had also come to power in the economically poor area of 
Kerala. Its domino effect was expected to affect the more populated and strategically 
located province of Bengal.81   
During the height of the cold war era, it was a frightening situation for the US. 
The American administration was ready to aid India – a country who had gone out of 
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its way to insult Americans during meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement and in the 
interests of Afro-Asian solidarity. It seemed that Indian neutralism was going to pay 
her more dividends than Pakistan’s alignment. On 4th March 4 1958, Dulles 
announced an emergency aid package for India: a loan of $225 million and provision 
of wheat and other food grains under the PL 480 program.82 To everyone’s surprise, 
in the very next fiscal year India increased its defence budget. This developed into a 
very precarious situation in South Asia. The Indians appeared afraid of Pakistan 
despite their superior numerical strength. They were building up their air and naval 
strength to offset American military aid to Pakistan. Hence, the United States faced an 
arms race between the neighbouring rivals, contributed to in fact, though not in intent, 
by US military aid to Pakistan.83  
India’s increased military expenditure appeared to be primarily and 
immediately motivated by desire to possess military power in such force that Pakistan 
could not merely be beaten but would be effectively deterred from risking war with 
India. Indian civil and military officials were fearful that political instability in 
Pakistan might cause the government of Pakistan to embark upon a military adventure 
against India to gain control of Kashmir in order to divert public attention from a 
deteriorating domestic political situation. Indians were specially fearful that US 
military aid to Pakistan would embolden Pakistan to initiate hostilities, and several 
high ranking Indian officials stated that Pakistan would probably attack India as a 
result of its increased military strength under the Mutual Defence Agreement Program 
(MDAP). These fears were heightened by what Indians considered to be intransigent 
statements by Pakistan officials. Indians publicly related India’s increased military 
expenditures directly to Pakistan’s military build-up resulting from the US military 
aid program.84 
In 1947, at the time of the partition of British India into India and Pakistan, 
India claimed to have had a 2.7:1 military superiority over Pakistan which was now 
2:1 in all the three military services. India’s military purchases since 1952 were 
closely related to Pakistan’s military acquisitions. The location of India’s military 
forces also reflects India’s immediate concern with Pakistan. The great bulk of India’s 
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combat troops were located in Jammu and Kashmir and in the Punjab, along the 
Pakistan border.85  
Pakistan was the frontline ally of the US, but no one knew the extent of its 
commitments. Though they had only a military alliance, both were ignorant of their 
un-demarcated and undefined obligations. The military junta in Pakistan always over-
emphasised the US pledges, but America constantly under-emphasised Pakistan’s 
influence on regional politics. Major General Louis W. Truman, chief of the MAAG 
mission in Karachi admitted, ‘there is no firm idea in anyone’s mind, either US or 
Pakistan as to what the commitment is or as to the extent of it’.86 It was a time when 
American policy makers were more obsessed with their bigger rival in the region than 
a collective security arrangement against Soviet Union. General Truman further 
disappointed by saying that the Pakistani army would prove hopelessly inadequate 
against an Indian attack. He also said that East Pakistan was very vulnerable to India 
and West Pakistan could hold out for only about thirty days.87 However, during the 
same MAAG meeting, Ayub Khan tried to mould the pace of discussion towards 
British strategy during colonialism and the strategic location of Pakistan. He was very 
fond of playing on his favourite theme, the necessity to combat militant communism 
which presented a threat of local war on the borders of Pakistan, Iran and possibly 
Turkey. While addressing the MAAG Chiefs conference in Karachi, he ‘referred to 
the methods used by the British in containing these threats successfully for many 
decades. The kingpin of the British policy had been to avail themselves of the 
manpower resources of India for foot soldiers, preserving their own manpower to the 
fullest extent possible in the UK’. Ayub urged that it was in America’s interest to take 
a leaf out of the British book, ‘save our manpower and develop friendly military 
forces in the Middle East’. He also suggested that the US should consider cutting the 
size of its own ground troops and concentrate still more heavily on navy, air force and 
modern powerful weapons leaving friendly countries that have military capabilities to 
do the work necessary on their own ground. Ayub also referred to the need of the US 
to make clear to Pakistan ‘what Pakistan’s role should be in the event of a limited or 
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of a global conflict’.88 It was true that both India and Pakistan were involved in an 
arms race. However, ‘Pakistan had the reason to equip itself defensively against an 
attack from Russia, whose intentions were incalculable, or against India who had a 
regional issue with it and hence had sour relations. But against whom was India 
arming itself?’89 It was out of the question as far as arming against Russia and China 
was concerned. Nehru had repeatedly insisted that ‘neither of the two powers had any 
aggressive designs against India’.90 The posture was, hence, not defensive but 
threatening and it could be directed only against Pakistan. Therefore, stoppage of 
military assistance to Pakistan was a cure worse than the disease itself.91 Ayub was 
quite upset when General Truman told him during the conference that America would 
at once stop arms supply to Pakistan if it suspected that they might be used against 
India. Ayub was fed-up of the repeated mantra of ‘not using American weapons 
against India’. In reply he shouted, ‘I don’t think much of your military ability’. The 
American general was shocked at Ayub’s un-expected reaction and said, ‘this hostile 
attitude will continue to increase if we do not give him everything he asks for’.92 
With the geo-strategic location and importance of Pakistan and India’s bigger 
size, the Americans were supporting both of them economically and militarily. In the 
region, it had started a vicious cycle, as stated by JB Johnson, an expert on South 
Asia. In a message, he wrote to the British embassy in Washington DC:  
 
The US gives arms to Pakistan; India restores the balance and goes one 
better; and we and the Americans then get renewed and frantic demands 
from Pakistan to enable her to catch up with India. This ludicrous process 
is having disastrous results on the economies of both countries.93 
 
The likelihood of Communist influence in India was a nightmare for the US 
administration. In the meantime, they were also receiving alarming reports from the 
US embassy in New Delhi. Ambassador Bunker wrote in his long report of May 
1959: ‘The Soviets have designated India as a primary target in Asia. They have 
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embarked upon a major campaign to capture it’.94 The voice of a strong India as an 
alternative to Communism in the Asian context was a catchy phrase in the US policy 
making corridors but it was a very expensive plan. Hence, President Eisenhower 
observed:  
 
…If the US were actually to try to make India a counterweight to 
Communist China, the task would be so great that we would probably 
bankrupt ourselves in the process.95 
 
He did not realise the importance of India without having any alliance commitment. 
He visited New Delhi in December 1959. The President’s visit was termed as ‘a 
brilliant success’ there. In May 1960, America signed a multi-year PL 480 agreement 
and delivered C-119 aircrafts purchased by India. America was following an even-
handed policy towards India and Pakistan which was considered in Karachi as a tilt 
towards India. Pakistan could not rely on an unreliable superpower friendship which 
was not considering Pakistan’s security concerns. The Indo-American friendship was 
forging ahead at the cost of the US-Pakistan alliance. It was repeatedly urged on 
Pakistan that any US relationship with India would be beneficial for Pakistan in the 
long run. Rather the US and Pakistan’s stakes were kept in line with the security of 
India. The Bureau of NEA wrote: “The US and Pakistan should have a common 
interest. Pakistan needs a stable India. A fragmented India would only be an invitation 
to the extension of communist influence into the subcontinent – and that ultimately 
could pose great dangers to Pakistan itself”.96 No-one understood Pakistan’s 
sensitivity and its precarious situation: India’s growing power against its neighbours 
and the burning issue of Kashmir. This further confirms that the rapprochement 
between the US and India had not started during the Kennedy administration. Nor had 
it been heralded during and after the Indo-China war of 1962. Americans developed a 
‘soft spot’ for India due to the fear of communism during the late 1950s.  
 
4.3.3 India’s annexation of Goa 
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Pakistan had yet to recover from the blow of growing Indo-US friendship when 
India annexed Goa in 1961. The Indian attack was condemned by the Pakistani press 
as ‘Indian elephant attack on Goa mosquito’.97 Nehru did not heed the call by 
‘President Kennedy for restraint’ or the UN Secretary General ‘U Thant asking for 
peaceful settlement of the issue’.98 This made Pakistani policy makers to re-think the 
importance of SEATO and CENTO. Portugal, which was controlling Goa until then, 
being a member of NATO, was not helped by the US or the West (on the axiom of 
one for all and all for one) in her confrontation with India. By now India’s warring 
power had also increased tremendously due to the US and Soviet support. Strangely, 
America was having alliances with Pakistan but was still arming India. Critics in 
Pakistan were very vocal about the passive role of the US in halting the Indian 
takeover of Goa. The Dawn wrote in its editorial:  
 
…Just as NATO membership did not help Portugal, SEATO and CENTO 
membership would also not assist Pakistan. The West and in particular the 
US was mad to have neutralist India’s support for becoming a stake holder 
in the neutralist Afro-Asian nations. They were ready to sacrifice 
Portugal’s interests for the time being to gain the Asian leaderships’ nod. 
It was the opportune time for Pakistan to understand the importance and 
value of the Western sponsored Pacts.  
 
The Dawn newspaper took lead in writing too harshly in following words:  
 
After [the] Goa episode… the first thing we should do is to recognise 
something that is so clear, namely, that military pacts are but millstones 
round our necks that retard and humiliate but do not help. Having 
recognized we must at once get out of the pacts.99 
 
The Indo-China war had yet not occurred. However, the Kennedy 
administration was bent towards India more than the word ‘tilt’ signifies. Of all the 
regional powers, Kennedy was most interested in India, which he had long regarded 
as ‘the key area’ in Asia.100 Kennedy wanted India in the Western camp at all costs. In 
his early 1963 remarks to the National Security Council, he said: 
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We cannot permit all those who call themselves neutral to join the 
Communist bloc. If we lose the neutrals; the balance of power could 
swing against us.101 
 
4.3.4 Further Dips in Pak-US Relations 
 
The ruling military clique in Pakistan was annoyed by Indo-US proximity. President 
Kennedy sent Ambassador-at-Large Harriman to Karachi to clarify US intentions. He 
told Ayub Khan that America was sensitive towards her commitments in the alliances. 
However, the non-aligned countries also needed American support to keep them away 
from the Communist fold. Later on, Ayub had a meeting with the British High 
Commissioner on 3rd April 1961. President Ayub thought that Harriman and the US 
administration were much too sympathetic to India.102 During his meeting with the 
High Commissioner, he ‘warned that too much aid to India could only lead to the 
break up of that country’. The High Commissioner replied that ‘America did not take 
the same poor view’.103 Ayub wanted America to pressure Nehru to bring about a 
settlement of Kashmir,104 but neither did Kennedy want to use his assistance to India 
as a bargaining point nor was Nehru likely to agree with the US administration 
regarding Kashmir. Finally, Ayub hinted to the British High Commissioner that ‘just 
as India had looked to Russia for support; so [can] Pakistan look to China’.105 It was 
the beginning of the end of the honeymoon period that the Pakistan Army had had 
with the US administration. Poles were now to be changed. Pakistan was tilting 
towards China more than to the US. The enemy of my enemy is my friend and thus 
China and Pakistan grew closer together against India.  
In May 1961, Vice-President Johnson visited Karachi. When Ayub asked him 
to influence India to solve the Kashmir problem, he replied that Pakistan 
overestimated US influence on Nehru. Ayub disagreed on this point. The Vice-
President also said that the tense relations between India and China compelled the US 
to come to India’s economic aid. He also urged that America maintain a distinction 
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between allies and neutrals. This conversation did not satisfy Ayub.106 Indeed, it was a 
strange phenomenon that America was supporting neutrality and alignment 
simultaneously. These were two different and diametrically opposite philosophies, 
and adopting both of them in one go was unimaginable. Until that point, the US 
administration had been wary of the term neutrality.  Indeed, it was very annoying to 
hear from Harriman that the new US administration did not regard neutrality as 
necessarily immoral.107 
The US administration seemed very impressed by India, so much so that the 
US Vice-President Johnson stated that, at the request of President Kennedy, he urged 
Mr. Nehru ‘to extend his leadership to other areas in South East Asia’.108 Any such 
statement was against the spirit of freedom the Asian states had recently acquired. No 
Asian country big or small was prepared to have an outsider appointed a super-leader 
or arbiter of its fate. The statement seemed to imply that Mr. Johnson was speaking of 
a kind of political relationship between India and other countries akin to the 
relationship between a leader and his camp-followers. Strong criticism was voiced in 
the local press. The reputable pro-West Civil and Military Gazette newspaper editorial 
page columnist Yusuf Saraf wrote on 28th May 1961:  
 
American policy had changed but not for better. It was not a leap forward 
but a thrust backwards. It was not different from the normal experience of 
history – everyone tries to be the friend of the strong.109   
 
The Daily Maghribi Pakistan in its editorial comments said:  
 
People of Pakistan will never accept the American suggestion for 
imposing India’s leadership on Asia. The birth of such an idea in the 
minds of American leaders constitutes an insult to America’s allies in this 
region.110  
 
The resolution of problems between the disappointed friends, the US and Pakistan, 
needed an opportunity.  Such an occasion arrived in the shape of Ayub’s first state 
visit to Washington in July 1961. Prior to his visit, he told an Associated Press 
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reporter that ‘Washington did not realise [the] gravity of the situation’. He very 
bluntly told a correspondent of The Times of London that the US was ‘too shy or too 
frightened’ of India to use its influence to solve the Kashmir issue.111 During his visit, 
Ayub defined Pakistan’s feelings towards the US as not so much anger as 
disappointment. He understood the US desire to aid India but added that such aid 
allowed India economically and militarily to pose a greater threat to Pakistan. India 
was already three times Pakistan’s strength, and although China posed a threat to 
India, 80% of the Indian army was facing Pakistan.112 Ayub indicated that one of his 
major complaints was that neither of the organizations (SEATO & CENTO) was 
strong enough. If they were defensive pacts, then they should have the power to 
defend their areas. If they were not defensive pacts, then they should be called 
something else. He said that at present, neither CENTO nor SEATO had the power 
locally to defend the areas they were supposed to defend. ‘All we get from them is an 
enlargement of our political liabilities and a lot of abuse and pressure from Russia and 
neutralist India’, he added.113  
Ayub had a strong conviction that the Kashmir issue should be settled while he 
and Nehru were in control.114 ‘He had a fear that if they could not reach a point of 
settlement, the issue would remain a pain in the neck for the rest of South Asia’s 
history’.115 It was this fear that compelled him to request Kennedy again and again to 
use his influence and aid to India in resolving the disputed territory. During his 
official visit to the US in 1961, he repeated his request, but Kennedy refused to use 
aid to India as a lever on Kashmir. However, he agreed to speak with Nehru about 
Kashmir during his scheduled visit to Washington in November the same year.  
Ayub also expressed his worries that the US might give military assistance to 
India in future, especially against the backdrop of escalating Indo-China tension. He 
also warned that ‘any such military assistance to India would force his country out of 
the pacts and alliances and everything’.116 However, Kennedy did not second this 
point of view. He was of the view that in case any war happened between India and 
China, and India sought US military assistance, he would first consult Ayub Khan 
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before making any such commitment. According to the proposed amendment of the 
Mutual Security Act, ‘President Kennedy stated categorically that the US had no 
intention of giving arms to India at present. Should she need such assistance even in 
the event of Chinese aggression Pakistan would be consulted first’.117 The new 
president also ordered to expidite the delivery of twelve F-104 aircraft to Pakistan; 
promised earlier by the Eisenhower administration. These assurances on Kashmir and 
military aid to India were sufficient to repair some of the damage to Pak-US 
relations.118 However, the gulf between the US and the military hierarchy in Pakistan 
deepened. President Ayub, while giving a statement on US TV on the 9th July 1961, 
stated that Pakistan might adopt neutralism if the force of circumstances presented 
neutralism as the only guarantee of Pakistan’s security.119 For any country, turning 
from alliance to neutralism was indeed difficult as there was much less space to 
manoeuvre. It could be only one of two choices for Pakistan: pro-US or anti-US. Any 
such statement regarding neutralism by Ayub Khan was just a bluff. If he was turning 
from a pro-US stance, he had no option but to go against the US by joining China. 
And this was the only option that he had in the following days. But leaving pacts at 
such a crucial juncture of the Indo-US growing relationship was also not a sane idea. 
This would have further alienated Pakistan in the region and deprived it of the 
remaining US military and economic assistance. President Ayub, while answering a 
question on 20th January 1962 at Mardan, said that he did not think that Pakistan’s 
SEATO and CENTO allies would not come to her aid if she became the victim of 
aggression. Even if they did not, he posed the counter-question whether they would do 
so if Pakistan left the pacts.  He went on to say that foreign policy was drawn up with 
very careful consideration and was not a matter which could be changed or altered 
abruptly. Pakistan needed allies and even if her present allies were an evil, yet they 
were a necessary evil, and a lesser evil was better than a greater evil. If Pakistan did 
not have friends then she must not lose her half or quarter friends under the present 
circumstances. Pakistan wanted to be faithful to her friends and expected them to be 
faithful to her.120 The Daily Telegraph interviewed President Ayub on 22nd January 
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reporting that he said, ‘Pakistanis are dissatisfied not with the pacts but with the 
attitude of its allies’.121 He was mourning the US support to the neutralists. 
 However, in the entire scenario, India emerged as the ultimate benefactor. She 
turned from neutralism to a pro-US stance. To make such a shift was very easy for her 
and even the Soviet Union could not object to such a stance. It was a question of 
India’s survival vis-à-vis China. Hence, India not only remained close to both 
adversaries but also cashed in on them to the fullest extent. America and Communist 
Russia were very proud to be the allies of India. In this equation, Pakistan seemed to 
be the odd man out. 
In November 1961, Nehru visited Washington. Kennedy raised the issue of 
Kashmir with the Indian Prime Minister fulfilling his promise to Ayub Khan. Nehru’s 
response was very cold. He replied that, apart from minor boundary adjustments, 
nothing would be acceptable to India short of formal recognition of the status quo. 
Kennedy later described his meeting with Nehru as ‘a disaster’. It was ‘the worst 
head-of-state visit I have had’,122 he said. ‘The President did most of the talking since 
Nehru simply did not respond’.123 
 
4.3.5 Sino-India War and the Beginning of the End of 
Institutional Interaction 
 
D-day occurred on 20th October 1962 when India-China border skirmishes erupted 
into a fully-fledged war. For Americans, it was a war between Democratic India and 
Communist China. President Kennedy hurriedly wrote a letter to Ayub Khan asking 
him to play the role of statesman by offering a unilateral no-war pledge to India.124 
With this, on 27th October 1962, the US president also took the decision to arm India 
in its war against China.125 Ayub predicted that any arms that India acquired for use 
against China would eventually be turned against Pakistan.126 He personally felt 
betrayed by Kennedy. Kennedy had promised Ayub during his visit to Washington the 
previous year that Pakistan would be consulted before further military aid would be 
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offered to India.127 Contrary to that, he had been informed and not consulted. Ayub’s 
reply to ‘Kennedy’s earlier request [to be] friendly with India during Indo-China war’ 
was very blunt.128 He said that the solution of strained relations between India and 
Pakistan did not lie in being sympathetic with India but in the solution of the Kashmir 
issue. He very bluntly disagreed with Kennedy’s approach of arming India by saying:  
 
…No, Mr. President, the answer to this problem lies elsewhere. It 
lies in creating a situation whereby we are free from the Indian threat, and 
the Indians are free from any apprehensions about us. This can only be 
done if there is a settlement of the question of Kashmir.129  
 
He also downplayed Kennedy’s assurance that India would not use US supplied 
weapons against Pakistan. Ayub said that ‘Our belief is that arms now being obtained 
by India from you for use against China will undoubtedly be used against us at the 
very first opportunity’.130  However, the US administration was underplaying 
Pakistan’s reaction as an emotional crisis. Robert Komer of the National Security 
Council (NSC) staff wrote to President Kennedy in a memo: 
The Pakistani[s] are going through a genuine emotional crisis as they see 
their cherished ambitions of using the US as a lever against India going up 
in the smoke of the Chinese border war. Their plaint about lack of 
consultation is mere cover for this (if we'd "consulted" with the 
Pak[istani]s, instead of notifying them, we'd still be arguing about 
Kashmir). …We have no need to apologize. … Whether Pakistan moves 
from words to action depends on whether it is willing to risk its 
relationship with the US. Ayub probably isn't, but he may be a prisoner of 
Pak public emotions in this case.131 
Komer did not realise that if Pakistan needed them, the US also needed 
Pakistan especially against the backdrop of intense Cold War rivalry. Brigadier (Rtd) 
Inam-l-Haq Afridi says:  
The mood in the GHQ was extremely disappointing. Every officer was 
shocked to know that Americans were supplying arms to India. Our 
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loyalty was equated with India’s stubbornness and nonalignment. Pakistan 
and India were two extremes of a situation and America had to choose one 
of the two. Her policy of trying to keep both together in her equation was 
full of flaws and baseless.132   
It was the turning point for the Pakistani Army’s relations with US policy making 
bodies. US sponsored alliances were considered as liabilities now. Henceforth, 
profound institutional interaction was over. No one had another better idea than to 
move to the opposite pole: China. Hawaldar (Rtd) Ghafoor Yousafzai says:  
 
We already doubted American intentions vis-à-vis India. We the soldiers 
were sure that the US would support India and the balance would be 
shifted. Same thing happened during the Indo-China war. Friendship with 
the US was more of a liability than a benefit. Most of my colleagues were 
against CENTO and SEATO. We were not communist or socialist 
minded. But we wanted to have the support of neighbouring countries like 
the Soviet Union and China rather than a country situated thousands of 
miles away. We also had an opinion that Americans were shy to support 
us openly in our disputes with India and on international forums. In other 
words we were very happy about the Indo-China war. We were expecting 
a change of mind in the GHQ.133 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Lt. Col. (Rtd) Arsalah Khan in following 
words: 
 
Pakistan Army’s joining of alliances was an understanding between the 
top-brass Army and the US Department of State and Pentagon. Ayub and 
his coterie were in the forefront as they were much under American 
influence. The Army’s lower ranks wanted a balanced approach between 
the East and the West. They wanted to have cordial relations with China 
and the Soviet Union too, as they knew that not communism but India was 
their enemy. Rubbing shoulders with a superpower [America] least 
concerned with Pakistan’s security interests would not have benefited 
them against India. Such fears were proved during the Indo-China war of 
1962 and Pak-India war of 1965 in which the US role was absolutely 
unfriendly vis-à-vis Pakistan.134  
 
Many people felt that the US was very closely identified with India and therefore with 
aggressive Indian designs.135 Americans were already not generally popular in 
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Pakistan, either with the people or with the civil authorities.136 The friendship had 
reached its climax. The Pak-US alliance was like the beauty of a young girl: the 
moment it reached its peak, it started receding. 
The proximity between India and the Kennedy administration compelled 
military rulers to find alternate ways to ensure Pakistan’s security against India. 
Ambassador (Rtd) Hamidullah Khan says: 
 
Many people in the foreign office were wishing for some kind of 
arrangement with China in order to meet the main security threat to 
Pakistan from India. Any such arrangement was to serve twin purpose for 
Pakistan. It was an opportunity to apply pressure on Americans. It could 
also have resulted in strong ties between China and Pakistan in case the 
US did not come under pressure. But we were ready that the Pakistani 
flirtation with China could result in a deep love affair. The ideological 
difference between the two countries was something of the past. However, 
there were two risks: stoppage of US aid to Pakistan; and the coming 
together of Pakistan and China might result in strong Indo-US ties. For 
Pakistan, both risks were less than the threat of India. Thus, we still 
followed the policy of wait and see to finalise our relations with China. 
But the India-China war and resultantly the US unconstrained aid to India 
just proved to be the last nail in the coffin of our wait and see policy. It 
threw us into the lap of China. The flirtation developed into a strong love 
affair. The love affair was already realised by the Foreign Office. 
However, the GHQ took a while to realise that a nearby ally was much 
more precious than a distanced sceptical friend.137  
 
The Dawn wrote that ‘an alliance nearer home against a common enemy was far more 
logical’.138  
The Kennedy administration’s explicit pro-India stance threw Pakistan into a 
quandary. In quest of friends, Pakistan focused on the Muslim world to muster 
support against India in the name of Islam. Kashmir, a regional dispute, was presented 
as an issue of the Muslim world.139 President Ayub said that the foreign policy of any 
country was a projection of its internal policies: these in Pakistan’s case were to carry 
out the ideological integration of Pakistan, to ensure its territorial security, and lastly 
to reform and rebuild. Regarding the Muslim world’s problems and quarrels, he said 
that though Pakistan wished them well genuinely, it would be ‘fatal and futile’ for her 
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to take sides in their problems. ‘There is no doubt that the greatest importance is 
attached here to cultivation of good relations with all Muslim countries, even when 
they are quarrelling with each other’, he said.140 He also attempted to dissociate 
himself and the people of Pakistan from pro-West and US attitudes adopted by the 
government of the day during the Suez Crisis in 1956. It was a natural and recurring 
wish in any young nation, and Pakistanis had their reasons for a rather frustrated 
desire to feel that they had some room to manoeuvre and to distribute their affections. 
It was important when among so many of their fellow Muslim states, the 
‘uncommitted’ position seemed fashionable and profitable, as was the case with India, 
but it was a very risky situation. How could Pakistan move into the Indian position of 
neutrality without fearing the charge of being under India’s shadow? On the other 
hand, Pakistan could not turn towards Soviet Russia due to her staunch position vis-à-
vis Kashmir and ‘Pushtoonistan’ directly opposed to Pakistan. Secondly, the religious 
parties of Pakistan considered communism as diametrically opposite to Islamic 
ideology. Thus Ayub Khan was caught in the cross fire. Proximity with the Muslim 




With the declaration of Martial Law, the Pakistan Army took full and overt 
control of the country. Politicians and opposition parties were suppressed with an iron 
hand and law and order was maintained. This proved the statement given by the US 
Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree that ‘Pakistan did not have enough 
talent to build itself as a nation by democratic methods’.141 Occasionally or in times of 
national crisis, the reaction of the opposition parties or of the public had a profound 
effect on the state’s foreign policy. However, in absence of such reactions, foreign 
policy becomes the victim of stagnation. During General Ayub’s regime of martial 
law, the foreign policy could not serve national interests. The reason was that political 
parties were not involved in its formulation. When foreign policy becomes the subject 
of an institution or personal interests, it will be exercised according to institutional or 
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personal criteria. This was the case with the country’s foreign policy and the Pakistan 
Army. The army emerged as the only unified organised and well established 
institution during Ayub’s era. The detachment of foreign policy from the public 
proved a great loss for the country. A foreign policy must be a national foreign policy 
based on national interests rather than on an institution’s agenda.  
The Pak-US romance succumbed to Americans’ fear of India becoming a 
victim of communism. Fear prevailed over romance. In fact, fear was stronger than 
romance. First, American support to India was to curb her economic difficulties. 
Then, she was supported militarily against China. This proved that the American 
vision for India was quite clear. But conversely, US objectives of military support to 
Pakistan were ambiguous. Military aid to Pakistan was neither so huge to defeat nor 
so little to even combat Soviet Union. It was like a tip paid to Pakistan to keep it with 
the US so that its land may be used in the event of a world war against the Soviet 
Union. However, the negative impact of such modest assistance was that it unleashed 
an arms race between the two arch rival neighbours, India and Pakistan. The US role 
was still very sensitive in the region. It wanted Pakistan to play the role of a frontline 
ally against communism and, hence, military assistance was granted. But Americans 
also wanted to keep Pakistan weak to bar her from any kind of adventurism against 
India. It was dual containment for Pakistan. Pakistan had to be reasonably strong 
against Russia but had to remain weak against India. It was a paradoxical situation. In 
a reply to Senator Russell, the State department remarked that ‘India would 
undoubtedly maintain a strong military superiority over Pakistan. With this, any 
attempt by Pakistan to engage India in military combat would be suicidal’.142 The 
ground realities were diametrically different than what was thought in Washington. 
The Pakistan Army wanted to resolve the issue of Kashmir by any means. Once 
diplomatic efforts failed India and Pakistan would resort to war in 1965. The Pakistani 
Army was adequate for the maintenance of internal security. It had a good capability 
for defending itself. But it was not capable of defending its borders or maintaining its 
territorial integrity against an attack by the USSR, even if the forces in the approved 
force objectives should be brought to full strength in men and equipment.143 At the 
same time, ‘East Pakistan was entirely vulnerable to a major military effort by 
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India’.144 Pakistan just had an impression of being a great nation due to its friendship 
with the US. However, in reality, it was a poor and weak country with a strong army 
supported by the US. The US’s confused policy and Pakistan’s confused 
understanding with America was exposed during the Indo-Pak war of 1965.  
Ayub Khan’s policy in relation to India was not merely that Pakistan was 
smaller and less powerful but also that her state of development was fifteen years 
behind India’s.145 By now, Ayub had a mission to reform his country. He was, 
therefore, doing his utmost to consolidate his reforms and put the country on its 
forward path. For this he required a great deal of help from the US, but the regional 
situation had changed. China-India tension had attracted the US administration’s 
attention more than Pakistan. The US support for India was commensurate with the 
greater threat she faced from communism and Pakistan was left behind in the race of 
attracting foreign aid in terms of military and economic assistance from Washington. 
With the Chinese attack in 1962, Pakistanis felt that fortune was smiling upon India. 
The Sino-India war also exposed the strategic importance of SEATO and 
CENTO. The pacts had brought no preferential privilege and no advantage in 
Pakistan’s bargaining position vis-à-vis India. Alignment isolated it among Afro-
Asian nations. While the gains the alliances brought were limited if not negligible, the 
political liabilities proved enormous. Chiefly, the Soviet hostility to Pakistan and its 
support for India on Kashmir was mainly or entirely due to Pakistan’s membership of 
the pacts. On the other hand, America was quite hesitant to support Pakistan in her 
regional disputes with India. Hence, Ayub was compelled to say:  
 
No one will present Kashmir to us, nor shall we have to beg it from 
anyone. Pakistan could depend on the friendship of the US [but] Kashmir 
is a problem of Pakistan. We shall solve it ourselves instead of throwing 
our responsibility on our allies.146 
 
Ayub was forecasting the future Pak-India war of 1965. The balance of power took a 
shift in South Asia. Indo-Pak rivalry was joined by the US and China from different 
poles respectively. South Asia became a flash point for the rest of history. 
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The Foreign Office and subalterns of the Pakistan army were in favour of an 
alliance with China. At the outset, they were not in favour of the US sponsored 
military pacts. However, the power of GHQ prevailed over the Foreign Office as well 
as lower ranking officers. Military alliance with the US was just a result of drawing-
room politics where the decision-makers were the top-brass military command of 
Pakistan. As very bluntly stated by Subedar-Major (Rtd) Akram Khan: 
 
Whatever the opinion of hundreds of thousands of subalterns, the major 
decisions of the country were taken in the GHQ by the central command 
of the Army. GHQ did not necessarily reflect the opinion of the majority 
of soldiers. There soldiers did not make decisions; Generals did. It did not 
run on democratic principles. It was not Pakistan: it was the Pakistan 
Army.147 
 
The GHQ’s confidence in the US policy making bodies had shaken. Institutional 
interaction was at stake. And the allies were at the loggerheads. 
 
                                                 








The relationship between the United States and the Pakistan Army was both 
mutually beneficial and antagonistic. The Pakistani military was able to dominate 
domestic politics because of its strong ties with the US, and vice versa. During the 
years 1962-65, both parties exasperated each other but tried to forge an alliance 
despite mutual annoyance and even hostility due to US support to India. This chapter 
investigates how the army lost public support inside Pakistan with its estrangement 
from the US and became an object of censure along with the latter.  
As a nation, Pakistan had risked much to join the Western camp. It borders 
Afghanistan, India and Iran and is close to the former Soviet Union. Of the countries 
sharing a common border with Pakistan, only Iran was in any way connected with the 
Western world in the struggle against communism in the period under discussion. 
Afghanistan was virtually a puppet of the Soviet Union, and until Red China attacked 
neutralist India, India was leaning heavily towards the communist side. But Pakistan 
chose early to stand with the Western world.1 Therefore, it emerged initially as the 
west’s only ally in the region. In this way, Pakistan not only wanted to check the 
spread of communism, but also, through its allies, to apply pressure on India to solve 
its regional disputes including Kashmir. 
 
5.2 The Kashmir Dispute and the Triangular Relationship 
between Pakistan, India and the US 
 
The Kashmir dispute was only one of India’s foreign policy problems, but 
Pakistan’s frustration over its inability to wrest Kashmir from India was the basic 
emotion moulding its entire foreign policy. To Pakistanis, Kashmir was a blemish on 
their national honour. The proposal for status quo on the valley did not impress the 
General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Pakistan Army who considered themselves the 
custodian of Pakistan’s territorial integrity or President Ayub, whose political future 
was inextricably tied to Kashmir. In 1959, Ayub tried for the first time to exploit the 
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Sino-Indian border difficulties by proposing joint Indian-Pakistani defence measures 
for the Subcontinent – which in themselves possessed real merit – predicated on a 
Kashmir settlement.2 Prime Minister Nehru was unresponsive.3 He considered the 
joint defence idea a violation of non-aligned principles.4 Pakistan’s military junta then 
hoped that the Chinese pressure on the Indian border would force India to secure its 
Pakistani flank by offering concessions in Kashmir. However, in the Pakistan army’s 
view, its western allies, by sending military assistance to India following the 1962 
Chinese invasion, eliminated the necessity for Indian concessions over Kashmir.5 In 
particular, the arms sent by the US to India, even though intended only for use against 
China, were interpreted by Pakistan as disloyal and treacherous support of an enemy 
by an ally.6   
Both India and Pakistan were always more concerned with their most 
immediate and primary threat, and, in Pakistan’s case, it came from India, not 
communism. Colonel (Rtd) Saleem Zafar in an interview said that senior military 
officers were using official letterheads to write, and verbal commands to pronounce, 
official policy that the US-supplied arms must be deployed at the Eastern front against 
India.7 Similarly, Senator Gruening in his Senate speech exposed India’s centrality to 
Pakistan’s defence schemes despite Pakistan’s participation in US-sponsored alliances 
against communists. He said:  
 
Two years ago…I received a communication from the Ambassador of 
Pakistan to the US, in which he said, in effect, “We do not intend to use 
this money [US aid to Pakistan] to fight communism. We are going to use 
it to fight India”.8  
 
Pakistan and the US were at loggerheads regarding US military assistance to India 
during and after the Indo-China war of 1962. China and Pakistan – armed with US-
supplied weapons and with the dispute in Kashmir on its hands – were the chief 
regional powers hostile to India. There existed an understanding between Kennedy 
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and Ayub (as explained in the previous chapter) that Pakistan would be consulted 
prior to any US military support to India in case of an Indo-China clash. However, 
Pakistan’s great expectations were frustrated because of US neglect of Pakistani 
interests during its relations with India. Senator Mr. Thurmand was quoted in 
congressional record papers as saying:  
 
While I was in Pakistan last fall, Mr. Nehru had more troops massed on 
the Pakistani border than he did facing the Chinese Reds who were 
waging war against Indian forces in the Himalayan Mountains. When 
President Ayub visited the US in 1962, he was told by the president [of 
the United States] as well as the Department of State, that he would be 
consulted before giving any arms to India. However, as soon as Mr Nehru 
made his first screams for aid against the Chinese Communists, our 
country ran to India’s assistance. In fact, this was one of the swiftest 
responses America had ever made to any act of communist aggression. 
And this aggression was not directed at our Nation or that of an ally, but 
rather at a pro-Red neutralist country. Our Government gave military aid 
to Mr. Nehru and did so without consulting President Khan [Ayub Khan]. 
We only gave him a perfunctory notice of the fact that aid was being 
given to his arch enemy.9  
 
The Indo-China clash not only resulted in annoying Pakistan by bringing the 
US closer to India but also took both super powers, the Soviet Union and the US, 
aback. The clash started suddenly and ended abruptly. On 20th November 1962, the 
Chinese declared a unilateral ceasefire and began to withdraw from their forward 
positions. Their action surprised Indians and Americans alike. ‘India had suffered a 
military defeat’, but the Chinese withdrawal ‘superimposed on this defeat a 
diplomatic defeat’.10 Chinese leaders claimed that with this war they had not only 
settled the border dispute with India but also dashed its ‘arrogance’ and ‘illusions of 
grandeur’.11 They also forced upon Khrushchev the difficult choice of Soviet support 
to either New Delhi or Peking. Maintaining neutrality between the two sides placed 
the Soviets in an awkward position. Obviously concerned about the implications of 
Indian acceptance of Western arms, Moscow was persisting in its efforts to preserve 
its position in India without, however, seriously jeopardizing its relations with 
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China’.12 Khrushchev has written as follows in his memoirs about the awkward 
situation of the Soviet Union between India and China:  
 
I think Mao created the Sino-Indian conflict precisely in order to draw the 
Soviet Union into it. He wanted to put us in the position of having no 
choice but to support him.13  
 
5.3 Harriman’s Mission Impossible to the South Asia 
 
The Indo-China border clash at once attracted US attention to the region. 
American policy-makers became more serious than ever regarding the resolution of 
the regional issue of Kashmir and arranging a détente between India and Pakistan to 
enable India to deal with China effectively. Kennedy sent his Assistant Secretary of 
State for Far Eastern affairs, Harriman, to South Asia on a diplomatic-military-
assistance-keeping-India-and Pakistan-happy-together-Mission. Roger Hilsman, who 
was with Harriman in his first meeting with Nehru, wrote in his book that Nehru 
looked tired and strained. Hilsman further observed that it must have been difficult to 
greet Americans over the ruins of his long-pursued policy of neutralism.14 
Accompanied by his British counterpart, Duncan Sandys, Harriman assured Nehru of 
the willingness of Washington and London to assist India in the short and long term. 
However, he urged upon him to reopen negotiations on the issue of disputed Kashmir 
with Pakistan. In the beginning, Nehru was not ready to soften his stance towards a 
nation that had expressed a ‘revengeful reaction’ against India at war.15 Harriman 
‘quite bluntly’ informed Nehru that the Kennedy administration would find itself in an 
‘untenable situation’ vis-a-vis American public opinion if it provided mass military 
aid to India without the latter expressing interest in the resolution of her problems 
with Pakistan. Nehru understood the American position and agreed to restart 
negotiations with Pakistan over the issue of Kashmir.16 
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Map 5.1 Disputed Territory of Kashmir17 
 
Nehru’s undertaking to restart negotiations on Kashmir necessitated Harriman’s 
next mission – a meeting with Ayub Khan in Karachi. In his anticipated meeting, his 
first objective was to give Ayub a sugar-coated appraisal of the growing relationship 
between India and the US. In the meanwhile, Kennedy sent a mail to Harriman 
instructing him how to deal with Ayub. He emphasised that:  
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Were Pakistan to move closer to the Chinese at a time when we were assisting India 
to confront Communist China, it would cut across the deep commitments of the entire 
free world… Pakistan must realise that there are certain limits which should not be 
overstepped if a fruitful Pak-US relationship can continue.18 
 
During the Harriman-Ayub meeting, Ayub accepted that limited US military aid to 
India was understandable. However, he expressed a desire that further military aid to 
India be linked to progress towards a just Kashmir settlement. Ayub’s cool reaction 
was a surprise to the Americans. Kennedy admired him for his ‘statesmanlike 
approach’.19 However, Pakistan was expecting the US to work hard for the resolution 
of the Kashmir dispute. It was thought that US pressure on India, especially during the 
latter’s encounter with the Chinese, would be the final spur to the resolution of the 
Kashmir dispute. General (Rtd) Matinuddin, while defending Pakistan’s expectation 
from the US very confidently said: 
 
Of course we had been fighting the US proxy war against the Soviet 
Union for a long time. Now was the time for the US administration to 
return our loyalty by compelling India to move decisively for the Kashmir 
solution once and for all.20 
  
The US ambassador in Pakistan, Walter P. McConaughy warned that the failure of 
talks on Kashmir and the continuance of US aid to India ‘could set into motion 
virtually uncontrollable pressures for open estrangement from [the] West with deep 
injury to [the] American presence here, irrespective of logical consequences’.21 In his 
final report, Harriman wrote that the Indo-China war provided ‘a unique opportunity 
for a close Indo-US relationship’ and also ‘a unique opportunity for the easing of 
tensions between India and Pakistan’. Regarding the Kashmir dispute, he informed 
Rusk that ‘if the present opportunity toward encouraging a settlement in Kashmir is 
not seized, it is hard to see how any other occasion more favourable will arise’.22 
                                                 
18 Kennedy to Harriman, Folder, Trips & Missions, India-Pakistan,11, Box, 535, December 5, 1962, 
Harriman Papers, Library of Congress. 
19 Ibid, Kennedy to Ayub Khan, December 5, 1962. 
20 Interview with General (Rtd) Kamal Matinuddin, (Islamabad, 24-03-07). 
21 McConaughy to the State Department, November 25, 1962 quoted in Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima 
to Glasnost: At the Centre of Decision, A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfield, 1989), p.242. 
22 Memorandum of Conversation between Harriman and Fulbright, folder: Trips and Missions, India-
Pakistan,9,box 534, December 4, 1962; Harriman to Rusk, folder, Trips and Missions, India-Pakistan, 
2, box, 533, December 18, 1962, Harriman Papers, US Congress Library. 
 192 
The Indo-China war provided an opportunity to the ‘free world’ to seize the 
moment and get neutralist India into the Western camp and to act as a catalyst for the 
resolution of the Kashmir problem. British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and 
President Kennedy announced an Anglo-American emergency military aid package of 
$120 million for India, and also pledged to work for the resolution of the Kashmir 
problem.23 A strong message was sent from the State Department to the US 
ambassador in India, Galbraith, to convey to Nehru that whether we like it or not, the 
question of Kashmir is inescapably related to what we can do to assist the Indian 
military. [The] President, therefore, will find it difficult to justify extensive aid without 
progress on Kashmir.24  
Under the influence and pressure of the West, talks between India and 
Pakistan did commence. However, the parleys proved very superficial. According to 
Ambassador (retired) Hameedullah Khan, no substantive outcome was possible as the 
Indian delegation was not serious in negotiating over the disputed territory of 
Kashmir, much less seeking a resolution.25 India had been unwilling to negotiate over 
Kashmir even when she was in a position of weakness. However, now, with the influx 
of US military and economic assistance, she was a strong state. It was far-fetched to 
expect concessions or a just resolution of the issue from India.26 
India embarked on a policy of major military expansion against the backdrop 
of the Indo-China war of 1962, enlarging its army from 550,000 to over 900,000.27 It 
completely ignored the disputed status of Kashmir. Rather it began a military 
programme aimed at achieving self-sufficiency in the production of large quantities of 
tanks, artillery, aircraft, etc.28 It received commitments of large amounts of military 
aid from both the US and the USSR. New Delhi described its efforts to arm itself as 
aimed solely at preventing communist Chinese aggression. However, it clearly 
intended to have armed forces large enough to deal with both Pakistan and China.29 
‘India’s military build-up badly frightened the Pakistan Army. It believed that the 
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strengthened Indian Army was aimed not only against China, but also against 
Pakistan’.30 In fact, substantial elements of the Indian armed forces were deployed 
toward the borders of Pakistan rather than China.31  
India’s growing military strength worried Pakistan, leading to fears that 
India’s military power might make her even less compromising on the issue of 
Kashmir. The policies of the two nations continued to be primarily determined by 
their fear of and hostility towards one another, and not by Cold War issues. Pakistan 
had signed up for SEATO and CENTO to ensure US assistance in the event of a war. 
However, the US motive in bringing Pakistan into such alliances was the containment 
of Communism. A misunderstanding is always against an understanding. On the other 
hand, India, in its hostility against and fear of China, maintained friendly relations 
with the US. India, moreover, already maintained good relations with the USSR, 
which had furnished SAMs, Tanks, and the facilities for building MIG 21s, and was 
considering furnishing her with four submarines.32 US policy aims of containment 
were certainly frustrated. In particular, there was no chance whatever in the 
foreseeable future of getting Pakistan and India to cooperate in mutual efforts against 
the communist bloc. It was difficult for the US to remain friendly with two countries 
so hostile to each other simultaneously.  
 
5.4 Pakistan Drifts towards Communist China: Troubled Pak-US 
Relations 
 
During 1963, Pakistan, disturbed by India’s growing military strength and its 
intimacy with the US, chose to modify the exclusiveness of her thirteen-year old 
institutional interaction with the US, seeking closer relations with Communist China. 
Her apparent goals were two-fold: to pressure Western powers [America and Britain] 
into either reducing military aid to India or increasing such aid to Pakistan; and to 
strengthen her own international position by playing both sides of the Cold War. 
President Ayub exhibited growing frustration over his inability to halt the arming of 
India following the Chinese attack of October 1962 and Indian intransigence over the 
issue of Kashmir. Claiming that US-UK agreements to supply arms aid to its 
traditional enemy upset the delicate balance of power in the subcontinent, Pakistan 
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turned to India’s enemy in a calculated effort to redress the balance. General Sheikh 
and General Burki along with Foreign Minister Bhutto were frequent visitors to 
Peking. At this time Bhutto was said to be visiting Peking more frequently than his 
hometown, Larkana.33 Concurrently, Pakistan’s Foreign Office also asserted that India 
and other nations who had remained aloof from the fight against communism had 
fared better at Western hands than those who allied themselves unreservedly with the 
US.34 On 6th January 1963, President Ayub said that the future role of Pakistan in 
CENTO and SEATO was ‘quite uncertain’. His Foreign Secretary Dehlavi expressed 
similar sentiments earlier in Rome when he said that his country could withdraw from 
the pacts the ‘day we feel they are of no use’.35  
As a matter of fact, Pakistan felt no danger from communism, especially from 
China. The animosity expressed against this ideology was purely in the interest of 
acquiring US support and aid. Thus, the emotional reaction to the growing US-India 
cordiality was natural. As confidence in the Pak-US institutional interaction became 
shaky, Foreign Minister Z.A. ‘Bhutto visited Beijing in February 1963 to sign the 
border agreement’. Pakistan accepted China’s well-timed offer to come to agreement 
on their common border. Their joint communiqué reflected both Pakistan’s 
preoccupation with the Indian threat and China’s desire to appear as the peaceful 
neighbour. Both expressed their hope for settlement of the Sino-Indian border 
differences by similar negotiations.36 It was strange that Pakistan, though an ally of 
the US, was signing pacts and agreements with its enemy, China. Former US 
ambassador to India John Galbraith wrote very rightly about Pakistan in his memoirs: 
‘History can be idiotic. A staunch American ally against communism was negotiating 
with the Chinese Communists to the discontent of an erstwhile neutral’.37 Foreign 
Minister Bhutto was very keen to have close ties with China, although he was well 
aware that such moves were contrary to the policies and interests of Pakistan’s 
Western allies. The impact of Pakistan signing a non-aggression pact with China was 
further strengthened by Bhutto’s warning to India on 17th July 1963 that an attack on 
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Pakistan would pose a serious threat because ‘the largest state in Asia’ would help 
Pakistan.38  
The Kennedy administration was concerned about Pakistan’s drift towards 
China. The development of Pak-China relations was contrary to American global and 
regional interests while harming the rationality of defence alliances against 
communism. Harriman openly expressed his distaste for a proposed air link between 
China and Pakistan. He explained to Pakistan’s Ambassador in connection with the 
Pakistan-China air link that ‘in this period, no member of the Free World should do 
anything to aid Communist Chinese’. He cautioned that ‘Pakistan should be very 
careful in its dealings with the Chicoms [Chinese Communists] and not jeopardize its 
relations with the Western world’. He also said that any further ‘rapprochement’ 
between Pakistan and China could annoy the US, resulting in ‘a very unfortunate 
reaction’.39 Averell Harriman wrote in a memorandum that Pakistan was playing the 
China card against ‘us’, with the intent of having ‘more arms from us or reducing our 
assistance to India’. He thought the growing relationship between China and Pakistan, 
together with Pakistan’s decision to stop the expansion of American intelligence 
facilities, seemed ‘a type of blackmail’ that was ‘intolerable’ for the US.40 Senator 
Wayne Morse also denounced Pakistan’s relations with China as ‘international 
blackmail’ in the Senate. He said that ‘all foundation for so-called strategic assistance 
to Pakistan has disappeared, and ought to be eliminated from the foreign aid bill for 
fiscal 1964’.41 Senator Gruening, for his part, spoke very sarcastically about Pak-
China relations:  
 
While we had been pouring this economic aid in billions of dollars into 
this country and also a large sum of money in military aid, Pakistan had 
moved closer and closer to Communist China.42 
 
Americans wanted an end to further deterioration of relations with Pakistan without 
harming their new friendship with India, but how to achieve that ideal was an enigma 
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for them.43 Harriman knew the crux of the problem: Pakistan’s psychological fear of 
an Indian attack.44 He repeated Washington’s assurances that it would come to 
Pakistan’s help in the unlikely event of an Indian attack. In order to bring credibility 
to his pledges, Harriman suggested that ‘US promise the future deployment of one of 
its aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean area’.45  
Kennedy underestimated Pakistan’s security fears. From his own perspective, 
‘India did pose a threat’46 but not a real danger to Pakistan’s security.47 He tried to 
keep Indo-Pakistan regional issues separate from the Cold War containment. For him, 
dealing with India’s security against China was more important than Pakistan’s 
security against India. Therefore, Harriman’s suggestion of a credible US assurance to 
Pakistan backed by the promise of a naval task force in the Indian Ocean was 
premature to him. Kennedy wanted to know more of the Pakistani position before any 
such commitment was made.  Hence, in August 1963, Kennedy sent Under Secretary 
of State George Ball to Pakistan to clear the air regarding Pakistan’s relations with 
China and its effects on the US.48  
During the Ball-Ayub parleys, Ayub repeated his concerns: US military 
assistance to India had greatly jeopardized Pakistan’s security and destabilised the 
strategic balance in the region. Although he had developed relations with Chinese 
leaders to offset India’s increasing military strength, he insisted that they were not 
aimed at the US. Ball tried to convince Ayub that US assistance to India was intended 
to contain communism as part of the global American strategy. He also assured Ayub 
that Pakistan could depend on US help in case of an attack from India or any other 
nation. However, Ayub remained sceptical about such assurances. Under Secretary 
Ball also expressed his disappointment over strengthening China-Pakistan relations 
and implied that this could affect the alliances between the US and Pakistan. Overall, 
Ball was not satisfied with his meeting with Ayub Khan.49  
The failure of the Ball mission demonstrated that the US and the Pakistan 
Army had parted ways. Since Pakistan believed that Indian arms would inevitably be 
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used against Pakistan, guarantees that US weapons would not be so used carried little 
weight.50 In her pique over assistance to India, Pakistan seemed willing to imperil her 
relationship with the US by deliberately drawing closer to China. Z. A. Bhutto, the 
then Foreign Minister and architect of Pak-China relations, has written of this moment 
in his book. ‘American military help to India’, he says, ‘revealed the irreconcilable 
contradictions between the different assumptions on which Pakistan and the US had 
built their special relations’.51 SEATO and CENTO failed to keep both nations united. 
The relations had reached such a low ebb that Bhutto rebuffed President Johnson’s 
suggestion that ‘Asian allies of the US contribute more to the war against Communist 
guerrillas in South Vietnam’.52 Rather he said that ‘his country intended to pursue its 
program of normalizing its relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union 
despite its defensive alliances with the US’ – a paradox.  
Bhutto’s statement implied that the US and Pakistan were still at odds and that 
their relations regarding the US’s Asian policy continued to be troubled. The Pakistani 
government refused to permit Pakistani journalists to cover the CENTO meetings in 
the US. Bhutto’s excuse was that ‘sheer lack of foreign exchange’ had prevented 
Pakistan from allowing the newsmen to travel. He failed to attend the SEATO 
meeting in Manila, which greatly irritated Washington. He chose instead to attend the 
preparatory talks for an African-Asian conference sponsored by Communist China. 
Bhutto missed no chance to express Pakistan’s resentment against Washington’s 
policy of support and aid to New Delhi, an indication of just how strained relations 
had become between the two allies. It was at this time that he stated that ‘it would be 
dishonest to say we could make a contribution to the war in Vietnam. The menace of a 
Western-armed India made it impossible for us’. Pakistan and Thailand were the only 
countries that had not sent any military, economic or technical assistance to South 
Vietnam despite being members of SEATO.53  
Pakistan was indeed ‘seriously concerned’ about US military assistance, loans 
and grants to India. Foreign Minister Bhutto warned the US ambassador McConaughy 
on 26th May 1964 that a long-term US military aid programme for India might force 
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Pakistan to ‘narrow its commitments’.54 Bhutto’s anti-American sentiments were 
becoming too blunt. 
 
5.5 Popular Anti-US Sentiments in Pakistan 
 
The domestic environment plays a particular role in the shaping of the foreign 
policy of a state. The people, the opposition and internal objectives all have an effect 
on the policy-making process. In times of crisis, the reaction of the opposition 
especially the intelligentsia and other interest groups could equally have a profound 
effect. The Pakistanis were a nation highly interested in politics and relations with 
countries like the US, India and China, in such a way that a great amount of political 
debate used to take place in every tea shop, restaurant, in media, and in the colleges 
and universities. The polarization of the system between pro and anti Army and 
Americans ensured that the public interest in politics remained high.55  
The US-India friendship turned the populace of Pakistan against America. 
Pakistan’s foreign policy had already turned to neutralism56 with a tilt towards China. 
The common public impression prevailing in Peshawar was that ‘America cannot be a 
friend of Pakistan because of the military aid which it is extending to India’.57 
Similarly, America was condemned in Dacca for its arms aid to India.58 At the 
National Students’ Federation’s (NSF) annual meeting in Karach, Faiz Ahmed Faiz, 
an eminent poet, pointed to the banners and posters covering the walls {some of 
which read: ‘Pak-China Dosti Zindabad (Long live Pak-China friendship), Students 
Hate American Aid, Pakistan Must Withdraw from SEATO and CENTO, and 
Students Support Present Independent Foreign Policy’} and said that he was happy to 
see students of the NSF taking an active part in ‘real’ education.59 For the first time, a 
mob of several thousands attacked the US Embassy in Karachi and burned a USIS 
library.60 Pakistan had become an embodiment of anti-Americanism. 
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The government of Pakistan took serious steps to curtail direct American 
contact with Pakistani military and civilian officers. Junior military and civilian 
officers were under orders not to have unauthorized contact with foreign diplomats. A 
junior officer had to obtain permission before he could even accept an invitation to a 
reception or dinner hosted by a foreign diplomatic or military officer. The government 
of Pakistan demanded that direct mailing of USIS material to military officers be 
stopped. It also imposed restrictions on the US Embassy in the selection of private 
citizens for leadership courses or specialist grants. The Ministry of Education was 
hampering approaches by foreign officials to university and government college 
faculty members, to the student body as a whole, or to any special group of selected 
students. The Vice Chancellor of Karachi University issued confidential written 
orders to the academic staff stating that ‘all contacts of a personal, public or private 
nature between University employees and employees or administrators of any official, 
semi-official or unofficial foreign mission must be made through the Vice 
Chancellor’s office’.61 A general directive to this effect was issued to all Vice 
Chancellors by the Ministry of Education. If the employee was contacted directly, a 
report had to be sent to the Vice Chancellor. Such was the government’s attitude that 
faculty members at Peshawar University were reprimanded by the authorities for 
attending a farewell reception for a United States Information Services (USIS) 
officer.62  
According to a Dacca-based politician, Mehboob-ur-Rehman, the government 
of Pakistan was fearful that American officials were lending support to the opposition 
to embarrass Ayub and was therefore increasing its surveillance over them.63 Mr 
Rehman voiced this opinion again in May 1964.64 Thus, the government of Pakistan 
was restricting the US embassy’s activities and interaction with officials and 
politicians. In the meantime, America was charged twice (once by Home Minister 
Habibullah) with supporting the East Pakistan opposition. Such allegations were 
rejected by Assistant Secretary Talbot himself.65 Sections of the press alleged that 
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Pakistan had become the ‘playground of America’s invisible government – the 
CIA’.66 
 
5.6 Post-Nehru India 
 
After Nehru’s death in 1964, the Indian leadership did not take up a new line 
with respect to China and Pakistan. They were at least as anti-Chinese as Nehru. 
Hence the Indian defence build-up was expected to continue. Nehru’s successors also 
shared the general Indian mistrust of Pakistan. Although Shastri had a more flexible 
attitude on Kashmir, initially he was unlikely to risk making unpopular concessions.67 
However, he was anxious to see better Indo-Pakistan relations.68   
Shastri’s somewhat docile approach to Pakistan raised American expectations 
for a Kashmir solution. The American ambassador to Delhi wrote to the US 
representative at the UN, Adlai E. Stevenson, that the government likely to emerge 
within the next few months in India would be easier to deal with on this subject 
[Kashmir] than the Nehru Government.69 Indian PM Shastri was already very open in 
dealing with Pakistan. During his meeting with Bowls and Talbot, he stressed in a 
most persuasive way his conviction that a rapprochement with Pakistan must be 
worked out. He was unequivocal in saying ‘India was prepared to start negotiations 
now on the communal disturbances, refugee movements, evictees in Assam and 
Tripura etc on any basis the Paks [Pakistanis] will agree to ministerial level talks, civil 
servant level, mediator, etc. If these meetings went well, they [India and Pakistan] 
could move on to border matters involving Kashmir and the other major issues 
dividing the two nations’. In the circumstances and especially against the backdrop of 
the Nehru era, it was a very encouraging gesture. On the question of border 
discussions, he said that India was prepared to accept any method that was realistic: 
secret discussions, direct negotiations, with or without a mediator, etc.70 Though these 
were very encouraging statements from PM Shastri, the Americans had even higher 
expectations from the change of regime in India. Ambassador Bowles went to the 
extent of predicting the resolution of the Kashmir issue within the next year. He 
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wrote: ‘If the Paks [Pakistanis] want a settlement instead of an issue, there is a fair 
chance they can get it within the next year or so with the new Shastri government 
which is emerging’.71 The US Department of State also lectured Pakistan on the 
benefits of common objectives with the US: ‘The US and Pakistan should have a 
common interest. Pakistan needs a stable India. A fragmented India would only be an 
invitation to the extension of Communist influence into the subcontinent – and that 
ultimately could pose great dangers to Pakistan itself’.72 The Americans had 
understood that India was a major power in the region. According to a State 
Department telegram, ‘We agree India is the larger and stronger power and should be 
treated as such. India has initiative and opportunity to see peaceful modus vivendi 
with Pakistan’.73  According to General (Rtd) Kamal Matinuddin, by 1964-65 US 
military assistance to India was much more than to Pakistan.74  
 
5.7 The US Assistance to Pakistan and India 
 
Until 1965, the Americans had pumped a lot of military and economic aid into India 
and Pakistan. The US MAP assistance to Pakistan had amounted to approximately $1 
billion through fiscal year (FY) 1965. The US provided substantial support to five and 
a half out of the total of eight Pakistan Army divisions. From 1954 to 1964, Pakistan 
received one billion dollars in military assistance from the US.75 (See the charts for 
developmental loans and grants). US MAP assistance to India had amounted to $160 
million of grant assistance plus offers of $60 million in credit sales. The US also 
provided support to nine out of a total Indian Army strength of sixteen full divisions 
and four divisions being raised.76 The American aim was not only to replace all the 
Indian weaponry but also to disrupt the assembly of Russian weapons taking place in 
India. For aircraft, Philip Talbot said: ‘our aim would be to get the Indians ultimately 
to settle for one Western-oriented aircraft production line and put their plans for MIG 
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production into cold storage’.77 Moreover, 60% of all the aid in IDA loans during 
1964 had gone to India.78 If PL 480 assistance was included, India was receiving 
nearly 40% of the US total economic aid expenditure each year. In addition, private 
donors like the Rockfeller Foundation and the Ford Foundation as well as religious 
groups and the Peace Corps invested millions of dollars there annually.79  
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Figure 12. Loans and grants made to Pakistan under the Agency for International 
Development and predecessor agencies.81 







1949-52  10.6 
1953-57 103.0 227.3 
1958 38.6 54.3 
1959 63.2 99.5 
1960 102.0 96.6 
1961 27.2 97.0 
1962 207.1 33.0 
1963 169.4 4.9 
Total 710.5 623.2 




Figure 13. Development loans made to Pakistan82 
(Repayable in dollars) 
 
 









GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN   
Commodity Assistance 45 2.5 $15,000,000 
Iron and Steel Imports 40 ¾   90,000,000 
4th Railway Project 40 ¾   31,000,000 
General Commodity Imports 40 ¾   42,000,000 
Expansion of Power system 40 ¾     8,000,000 
Thermal Electric Power Generating System 40 ¾   26,000,000 
Malaria Eradication Program 40 ¾     3,800,000 
Airports and Railways Equipment 40 ¾     2,100,000 
Salinity Control and Reclamation Project 
No. 2 
40 ¾   10,800,000      
General Commodities (2nd) 40 ¾   30,000,000 
Chalna Anchorage  Project  40 ¾     3,600,000 
Feasibility studies 40 ¾     2,000,000 
Total    264,900,000 
 
 
                                                 






Figure 14. The American Sectoral Allocations for the Second and Third Five-
year Plan.83 
 
                                                 








As the by-product of the US-Soviet nuclear détente85 and the Sino-Soviet 
split86, the Soviet Union at this time followed an active and aggressive policy in South 
Asia. James P. Grant, the head of NEA, was so scared of Russian activities in India 
that he wrote: ‘Soviets launched a major offensive in India with the objective of 
bringing India under Soviet dominance and eventually communizing the 
subcontinent’.87 The Soviets actively pursued their strategic, economic and cultural 
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agenda in India.88 By 1964, the Soviet-supplied or committed military aid to India had 
reached the value of $131 million against $110 million by the US.89  
Despite these advances, India had a record of accepting Soviet assistance 
without yielding to political subversion.90 It was an exaggeration to say that the 
Soviets were trying to bring the subcontinent into the Communist orbit. Just after the 
Chinese invasion, India tilted more towards the West for her political and military 
requirements. ‘Soviet’s motive, in undertaking the current surge in India, was to 
redress the balance’91 upset by its tilt towards the West. Hence the Americans 
remained very cautious. They had to counter communist influence effectively.92 Every 
minor detail of efforts for the containment of communism in India was given 
meticulous consideration. Postings of the US embassy and consulate staff were also 
based on their study of communism. Not only the experience but the age and spousal 
arrangements of the men appointed as staff of the US Embassy or consulate office 
were also taken into consideration. In one of the letters, American Ambassador in 
New Delhi, Chester Bowles wrote: 
 
There is urgent need for a topflight Counsel General in Calcutta to take 
Bill Baxter’s place. We want a younger man who is on the way up, who 
can articulate [the] US policies effectively, who has the vigor to travel 
widely, the capacity to communicate with Indian students and labour 
groups, and who has a real concern for the AID program. He should also 
have good knowledge of communism – especially Chinese Communism. 
This is a major opportunity calling for one of the ablest younger men in 
the Foreign Service, preferably with a wife who will be a strong supporter 
and partner.93  
 
The US paradigm shift occurred by replacing Pakistan with India to contain China. A 
Department of State (DOS) letter clearly shows the shift in US priorities in South Asia 
from Pakistan to India. It stresses the need ‘to wipe the slate clean with Pakistan and 
to develop a new …realistic assessment of US interests and problems in the 
subcontinent’. It says:  
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The circumstances in Asia have changed drastically, both politically and 
strategically, since we [Americans] formed our alliances with Pakistan. 
Pakistan has amply demonstrated its own desire to reduce its previous 
dependence on us. It’s neither in our interests nor in Pakistan’s, nor could 
they sustain the previous degree of alignment in our policies… The major 
problem now facing the US is to contain the Chinese Communist thrust. 
India, by virtue of its power position and its unrealised potential for 
serving as a counterweight to Communist China, is more central to our 
interests than Pakistan.94 
 
As Pakistan (‘a maverick and irredentist Pakistan’)95still had the potential to upset the 
region’s balance by aligning itself with any of the adversaries of the US, a sharp 
change in attitude towards Pakistan was not possible. The letter quoted above further 
says: ‘it is not possible to base a Subcontinent policy on India alone since Pakistan has 
sufficient resources to upset the balance of power and stability of the subcontinent’.96 
Moreover, Americans also had direct interests in Pakistan, including Badabar 
Airbase.97 The US continued with a two pronged policy: to contain China through 
India and to keep Pakistan away from her intimate friendship with China. Now 
Americans expected to have evidence in word and deed that Pakistan felt that it was in 
its interest to continue a close, if not allied, relationship with the US. This also 
included ‘a less offensive and abrasive public Government of Pakistan posture in 
Afro-Asian and other forums; halting of public criticism of the US policies; a 
curtailment of press attacks and better treatment of American personnel based in the 
Pakistani capital’.98 Though the Department of State did not oppose Pak-China 
relations, they wanted ‘the assurity that the relationship would not take the form of 
collaboration in opposing vital US interests’. They also wanted Pakistan to work for a 
basic accommodation with India, resting on sufficient mutual compromise and good 
will to permit a process of negotiations. ‘Such talks would contribute to the 
containment of tensions in the region and progress toward a Kashmir settlement’.99  
As relations touched their lowest ebb, the State Department wanted Ayub Khan 
to agree to help the US in Asia, especially in Vietnam, in return for America 
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continuing to give economic and military assistance to Pakistan. The State 
Department also made it clear to the Ayub regime that the US could not subordinate 
its interests in India to Pakistan’s. Americans were determined to pursue their interests 
in India for themselves imagining that their pro-India policies would not be 
detrimental to Pakistan’s integrity and development. Striking a particularly stern note, 
the DOS letter went on to remind Ayub Khan that America expected recipients of 
future US aid to show ‘results, not apologies; performance, not promises’.100 The 
Americans were bent on removing ‘the blame of babying Pakistan unduly’.101 In 
another telegram, the Department of State wrote:  
 
We do not insist on substantive Indian concessions on Kashmir as a price 
for US aid.102 
 
In yet another mail, the State Department said that ‘It would be much more fruitful to 
define clearly to Ayub the limits beyond which he could not go without serious 
consequences to his relations with US and UK’.103 Pickard informed Robert Komer, 
who was handling South Asia as a member of the National Security Council (NSC) 
that ‘it would be difficult to overstress Pakistan’s sensitivities to [the] effects of US 
diplomacy on what they [Pakistanis] regarded as essential national interests, i.e. 
Kashmir and search for [an] independent role as Afro-Asian leader’. Pakistan’s 
emotional foreign policy turn from the US towards China was not lost upon the 
Americans: Pickard further wrote in the telegram that the amount of US pressure on 
Ayub had to be carefully weighed against Pakistani emotionalism.104 Both nations had 
taken sharp U-turns against each other and towards each other’s adversary. They were 
condemning each other without fixing problems and mending fences. In general 
terms, the Pakistani military officers thought that Americans were using Pakistan to 
promote their own interests and were unconcerned about Pakistan’s security vis-à-vis 
India.105 
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Relations between the US and Pakistan reached such a low point that Foreign 
Minister Bhutto gave priority to President Ayub Khan’s visit to the Communist bloc 
(Soviet Union and China) over the CENTO Ministerial meeting. He told the US 
ambassador in Pakistan that the President’s visit to Moscow in April 1965 was of 
greater importance to the Government of Pakistan than the CENTO Ministerial 
meeting and that he could not neglect that visit.106 In de-linking Rawalpindi 
(Pakistan’s Capital) from Washington DC, Bhutto had gone too far. During President 
Ayub’s visit to Moscow, Bhutto aligned Pakistan with the Soviet Union’s philosophy 
of peaceful co-existence. He also added: ‘We are an ideological state. So is the Soviet 
Union – as an Eastern thinker [Mao Zedong] has said, let one hundred flowers bloom 
and let one hundred schools of thought contend’.107 Ayub-Bhutto’s visit to Moscow 
and then quoting Mao in official statements constituted a double jeopardy for the US 
policy makers in South Asia. Speaking of the allies of SEATO and CENTO Senator 
Morse said:  
 
What allies? How does one judge an ally? He judges an ally by whether or 
not an ally stands with him. Where have Pakistan and India been in regard 
to the crisis in Southeast Asia? The Prime Minister [sic, Foreign Minister] 
of Pakistan standing in Washington DC before the Washington Press Club 
some months ago, when asked, if they were going to be of assistance to us 
in Vietnam, at first made the categorical answer “No”. Then he proceeded 
to say: “It is a US problem, not a Pakistani problem. Our problem is with 
India”.108 
 
Voices were raised in Capitol-Hill corridors against the politics of alliances (SEATO 
& CENTO) and military assistance to the US allies. Senator Morse further said: 
 
The sad fact is that the SEATO Treaty has been naught but a worthless 
paper to the United States from the very time it was signed. The weapons 
we have supplied [to] Greece and Turkey, the weapons we have supplied 
India and Pakistan, would be of no assistance to us whatsoever in case of 
a war with Russia or Red China. In the event of a war with Russia, neither 
Greece nor Turkey in the Mediterranean, nor Pakistan or India in Asia, 
would be of assistance to us in such a war for it will be a nuclear war. It 
                                                 
106 Incoming Telegram DOS, NND959000, Political and Defence, Box # 2555, RG 59, March 24, 
1965, NARA 
107 Dawn, April 6, 1965. 
108 Congressional Record-Senate, Senator Mr. Morse, 23948, CIA-RDP67B00446R000600130008-4, 
September 23, 1965. 
 210 




5.8 President Ayub’s Visit to China, March 1965 
 
The spiralling downward trend in US-Pakistan institutional interaction reached 
its lowest point during Ayub’s visit to China in March 1965. All realists believe in 
two assumptions: first, that the nature of international affairs is essentially conflictual; 
and second, that the prime human motivation in all political life is power and 
security.110 Ayub Khan visited China with the objective of acquiring power and 
security. In a joint communiqué issued in Peking, it was stated that Red China should 
be admitted to the UN and a summit conference held for prevention of the spread of 
nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean.111 Both of these points were very strongly 
opposed by America. The US ambassador in Pakistan, McConaughy, was shocked by 
such pronouncements in Ayub’s presence. He immediately visited Pakistan’s pro-US 
Finance Minister Shoaib’s residence in Karachi to express the US’s profound 
disappointment and concern at Ayub’s visit to China. He expressed his sense of being 
let down at Ayub’s association with Chou-en-Lai in the joint communiqué and in his 
speeches in Peking. He also said that the record of the visit set a very poor stage for 
Ayub’s forthcoming Washington visit. ‘Shoaib appeared somewhat depressed’. He 
attributed Ayub’s loss of balance to two factors, basing his assessment largely on the 
first hand report he had just received from Ghulam Farooq, a member of the 
delegation accompanying Ayub: firstly, the magnitude and enthusiasm of the public 
reception accorded to Ayub by the Chinese, which was characterized as beyond 
description and beyond belief. He said the Chinese had gone all out and had organized 
resounding public ovations which went far beyond anything the visitors had ever seen 
or heard before. Ghulam Farooq said the reception which the Chinese Communists 
accorded Suhrawardy in 1956 ‘was not ten percent of what they put on for Ayub’. 
‘Shoaib thought the president had literally been overwhelmed and swept off his feet. 
He felt that almost anyone’s head would have to be turned by such a tribute and this 
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had happened to Ayub’.112 Secondly, ‘Shoaib ascribed the bad outcome to the absence 
among Ayub’s accompanying advisors of anyone willing to counsel a strong stand 
against the Chinese Communist persuasions’. He said that the President had ‘self-
advisors’ who were either in favour of further concessions to the Chinese Communists 
or else men of no strong convictions who were inclined to follow the path of least 
resistance. He said that the members of the President’s retinue were all picked by 
Foreign Minister Z.A. Bhutto.113  
In response to McConaughy’s query as to whether the Foreign Office 
Additional Secretary Agha Shahi should not be expected to have played a balancing 
role, Shoaib replied that Agha Shahi was ‘only an official’ and did not have the 
stature or the independent position which would be required to oppose Bhutto’s 
advice. Referring to McConaughy’s remark about Ayub’s forthcoming US visit, 
Shoaib said that he recognized that ‘it is bound to be rough’. He also said that in view 
of the way things were shaping up, he would prefer not to accompany the president to 
the US. He gave excuses such as preparations for the budget session of the National 
Assembly and his son’s wedding on April 21.114 
Prior to Ayub’s China visit, the Department of State had an understanding 
with the US embassy in Karachi that the US would reject his offer to act as ‘middle 
man’ between Washington and Peiping [Beijing].115 Ayub had also assured 
McConaughy that he wanted a policy of minimum good-neighbourly relations with 
China.116 After his trip to China, Ayub faced a tough time with Finance Minister 
Shoaib. ‘Shoaib was very critical about the wording of the Communiqué at the 
Peking. He was worried about Ayub’s forthcoming visit to Washington. He feared the 
visit might [be] cancelled or postponed due to Ayub’s disappointing approach towards 
the US sensitivities i.e. warmer relations with China’.117 Veteran journalist, Sharif 
Farooq says that: 
 
Shoaib was notorious as a CIA agent. He knew the anticipated US policies 
towards Pakistan. However, he did not expect such a blunt language 
against the US policies in the communiqué especially under Ayub’s 
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signature. He also knew that as a consequence, Ayub’s forthcoming visit 
to Washington would be affected and therefore, he kept himself away 
from the growing Pak-China relations.118 
 
On the other hand, ‘Military generals were happy over the shift in Pakistan’s policy – 
a swing from Washington to Peking. At this time, Bhutto was very popular amongst 
military men as well as civilians due to his anti-American and pro-China stance. He 
developed his own following in the Army’.119 Bhutto and Ayub were following a 
carrot-and-stick policy, or, in other words, good cop and bad cop for the US. Bhutto 
was very hawkish while Ayub’s statements were dovish towards Americans. Ayub 
still hoped that the alliances with the US would act as a deterrent to other countries 
seeking to dominate Pakistan. He also assured Americans that Pakistan had never 
given any thought to a military alliance with China and that, in any event, Pakistan 
always thought that Communist China ‘couldn’t bring much against India’.120  
Regarding Kashmir, Ayub was not irrevocably attached to the plebiscite. 
Arbitration was also acceptable to him. But he wanted the US to take the initiative as, 
in his opinion, the US had more of a stake in the subcontinent than the Soviet 
Union.121 However, due to his visit to China, the Americans were as much 
disappointed by Ayub as he was by the Americans on Indo-US military relations. 
The fates of the nations of South Asia were changed by the mistakes of their 
leaders. Shastri and Ayub’s visits to the US were postponed due to their unfriendly 
policies towards Washington. Ayub’s visit to China and his communiqué worsened 
Pak-US relations. On the other hand, Shastri’s government was very supportive to 
Viet-Nam. In a Congressional speech, Senator Hartke mentioned an interesting 
exchange with an Indian minister. He asked the minister:  
 
Suppose we provided you with all the military equipment you need to 
defend yourself against the ‘Paks’. Suppose we provide you with all the 
economic aid you thought was necessary to start rebuilding your country, 
and also provided Public Law 480 food, which we are now providing to 
relieve the starving people. What if we cut off all our aid to Pakistan, of 
whatever nature whatsoever, and made sure that you had enough military 
equipment to defend yourself against communist aggression, which exists 
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on the Chinese border. Would you be willing to join us in Vietnam and 
help to oppose the aggressor?  
The answer to that was very clear and very quick: “That is your problem; 
that is your concern. We are neutral”.122 
 
The White House’s displeasure at the free-wheeling Indian policy statements on Viet-
Nam created an unfriendly atmosphere between them. The suddenness of the 
postponements left little doubt that President Johnson deliberately created an 
impression of rebuke to Shastri and Ayub. Bracketing India and Pakistan together 
only added insult to injury for both countries.123  
 
5.9 The Pakistan Army and the Domestic Politics 
 
Foreign policy should be integrated with the domestic policies of a government and 
justified by them in the same way.124 That is the reason that on some occasions, the 
foreign policy of a state is followed primarily to achieve domestic objectives. In such 
cases, what matters is the effect the policy will have on the citizens of the state rather 
than the consequences it will cause for the international relations of that state.125 
However, in the case of the foreign policy of Pakistan pursued by the military junta, 
not only rulers and citizens but also the state’s relations with other countries were 
affected. The failure on the foreign policy front was bringing a bad name to the 
Pakistani military junta at home. Anti-Ayub and anti-US sentiments arose, firstly, due 
to the deteriorating relations between the Pakistan military and the US administration, 
and secondly, because US support for India was considered a hostile act against 
Pakistanis. In Pakistan, the military remained in power as long as it enjoyed the 
confidence and support of the US. The moment it lost America as a supporter, it lost 
power as well. With the loss of the US as sole sponsor, Ayub had to look for domestic 
support. Ayub had already started to accommodate a few time-serving politicians to 
help the Pakistan Army save face as an institution. After the passage of the Political 
Party Act in July 1962 and the end of Martial Law, some ministers and their 
supporters called for an ad hoc convention of Muslim Leaguers – henceforth called 
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Conventionists (PMLC).126 The Convention decided to reorganize the pre-Martial 
Law Muslim League, with Chaudhri Khaliquzzman as Chief Organizer, Abdul 
Hashim as Organizer for East Pakistan and Mian Amiruddin as Organizer for West 
Pakistan. In September 1962, Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan became head of 
the party as the President.127 It was the beginning of the civilianization of military rule 
in Pakistan. A divide and rule principle served Ayub’s interests in domestic politics. 
The PMLC was the government party. Conservative in outlook, its programme 
was no more or less than full support for government policies and actions.128 Those 
who opposed the patronage of the Muslim League by Ayub Khan called a separate 
meeting. In this way, the Muslim League was divided into two factions – PMLC and 
the Council Muslim League (CML). The CML was revived at a meeting in October 
1962. The majority of the Council members were opposed to the calling of a party 
convention in September 1962 and boycotted it. Backed by the former Chief Minister 
of Punjab Mian Mumtaz Daultana, the CML was reorganized with Khawaja 
Nazimuddin (former Governor General and Prime Minister) as the President and 
Sardar Bahadur Khan129 (the brother of Ayub Khan) as the Secretary General of the 
party.130 The politicians were together trying to re-establish and revitalise political 
institutions that they had weakened in the past. Home Minister Habibullah Khan was 
very stern towards anti-Conventionists. He issued orders to the DC Peshawar to take 
action against those persons who, by their actions or philosophy, were dangerous or 
detrimental to the aims of the PMLC. The orders indicate how determined the 
Conventionists were to forestall any attempts by the opposition to form a viable 
opposition programme. Their willingness to attack individual opposition leaders 
became apparent in their campaign against Yusuf Khattak, leader of the opposition. 
President Ayub reportedly asked Habibullah Khan why “nothing had been done” 
about publicising Khattak’s romance with the English wife of a Peshawar-based 
doctor. He ordered that the matter be brought to the attention of the public. Two days 
later, the Khattak scandal was headline news.131 
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Easterners (East Pakistanis) were already filled with anti-Ayub and anti US-
Pact sentiments. They were ready to exploit the situation that had emerged as a result 
of friction between the US and the military junta of Pakistan 
. Now, they openly expressed anti-US feelings. Iqbal Ansari Khan was a Basic 
Democrat from Old Dacca. During a meeting with the US Vice Consul, Michael A.G. 
Michand, Khan said that the US was supporting a dictatorial government in Pakistan 
and contributing to the corrupt BD system through the PL 480. According to him, 
‘Basic Democracy (BD) was a class created by the Government and dependent on 
Government’s money’. Khan also said that in Pakistan dictatorship was possible only 
through US financial support to the Rural Public Works Program – a reason for the 
BD’s existence. He claimed that the US was so concerned about communism that it 
was supporting an anti-democratic government.132  
Pro-China elements in Pakistan in general and Easterners in particular were 
more vocal in their anti-US campaign. Maulana Bhashani was a pro-Chinese cleric. 
He visited China in July 1964. He talked about ‘monopoly Capitalism’ and the 
‘American economic exploitation of the third world countries’. He had already visited 
China in October 1963. His travels indicated the degree to which ‘Bhashani had 
become a close associate of the Chinese Communists’.133  
Disappointed at the US collaboration with India, the Pakistani intellectual 
class emotionally committed itself to the Chinese Communist regime.134 They had 
supported Pakistan in joining the US-sponsored pacts. However, with US arms 
support to India, positions changed. Now they vigorously supported any foreign 
policy move by the Government of Pakistan which further supported the Chinese 
Communists.135 Eminent Pakistanis, Gulab Khan-the chief of Shinwari tribe in Landi 
Kotal136, Jamal Kakakhel from Nowshera, Muhibullah Khan Kundi from D.I. Khan, 
and Hakim Muhammad Saeed from Karachi137 were now opposing US policies and 
were pro-China in reaction to American support for India. In particular, Easterners 
were so pro-Chinese that the government opened the PIA service to China from 
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Dacca.138 East Pakistan was a China-friendly area to which the Chinese community 
from Burma, Hong Kong and Calcutta had been migrating, especially since the 1962 
Indo-China war. Most of them did not hold Pakistani passports which indicated that 
they were relatively recent arrivals and that they had not yet acquired Pakistani 
citizenship. The migrants from Hong Kong possessed Commonwealth passports.139 
The West Pakistanis hated and feared India. The East Pakistanis just feared 
India. The Easterners’ fear was that any disruption of the Indian sea route to East 
Pakistan may cause an economic dislocation in Assam, and that the railroad could not 
handle essential transport.140 Ayub continued to tell the East Wing [East Pakistan] 
leaders that the East Wing can be, has been, and will be, defended by West 
Pakistan.141 Bengalis were so fed up of the military rule and ‘East defence in the 
West’ mantra that they wanted to get rid of ‘military rule from the Rawalpindi 
[representing General Headquarters of Pakistan Army] masters’.142 According to 
Bengali separatists, ‘We will not allow our self-respect to be crushed by the 
militarists’. ‘Pakistan was created unnaturally, the two wings. There is no unity or 
unifying force between the two wings. Bengalis are the victim of exploitation’.143 
‘The military regime is either with the US or China. But this will not make any 
difference to us. East Pakistan will continue to be ruled by Punjabi civil servants in 
any case’.144 Religion as a unifying force was completely rejected by the Bengalis. 
They argued that ‘the Punjabi Muslim rulers shooted [sic] the Bengali students. 
Bengali Muslims were killed in the struggle for the Bengali language’. Moreover, 
they justified their struggle against West Pakistan Muslims on the basis that Christians 
fought Christians in the last two great wars. They said that ‘in the twentieth century, 
the name of religion was used as a bluff in this region’.145  Bengalis also remained in 
touch with the US Consulate to canvass support for their cause. According to a 
separatist leader,  
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If and when the US is willing to express a sympathetic interest in the 
separatist movement, I will immediately put you in touch with some of the 
people in the movement who are much more important than I am, and 
give you details of our present actions and plans for the future. At the 
present we do not need money. I have been instructed to keep in touch 
with you and explain our general views in the meantime.146 
 
The Bengali separatists charged Ayub Khan with launching a war against 
India in order to suppress the ‘democratic uprising in East Bengal’. In East Pakistan, it 
was widely believed that President Johnson urged Ayub Khan to move towards more 
democracy in Pakistan.  This was also the reason for his annoyance at the US and the 
subsequent moves towards China.147  
American policies in South Asia completely failed due to the war between 
India and Pakistan in 1965. American military and economic support to India was 
frustrating for Pakistan. Thus the war between the two arch-rivals occurred in order to 
reduce India’s superiority. The irony is that both nations used weapons provided, in 
the name of containment of Communism, by the US. Senator Morse in a 
Congressional speech highlighted this aspect of US foreign policy in South Asia in 
very grim words. He said:  
 
…And how will the future historians assess the role our foreign aid 
program played in the bitter struggle between India and Pakistan? Two 
neighbouring nations have been locked in combat, using American-
supplied weapons and money furnished under the guise of foreign aid; 
testify to the crying need for a reappraisal of this program…Billions of 
dollars and untold weapons of war have been poured into both countries. 
Almost $8 billion in economic aid alone has been dumped into these 
countries since World War II; $5.2 billion for India and $2.6 billion for 
Pakistan. And to what end? Certainly not so that they could afford to fight 
like spoiled children.148 
 
The Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 was viewed as having redressed India’s poor 
performance against the Chinese Communists in 1962 and against Pakistanis in the 
Runn of Kutch episode earlier in 1965. Prime Minister Shastri’s position in domestic 
politics was also strengthened and the government’s intransigence over the Kashmir 
issue reinforced. Overall, India emerged in a better position from the war. Her larger 
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area of captured territory placed her in a better bargaining position, which raised the 
morale of the Indian Government and armed forces. Pakistan only achieved its tactical 
purpose of advertising the Kashmir question.149 The American Embassy in New Delhi 
reported that India was in no mood to give Pakistan by negotiation what Pakistan 
could not win by force of arms.150 The threat of Chinese involvement did not 
noticeably unnerve the Indians, and New Delhi probably felt that some of the stigma 
of military ineptitude that had hung over the Indians since the 1962 Chinese invasion 




The military regime in Pakistan lost public support with the loss of its primary 
supporter – the US. With the corrosion of relations between the military and the US, 
the masses turned against both of them. While India continued to regard China as the 
prime long-term threat, it also cultivated close relations with the USSR – and within 
reasonable limits this was not inconsistent with American interests.152 India was not 
going to settle Kashmir on anything like Pakistan’s terms. Control of communication 
lines to Ladakh and thus control of the Kashmir Valley was central to the strategic 
defence of India against China.153 Hence Americans could ask quite a lot from India – 
but not Kashmir.  
The American objective during the first half of the 1960s was to keep India 
from becoming either a power vacuum or a communist state.154 The US was 
determined to prevent India’s defeat by Communist China. It wanted to point out to 
Pakistan that a continuation of existing trends (Sino-Pakistan strategic partnership) 
was likely to lead quickly to a situation in which the US was providing substantial 
military support to India. In such a scenario America would appear to be lined up on 
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the Indian side in opposition not only to Communist China but also to Pakistan.155 
Faced with such a threatening scenario, the Pakistan Army clique made costly 
blunders: loss of the US as a strategic partner, loss of American military support, and 
the war with India. In the end, the Pakistani leadership became so anti-American that 
in congressional records, it was noted that: 
 
In the recent presidential elections in Pakistan, the main issue between the 
two presidential candidates [Ayub Khan and Ms. Fatima Jinnah] was who 
was the most anti-American; Ayub Khan won.156  
 
The allies were at a crossroads. With the end of cordial relations, both sides 
made blunders: The US’s new-found sensitivity towards India mustered nothing but 
an extra liability in granting military and economic support, and the Pakistan Army, in 
its frustration over losing American patronage, invaded India in 1965. The war was 
initiated by the Pakistan Army to contain India’s growing military superiority and to 
wrest Kashmir by force. The invasion backfired: except for China, in international 
forums no country was willing to support Pakistan. Breaking off of terms and 
consequently committing blunders became a permanent trend in the Pakistan Army’s  
relation with the US. 
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During the course of this study, Pakistan’s foreign policy, US policy towards 
Pakistan, the political role of the military, Pakistan’s constitutional and political 
problems, Indo-Pakistan relations and Cold War issues have been discussed, drawing 
upon a wide range of sources. The process of decision-making in foreign policy 
interactions between the United States and Pakistan has been assessed through 
recourse to archival material, autobiographies, books, journals, newspapers, and 
parliamentary debates. Alongside the written sources, data collected from interviews 
has served to eliminate contradictions and confusions about the study of US 
intentions, policies, plans, and expectations from Pakistan as a country and the role of 
the Pakistan military in compliance and later on in defiance of such expectations 
during the 1950s and 60s.  In so doing it is hoped that this work will generate wider 
debate on the issues raised. 
This study investigates the role of the Pakistan Army as an institution that 
dominated the foreign policy of the country in order to achieve its objectives. A 
number of published works have scrutinised the role of religion, ethnicity (in 
particular the divide between Punjabis, Pathans, and Bengalis),1 and the wealth of the 
military as explanations for the army’s role and influence in the political history of 
Pakistan.2 However, this study establishes that it was principally the issue of control 
over the foreign relations of the country, especially with the US, that provided 
encouragement to the military’s rise in politics. The thesis cites powerful examples of 
Ayub’s conversations with CIA officers to garner American support for military 
action; and which earned him the title of ‘the strongest individual in Pakistan’s 
politics’ from the US Department of State,3 much before the 1958 promulgation of 
martial law. The formation and climax of the institutional alliance between US policy 
making bodies (State Department, White House and the Pentagon) and the Pakistan 
Army together with ups and downs of the alliance, has been presented in the 
foregoing chapters.   
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East and West Pakistan Tension 
 
Muslimhood had great strength during Pakistan’s movement – people’s unity 
with shared beliefs and a shared Islamic culture. But with the independence of 
Pakistan, different communities, like Punjabis, Pathans and Bengalis, had their own 
interests to promote and protect. The community with strength and power had to 
prevail over the rest. The Sur Posh (The Red Shirts) Pathans led by the ‘Frontier 
Gandhi’ Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan wanted ‘Pakhtoonistan’. According to an 
interviewee, Punjabis were the biggest impediment in their [Sur-Posh] way to 
‘Pakhtoonistan’.4 As most of the recruitment of the Pakistan Army came from Punjab, 
political as well as military leadership was dominated by the Punjabis. With the 
Punjabisation of the Army as well as politics, the rest of the communities, especially 
Bengalis and Pathans, felt deprived of their due rights. The ascendancy of Punjabis 
especially alienated the Bengalis. According to the strict principle of democracy, 
Bengalis were in the majority and, therefore, they wanted a greater stake in the 
country’s governance. The marginalization of Bengalis in central politics resulted in 
centrifugal forces in East Pakistan. Soon discord between East and West Pakistan 
became so obvious that it was noticed by foreign diplomats in the country’s capital. 
Morrice James, the British High Commissioner in Pakistan, was quite sceptical about 
the future unification of Pakistan. He expressed his fears in 1962 in the following 
words: ‘West and East Pakistan were not harmonious and their union would be a 
difficult task in the future’. ‘West Pakistan by itself might be homogeneous enough to 
exist as a separate country with a distinct and reasonable flavour’.5 The far-sighted 
High Commissioner’s words proved to be true and, within a decade of its creation, 
Pakistan not only lost Islam as a binding force but communalization became a much 
stronger factor in the country’s destabilization, and resulted in its dismemberment in 
1971. The concept of Islamic Pakistan after independence became a community-based 
Pakistan. 
Feeble or no efforts were made to work out a concept of Pakistan, with a 
sufficiently positive and inspiring content, which fitted both wings, East and West, of 
the country, with democracy and strong political institutions. Neither democracy nor 
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political institutions were strengthened; instead they wholly failed. British High 
Commissioner Morrice James, who also remained Deputy High Commissioner in 
Lahore and Karachi during the 1950s, further observed that Pakistan was still an 
experimental country with a pragmatic, questing and unsettled approach to life: ‘a 
country which, like a boy who had not yet made up his mind what he wanted to be, 
was prepared to try out successively a whole series of roles until one was found to 
fit’.6 These roles were witnessed by history as authoritarian rule by politicians and 
military rule by the Pakistan Army. Until the 1950s, survival itself was a great 
achievement for Pakistan. There was civilian rule in the country without democratic 
norms like general elections, elected parliament, and a constitution. During the 1950s, 
a shabby constitution survived only for a couple of years. 7 However, in the meantime, 
the Pakistan Army pushed itself into direct control of governance by sidelining the 
weak political class.8 In the right conditions, human nature has the capacity to 
transcend itself. The Pakistan Army’s modus operandi was based on human nature. 
As mentioned earlier, fear and insecurity was the basis of a constitutional 
struggle and evolutionary process for the establishment of Pakistan. However, the 
country did keep its colonial state system even after independence. The feudal, 
industrial and bourgeois class still depended on a military and civilian bureaucracy. 
The politicians failed to give a new indigenous system to the country. This led to their 
subservience to the bureaucracy (civil as well as military). A lack of vision-oriented 
policies weakened them and provided the country with a strong perception of the 
military as a viable alternative. This alternative was not possible as long as the 
military did not enjoy international support in the shape of Pak-US institutional 
interaction.  
 
The Pak-US Institutional Interaction 
 
The Pakistan Army inherited the centuries old trends of the British Army’s 
autonomous and authoritarian nature. Post-partition Indo-Pak rivalry also imposed a 
responsibility to secure Pakistan against a giant neighbour. This all propelled the 
Army to seek external support to bolster its active political role in the newly-born 
country. In turn, due to the Cold War, the US was in need of a country in the region to 
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contain communism militarily. Hence, relations between the US policy making bodies 
and the Pakistan Army developed positively. During 1952, as mentioned in chapter 3, 
a time came when the State Department communicated with the Army GHQ without 
consulting the Central government or the Foreign Office of the country.9 
The institutional alliance between the State Department, the Pentagon and the 
White House and the Pakistan Army was a strategic partnership in which their 
interests coincided in many ways. On the one hand, in domestic policy the political 
institutions were failing due to politicians’ short-sighted policies and internal 
wrangling. This concerned the Pakistan Army. On the other hand, the American 
policy making bodies needed a country with a comparatively strong army in the 
region near the hub of communism, i.e. China and the Soviet Union. India, a suitable 
candidate to fill this vacuum, was loathe to do so on the basis of its non-aligned 
philosophy. However, the Pakistan Army direly needed international support to deal 
with India’s hostility, fulfil the requirement of weapons to deter India, and to fix 
domestic politics. Pakistan, and especially its Army, had already recognized the 
importance of the US while the American administration, in the face of India’s non-
alignment, began to see the importance of the Pakistan Army. By now, American 
policy makers had understood that the power centre in Pakistan was not the Prime 
Minister’s House or the Governor General’s House but the Army GHQ. Therefore, it 
was not weak political institutions that were responsible for the military take over, 
instead it was a former colonial and US-supported Army that took over and pulled the 
country off the path of democracy. 
The Pakistan Army did not come into power simply as a result of weak 
political institutions, internal disunity of politicians, massive corruption or allegations 
of the sort. This study has shown that the military takeover of the 1950s took place 
with a pre-planned scheme. On 6th October 1954, a letter from the CIA proved that 
Ayub Khan was ready for military action. In his meeting with a CIA officer, 
Emmerson, he was trying to muster American support for such action.10 Later on, it 
was also argued that every time the government was changed, the military made 
known its likes and dislikes in the selection and rejection of the preceding and 
succeeding ruler respectively. The Pakistan Army was the King Maker until 1958 
when it decided to become King by itself. The frequent change of Prime Ministers 
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was an intentional effort to weaken the political fabric so that the governance of the 
country could fall into the lap of the Army. This proves that the military takeover was 
not the result of circumstances on the spot but a long-term and carefully planned 
strategy. In the meantime, US support to the military in the interest of containing 
communism further increased the Pakistan Army’s bargaining position in the 
country’s domestic politics. With American money and equipment, the military 
became the only rich department of the country. It also had a country – the US – as its 
very close ally. This was all possible when the military influenced the country’s 
foreign policy even when it was not in power. This was sufficient to play its assertive 
role in the country’s politics. A strong integrated massive army, foreign aid, military 
assistance, friendship with one of the strongest countries of the world, the US, and a 
dictating position in domestic politics – all via influencing the foreign policy of the 
country – the Pakistan Army was ready to come to power and fulfil its international 
commitments: the US containment of communism and its own agenda for the 
containment of India.  
Despite favourable international relations in South Asia, no civilian group in 
Pakistan was interested in military alliances with the US. To the East Pakistanis, US 
military support was aimed at defending West Pakistan from the Communist threat on 
its Western borders. They never expected that American financial aid would be spent 
in the East Wing where there was no lurking Communist threat. They only feared that 
the Pakistan Army might use force to curb the Easterners’ spirit of democracy in the 
name of suppressing Communism.11 The NWFP was not interested in the alliance 
with the US either. Rather, due to the Sur-Posh pro-Congress party tilt, they were 
keen to have cordial relations with India. Sindh was a very low profile province. Only 
Karachi was active due to the recent arrival of Urdu-speaking migrants, the Muhajirs. 
The Muhajirs were anti-India. They were more interested in US support against India. 
Baluchistan was a tribal society. Most of the time, they had no opinion about the 
alliances. 
Due to hostile popular opposition to the Pak-US institutional interaction, the 
Pakistan Army adopted a tougher and more demanding stance on the question of India 
than ever before. They wanted the British and Americans to tell India that they would 
withdraw their support against China unless she agreed to a just settlement in Jammu 
                                                 
11 Interview with Kamal Matinuddin, (Islamabad, 24-03-2007) 
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and Kashmir. They had been hoping too that the US and Britain would help Pakistan 
to secure, through CENTO, a collectively organized and underwritten defence of her 
territory against the possibility of an Indian attack.12 The British-American alliance 
had never given the Pakistan Army any ground for supposing they would do either of 
these things and ‘only political immaturity and wishful thinking could have led them 
to expect that’. The failure of such great expectations was damaging to Pakistan’s 
relations with both transatlantic powers. There were very basic divergences in the 
alliances.  The Army expected what the US could not deliver and vice versa. In one of 
the telegrams, the British High Commission mentioned Pakistan’s problems, such as 
regional security, as ‘her painful self-created dilemma’. This expressed the height of 
their frustration with the Pakistan Army’s excessive expectations. Similarly, 
Pakistan’s relations with the West depended on its relations with India. If relations 
soured with India, Pakistan expressed its frustration with the West with criticism of 
them and so on. So ‘they had to bring Pakistan and India together if they could. If that 
could be done, if acute fear and suspicion now felt by Pakistan against India could be 
allayed; and if Pakistan could be given some hope that the path to a just settlement 
over Kashmir was not barred once and for all by Indian intransigence, then many of 
the westerners’ difficulties in this country would have disappeared’.13 The big three 
‘ifs’, with which the West was scarcely concerned. 
 The Army garnered full benefits from US Communist-phobia. Ayub’s own 
view as Army chief was clear: ‘I was certain of one thing’, he was later to recall 
‘Pakistan’s survival was vitally linked with the establishment of a well-trained, well-
equipped and well-led army’.14 But to justify its continued all-embracing rule for a 
prolonged and indefinite period, the army had to find a new, more dramatic, rationale 
for it. Regretting that it had not taken advantage of the ‘strategic opportunity’ 
provided by the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict, it challenged India in the Runn of Kuch in 
196415 and provoked a full-scale war over Kashmir in 1965.16 From a less than 
friendly neighbour, India was converted into a hostile enemy. India’s hostility towards 
                                                 
12 DO35/8925, British High Commissioner J.M.C. James to CRO London, 26 July1965, PRO 
13  Ibid. 
14 Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters, A Political Autobiography, (London: OUP, 1967) p.21. 
15 CIA-RDP79T00975A008200500001-5, Current Intelligence relating to National Security, 27 April, 
1965. 
16 CIA-RDP78-03061A000300050002-3, Kashmir-Background on the Indian-Pakistan Crisis, 11 
October, 1965. 
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Pakistan was now shown as providing a complete justification for the otherwise 
illegitimate military rule. 
 
The Politics of Pacts and the American Foreign Policy Failure 
 
The aforementioned alliances, CENTO and SEATO, brought for Pakistan no 
preferential privilege and no advantage in her bargaining position in regard to India. 
Such pro-Western commitments also isolated Pakistan among Afro-Asian nations. 
While the gains such pacts brought to Pakistan were limited if not negligible, the 
political liabilities were enormous. Soviet hostility to Pakistan and her support for 
India on the Kashmir question was mainly (or entirely) due to Pakistan’s membership 
of the pacts.17  
During the first half of the 1960s, American policy towards South Asia was a 
complete failure. US military aid to India annoyed Pakistan. A confident ally 
(Pakistan) was forced to join Washington’s enemy, China. Still India did not agree 
with the US global and strategic plans and repeatedly lashed the dead horse of non-
alignment. President Kennedy followed a multi-pronged strategy in South Asia for 
regional stability, deterring China, containing the Soviet Union, and encouraging 
Indo-Pakistan détente. All his plans backfired. Kennedy’s foreign policy objectives 
could not be achieved, not because of lethargy or lack of coherent work but because 
the entire edifice of the plan was based on a number of speculations.   
Firstly, without following an even-handed policy, President Kennedy assumed 
that the US could have friendly relations with India and Pakistan simultaneously. In 
the pre-Kennedy era, American support mustered an ally in the region – Pakistan – to 
contain communism. However, with the new policy of military aid to India, they were 
left with none. Indian foreign policy was still dominated by the non-aligned 
commitments and Pakistan moved much closer to China. In an effort to keep the two 
arch rivals happy, Kennedy lost both. 
Secondly, without American participation in the talks, Kennedy thought 
bilateral negotiations for the solution of the Kashmir issue would bear fruit. The 
Kashmir issue by then had become an egoistic issue for India and Pakistan and, hence, 
needed a carrot-and-stick policy. Had it been resolved in that period of time, 
American plans in the region would have materialised. However, the extension of 
                                                 
17 DO 196/128, 7023970, Ext. 6/24/1, 30 June 1962, PRO. 
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Kashmir as an issue resulted in the Indo-Pak war of 1965. The war erased the entire 
edifice of American strategy in the region. Both nations used weapons supplied to 
them by the US in the name of containment of China and the Soviet Union against 
each other.  
Thirdly, Kennedy and his advisors believed that war between India and China 
would bring India into the western fold and she would discard her policy of non-
alignment. As Pakistan was already engaged in the effort to contain communism, 
India would join hands with Pakistan for a robust policy against communist 
neighbours. This entire supposition backfired. It was natural for India to become anti-
China after the war of 1962. However, this did not necessarily mean that she was anti-
Communist. Americans continuously underestimated Pakistan’s hostility to India. In 
the intoxication of their grand plan to contain communism, they failed to judge the 
intensity of Indo-Pak antagonism. If India was against China, Pakistan was friendly to 
Peking. And if Pakistan was against the Soviet Union; India was gracious to Moscow. 
One was pro-Russian and the other was pro-Chinese. Despite all out efforts and 
support to both of them, no one was pro-American in the region.  
Fourthly, according to American policy makers, US aid to Pakistan, which by 
1963-64 had been significantly reduced, would deter Pakistan from moving closer to 
China. They could not grasp that Pakistan’s new found fondness for China was in fact 
inspired simply by hatred for India. Nothing could stop the rapprochement with China 
except the resolution of Kashmir, and the Americans had failed to compel India to 
move toward substantive and fruitful talks with Pakistan on the issue.  
Fifthly, Kennedy’s advisors thought that the Kashmir issue would be resolved 
without attaching it to the question of US aid to India against China. However, India 
was in such an awkward position that she could have been pressed for a few 
concessions on Kashmir for the solution of the issue once and for all. Ayub had come 
round to a willingness to accept anything more than the status quo. Even Nehru was 
also ready to grant concessions to Pakistan as he could not afford two hostile 
countries on both sides of India.18 However, he died before any such settlement could 
have taken place. A slight push on India on the disputed land earlier would have 
changed history.  
                                                 
18 Major (Rtd) Sibghatullah Khan (Peshawar, 27 January 2007). 
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The last belief that again proved wrong was that the US weapons supplied to 
India and Pakistan would not be used by them against each other. Just after the 1965 
war, ‘Prime Minister Shastri celebrated his birthday. On his birthday cake there was a 
replica of the Patton tank, as an indication that they had conquered the great 
American military machine in the battlefield of Pakistan and that they had taken them 
over with Shermans and Centurians’.19 These flawed policies on the part of the 
Kennedy administration revealed that they were guided by Cold War issues ignoring 





Figure 16.  Failure of the US foreign policy in South Asia. 
 
There were minor achievements that were magnified by the US administration 
of the 1960s in South Asia. However, they were also not without flaws. Pakistan’s 
relations with China were taken too seriously whereas they had not and would not 
have harmed US interests in any way. It was the same Pakistan which became the 
                                                 
19 Congressional Record-Senate, Speech of Senator Mr Hartke, 3420, CIA-
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middleman – an offer repeatedly made to the Americans by Ayub Khan – to help in 
cultivating relations between China and the US. A hasty decision was taken by 
America to support India against China at the end of the Indo-China border clash of 
1962. A border skirmish was magnified as a war between them. The defence of India 
was equated with the defence of the interests of the free world whereas India had 
never been with the ‘free world’. Kennedy over-estimated India by attaching too 
much importance to her security and under-estimated the country’s poverty, 
population explosion, and military weakness. An over-ambitious Kennedy followed 
unrealistic policies in South Asia which quickly came back to haunt his soul in the 
form of the Indo-Pak war of 1965. 
An important conclusion that can be drawn from the discussion part of these 
events is that history still plays a significant role in Pakistan. It constitutes the base for 
the building of an identity which is dissimilar to any other in the world. The division 
of the world into pro- and anti-US states can be understood only when the 
metaphysical power of history is considered. Certainly history has had a metaphysical 
influence on Pakistani identity. And failing to learn the lessons from its history, 
Pakistan still trusts its un-reliable friend – the United States of America. 
 
The Pakistan Army as a National Political Actor 
 
The Pakistan Army, which was previously a part of the British Indian Army, 
had inherited a tendency of autonomy from colonial times. The independence of 
Pakistan was not the result of a revolution and was just carved out of the subcontinent, 
without any part of the British Indian military or the present day Pakistan Army 
playing a role in its creation. The role of the military with reference to the political 
development of Pakistan can be traced back to the era of the British Raj. Pre-1947 the 
British Army had an autonomous and authoritative streak as it was a colonial army. It 
was not possible to switch off such tendencies overnight.  
Following the partition of the Subcontinent, parts of the former British Army 
and its autonomous governing trends were bequeathed to Pakistan. Between 1857 and 
1929, 62% of the Raj Army had been recruited from the Punjab20 – hence the 
Punjabisation of the Army. After partition, Pakistan inherited the chief military 
                                                 
20 Reports from Commissioners, Inspectors, and Others: Ten Volumes. 4. East India Continued. 
Session 25 June 1929-August 1930, p.96.  
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recruitment area of the British Indian Army: a large military recruitment zone 
confined within a small state. Hence, it was natural that it had to show its muscle and 
mettle in the governance of the newly created country. The former British and today’s 
post-independence Pakistani Army wanted, even if by force, accommodation in the 
political system of the country. This, however, was not possible without outside help. 
Previously, during the colonial era, the British Raj provided such support to the 
British Indian Army. However, after the creation of Pakistan, the US Cold War 
provided an opportunity for the Pakistani Army to rule the country. Patronage and 
international connections worked in favour of the military’s assertive role in the 
governance and politics of the region. 
The overall relationship of the US policy making bodies and the Pakistan 
military clique proves that their alliance served to undermine democratic forces in 
Pakistan in the quest to serve their ultimate motives: containment of Communism and 
India respectively. The army recruitment area was so close to the border with India 
that the Pakistan Army developed an institutional animosity against India. This 
relationship that is attributed to the Pakistan Army, in the first instance, makes it a 
unique national institution in the polity of Pakistan and provides an explanation for 
today’s persistence of this institution.   
The Pakistan military was a political force. Few civilian politicians dared to 
fail to take into consideration the attitudes and interests of the military. The political 
power of the military derived from its being more highly organised and unified than 
any civilian claimant to power, from its monopoly of coercive power, and from its 
reserve of moral prestige. The military symbolized the nation at its best, guaranteed it 
against re-absorption into India, and remained the only reliable bulwark against 
anarchy, the dread of the property-owning classes.  
During the 1950s, the military’s political power was used to abrogate the 1956 
constitution, to establish a martial law regime in 1958, and to install the Army’s 
Commander-In-Chief as President of the country. The martial law period lasted for 44 
months and served to place the military’s political power into perspective. It 
demonstrated that the armed forces possessed the inclination and the manpower 
resources needed to defend the country (with US military support) against external 
enemies and, simultaneously, to rule it without civilian participation. However, direct 
involvement in civilian government threatened to weaken the military’s organization. 
Hence, the Foreign Office and General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army (GHQ) 
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shifted to the Presidency to homogenise civil and military affairs. The Army as a unit 
also worked through civilians to discharge the functions of government and shared 
with civilians the responsibilities of governance while preferred to abrogate the final 
say in the decision-making process to itself.21 
The martial law regime was regarded by its creators as an interlude, one 
directed at establishing a basis for future political stability and not as a nursery for 
future revolutions. The general tenor of the 1962 constitution reflected the military’s 
determination to create a strong, stable system of government, one that would obviate 
the need for military intervention. The 1956 constitution sought to subordinate the 
machinery of government to the dictates of a parliament controlled by indisciplined 
politicians; the 1962 constitution sought to immunize the principal organs of the state 
against political control and to ensure their functioning ‘even if the politics of the 
country went wrong’.22 It had been the inability of the military to ensure the executive 
against all political challenges that marked the continuing decline of the military’s 
political power.  
Despite the relative decline of its political supremacy, the military continued 
to constitute the most potent reserve of political power within the state. Its views on 
national defence and internal security were decisive. In other areas, Ayub Khan’s 
military background afforded the military an informal channel for influence. 
Inhibiting the fullest exploitation of this potential for broader political power was the 
military’s preferred means of remaining ostensibly aloof from politics. Moreover, 
there was congruence between the policies of the Ayub regime and the aspirations of 
the military, leaving the military without any special motive for exchanging its 
traditional aloofness from politics for an activist role. The identity of interests 
included foreign policy questions in general and current trends in Pak-US and Pak-
India relations in particular. Hence, the Pakistan military possessed considerable 
political assets, but it suffered from political limitations as well. It had a major voice 
in deciding national policy but not the power to insist upon a slavish adherence to its 
views. Only in the event of civilian politicians being perceived to threaten the stability 
                                                 
21 Interviews with Subedar Major (Rtd) Mohammad Akram Khan, Hawaldar (Rtd) Ghafoor Yousafzai, 
and Jamshed Swati. All the three interviewees offered similar opinions about the civilian role in Ayub’s 
regime. 
22 American Embassy in Karachi to DOS, Ayub Khan quoted in August 1962, NND959000, Box # 
2546, RG59, March 3, 1965, NARA 
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of the state could the armed forces could step in to redress the situation as they 




Many of the patterns and tendencies in US-Pakistan relations, as they were 
established over the course of the time period under review, had a long-term impact. 
To conclude this thesis I wish to briefly show how they have played themselves out in 
the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s, and then turn in a little more detail to the present 
situation in ‘Af-Pak’, as senior US policy makers have begun to refer to the region 
under review. Much of my commentary on current affairs has been informed by 
interviews with serving and retired army officers, which were ‘off the record’ and 
anonymous. They are important and worthy of inclusion in this thesis because they 
represent above all, how significant sections within the military perceive recent 
changes in Pakistan – US relations. Solid corroboration with documentary evidence 
will have to await future generations of historians. 
In the past, Pakistan-US relations have been good whenever Pakistan was of a 
special strategic value to the US. Whenever this importance decreased, relations could 
turn frosty very quickly. When the US and the Soviet Union reached a détente 
between 1965 and 1978, for instance, Pakistan struggled to maintain its place in the 
United States’s order of priorities. In response, Pakistan developed very cordial 
relations with China to widen its choice of foreign policy options. The year 1979, in 
contrast, proved a turning point for the better as far as US attitudes towards the 
Pakistan military were concerned. General Zia imposed Martial Law in 1977. In 1979, 
the democratically elected but often perceived to be anti-Western Prime Minister, 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was hanged. Soviet forces marched into Afghanistan, and an 
Islamic Revolution took place in Iran. All three events elevated the importance of 
Pakistan. The US under Ronald Reagan, who had great confidence in his personal 
relationship with General Zia, entered a new phase of renewed Cold War with the 
Soviet Union.  General Zia thus became the latest ‘strongman in Pakistan’ for US 
policy making institutions. It was a time of renewed Pak-US institutional interaction. 
Keeping in view previous difficulties with the US, General Zia wanted to make sure 
both sides understood exactly what the interaction involved. His main objective was 
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to equip the Pakistan Army with the latest weaponry so that it might have an edge 
over India and the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan that would last for a generation. 
Pakistan acquired $3.2 billion in 1981, $600 million a year in military and economic 
assistance thereafter, forty F-16s, Cobra Helicopters, Anti-Aircraft Cannons, and 
enormous CIA support to the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). The institutional 
interaction of 1980s was much stronger, durable and beneficial for the Pakistani 
military than that of the 1950s and 60s. The CIA and the Pakistan Army were true 
partners in their Cold War-2 against the Soviet Union. American policy-making 
bodies also honoured Pakistan’s regional sensitivities in its relations with India. 
Washington never took any step which might annoy its Islamabad partners. General 
Zia had learnt from his predecessor General Ayub Khan that it was better to have an 
informal but strong partnership rather than a formal and unequal alliance.23 The new 
partnership did not entail the kind of master-slave relationship so vividly described by 
General Ayub Khan in his memoirs, revealingly titled ‘Friends Not Masters’. 
With the demise of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, Pakistan lost its 
importance again. After their withdrawal from Afghanistan and General Zia ul Haq’s 
violent death in a plane crash, a new regime of sanctions was imposed on Pakistan; at 
some point covering eight different political, economic and military areas. This 
crippled Pakistan’s economy and seriously undermined already weak political 
institutions. Ironically, the 1990s was an era of tentative democracy in Pakistan and 
weak economic performance fractured the democratic process. As a consequence, 
Pakistan experienced numerous governments with short periods of tenure. The 
making and breaking of elected assemblies continued until once again the Pakistan 
Army under General Pervaiz Musharraf took over in 1999. Pakistan, however, 
remained low on the list of US priorities until the incidents of 9/11. At this point, 
Pakistan gained importance once more and the Americans placed the cap of the 
‘strongest man in Pakistan’ on General Musharraf’s head. But now the nature of US 
involvement had begun to change. During the Cold War, the US contained the Soviet 
Union by creating a ring of security alliances across the world. After the US had 
become the sole global superpower, its strategic interests required the containment of 
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rising ‘hawk states’ as well as radical Islamist movements by supporting liberal 
democratic regimes in South, South West and Central Asia. The difference between 
the two periods is that the internal governance of states now acquired critical 
importance for American policy makers. The Pakistan Army, in contrast, has 
continued to act as a regional player with an overriding focus on containing India. In 
consequence, the US and the Pakistan Army do not see eye to eye on several strategic 
issues.  
Lack of understanding between the respective global and regional agendas has 
shaped the current strenuous nature of bilateral relations. In the two decades that 
followed the end of the Cold War, both have gradually drifted apart in terms of the 
ways and means of achieving their strategic objectives. Had the Pakistan Army and 
the US policy making bodies not been such staunch allies throughout the Cold War, 
there could very easily have been an open break over the past couple of years. Both 
have found themselves in the middle of an undeclared rivalry. Even though the grand 
strategic objectives of the Pakistan Army and the US seems to converge in countering 
terrorism in South Asia and Afghanistan, there exist deep disagreements concerning 
the means and the methods of achieving their goals. It would not be wrong to say that 
the US foreign policy objectives were only warmly received at Pakistan GHQ when 
the US was a distant ally located more than 7,000 miles away. Now that the US has 
become a de facto neighbour of Pakistan since its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, it 
is seen in the Pakistani public domain as the ‘number one enemy’ and the greatest 
threat to national, territorial, and sovereign security, stability as well as political 
integrity. The majority of the Pakistan Army officers appear to agree with this wider 
public perception. 
 The Pakistan Army’s discontent with the American regional vision in South 
Asia has increased due to the growing strategic relationship between the US and 
India. Back in the 1950s and 60s, the US administration under Truman and 
Eisenhower provided General Ayub Khan with sufficient weaponry to counter 
Communism. However, President Kennedy switched over to arm India against China 
in 1962. This resulted in an arms race between the two South Asian rivals which 
continues until today. According to the current Indo-US nuclear deal, India would 
receive, for the first time, civilian nuclear technology from the US.24 This American 
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move is partly a hedge against a rising China. However, US President George Bush 
and his chief negotiator, Nicholas Burns failed to extract a promise from the Indians 
that, in return, they would stop producing weapons-grade nuclear fuel and stop 
expanding their arsenal. Of course, more nuclear fuel means the development of more 
nuclear weapons. Pakistan, has vowed that if the Indians build more weapons, they 



















Although the Pakistan Army, in the current circumstances of countering 
insurgencies in Swat and Waziristan, cannot object to the reinforcement of the US-
Indian relations, it is beginning to feel concerned about a potential strategic 
partnership or a coalition between them. For the Army, such a partnership would be 
damaging to Pakistan’s security interests in the region. It is feared that America’s ‘pat 
on the back’ will embolden the already extremely hostile Indian approach to its 
relations with Pakistan. The redesigning of regional politics in such a way does not fit 
with Pakistan Army’s traditional instinct to rely on US support. As this thesis has 
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demonstrated there are, once again, historical precedents at play. The present pro-
Indian attitude is a repetition of the 1960s. Although the US had security alliances 
with the Pakistan Army, its active support for India in 1962 and passive support in 
1965 was sufficient to keep the Pakistan Army elite worried. It was at that point that a 
military governed-Pakistan developed a strong alternative alliance with China, which 
was then still a staunch enemy of the US. A similar policy of double alliance is at play 
at present, as the Pakistan Army continues to develop its longstanding strategic links 
with the Afghan Taliban. 
For the Pakistani military, the real problem about the war in Afghanistan and 
the ongoing insurgency on the Frontier is not the Afghan Taliban or Al-Qaeda or the 
Pakistani Taliban (Tahreek-e-Taliban-e- Pakistan, TTP) militants fighting against 
them.  For them the real problem is India which they view as manipulating the crisis 
in Pakistan while expanding its own influence in Afghanistan. The close alliance 
between the US and India has deeply shaken Pakistani confidence in their own 
alliance with the United States. US policy makers could never convince the Pakistanis 
that Afghanistan would not become an Indian client state after their departure. Indian 
consulates along the Pak-Afghan border are seen as dens of Indian spies. Their 
purpose is rumoured to be the running of covert operations to destabilise Pakistan.26 A 
serving Army officer, on condition of anonymity, confirmed that the Pakistan Army 
has arrested numerous Indian- Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) agents who were 
financing and supplying weapons to the Pakistani Taliban in their insurgency in Swat 
and Waziristan. According to him, when America pulls out, India will have full 
control over Afghanistan. In this way, Pakistan would face a two front threat. Hence, 
Pakistan will have to sustain contact with the opposition to the Afghan government - 
code for the Afghan Taliban. 
Washington believes that today’s terrorists, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, are 
only driven by religious ideologies and that their goal is to annihilate their opponents. 
Both terrorist organizations are not regarded as rational decision-makers. It would not 
be possible to deter or dissuade someone who is ready to die for the sake of a sacred 
cause. Moreover, they are benefiting from the use of advanced information 
technologies. Hence it is difficult to engage them in a dialogue or political 
manoeuvres. For an American policy maker, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are one and 
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the same thing, who pose a grave threat to the US security. Maximum power has 
made the US uncompromising. While Pakistan defines Al-Qaeda as a terrorist 
organization and is prepared to help the US win its war against it, the GHQ at the 
same time, shies away from defining terrorism in reference to the Afghan Taliban. 
They consider the Afghan Taliban as a completely different entity from Al-Qaeda, 
though the favourite of the White House after Musharraf’s departure, the current 
Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Kayani referred to one of the wanted Taliban 
leaders in the US list-Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani as a ‘strategic asset’. The Afghan 
Taliban are seen as the same old allies - the Mujahideen - who served US interests by 
waging a proxy war on its behalf against the Soviet Union. Back then they were cast 
in the categories of “freedom fighters” and “holy warriors” by the Western media and 
politicians; for instance by Ronald Reagan who called them “the moral equivalent of 
our own Founding Fathers”.27  
In contrast to the US, the Pakistan Army views terrorism as more of a 
conventional security problem rather than a civilisational or religious conflict. 
Miscreants like Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) or the Pakistani Taliban are 
believed to be supported by the secret agencies of India (RAW), Afghanistan (KHAD) 
and the US (CIA). In the eyes of many in GHQ, terrorists are strongly dependent on 
the support of foreign secret services. The bombings in Peshawar, Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi are considered classic examples of RAW and KHAD activities, similar to 
those that used to take place during the Afghan crisis of the 1980s. Based on its old 
experience in dealing with such subversive activities as well as its long struggle 
against the TTP (especially in Swat and Waziristan), the Pakistan Army’s threshold 
for tolerating terrorism is much higher than that of the US. 
Many army officers with whom I spoke criticise America for defining 
terrorism in religious terms. They say that by making a reference to Islam in 
particular, the Americans are not only undermining Pakistan’s unity and its 
ideological basis, but are encouraging the terrorists to take an even stauncher stance in 
name of religion The more terrorism is associated with Islam, the more Islam 
becomes politicised. And the more Islam is politicized, the more Pakistan comes 
under threat. This is ironic as both the government of Pakistan under President Zardari 
and the US administration, previously under President Bush and currently under 
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President Obama, are deeply concerned about the rise of political Islam in Pakistan. 
Both agree that politicisation of Islam must be tackled. But the strong presence of 
Islamist-minded army officers in the Pakistan army, a legacy of General Zia ul-Haq’s 
Islamisation policies, makes it difficult to find much common ground over this. 
Although General Musharraf has eliminated many suspected religious extremists from 
the Army, the officer corps as a whole continues to include many officers recruited 
during General Zia’s era. Even though General Musharraf himself did not always 
agree to cooperate with Americans fully,28 there were certain segments in the Army 
who had reservations against his actions and policies. The lack of trust resulted in the 
ousting of generals like General Mahmood in 2002, the then head of ISI.   
According to my officer informants, the US have always assured the Pakistan 
Army that American ground operations on their territory would happen only 
following advance consultation with the Pakistan military, and that when possible, 
American and Pakistani troops would operate together. However, the US appears to 
have conducted ground and air raids inside Pakistan’s tribal belt without consulting 
their military counterparts. Consultation has now shrunk to the intimation of a strike, 
according to my sources, often only a few seconds before it happens. Such non-
consultation is once again the repetition of the institutional interaction of 1960s. 
President Kennedy provided military assistance to India but without previously 
consulting the Pakistan Army as promised. American drone attacks in the tribal areas 
of Pakistan, in which to-date 14 Al-Qaeda terrorists have been killed along with 1,000 
innocent Pakistani civilians, is a sheer violation of the territorial sovereignty of 
Pakistan. GHQ has long refused to give the green light to American operations in the 
tribal belt lest such attacks might convert people to Al-Qaeda. Thus despite a 62 year 
acquaintance, the military to military relationship is increasingly strained. The CIA 
senses that the ISI is acting in complete coordination with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan.29 The ISI in turn believes that the CIA is not only supporting the 
                                                 
28 Between 2001 and 2008, General Musharraf had been the master of promises, most unkept. He 
promised to find Daniel Pearl, the head of South Asia bureau of the Wall Street journal. Daniel was 
found dead in Karachi in 2002. Musharraf also divorced the Taliban just after the 9/11 and helped the 
US to invade Afghanistan. But his own military officers still supported Taliban, with or without his 
consent, till to-date. He was the master of the double game.  
29 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The World’s Most Unstable Region and the Threat to Global 
Security, (London: Penguin Books, 2008), pp.221-239. 
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Pakistani Taliban militants but is also carrying out subversive activities inside 
Pakistan’s territory.30  
 
The Pakistan Army has already launched military operations against the 
Pakistani Taliban, first in Swat in an operation named Rah-e-Rast (right path) and 
now in Waziristan in an operation Rah-e-Nijat (path to salvation). Pakistan exploited 
nearly all available non-military options before undertaking such operations. While 
Washington supports the GHQ in its plans in the areas mentioned above, GHQ argues 
that the resilience of the TTP terrorism is much related to the political and military 
support given to them by outside powers. There have also been military allegations 
that just in the beginning of operation Rah-e-Nijat in Waziristan American helicopters 
were witnessed to have started an air-lift of terrorists fighting for the Pakistani 
Taliban. In both cases, one feels there may be an officially sanctioned ‘dual policy’ 
practised by the US and the Pakistan Army.  
The Pakistan Army’s support for Afghan Taliban is no secret31 and widely 
supported amongst the Pakistani public. This has raised the power of attraction that 
GHQ holds in the eyes of activists in the NWFP, Baluchistan as well as Islamist 
elements everywhere in Pakistan. If GHQ in the near future moves once again closer 
to the US, it would most likely lose the moral ground it has gained over the past 
couple of years since Musharraf’s departure. The US image in the region is already in 
tatters. While Americans regard Pakistan and Afghanistan as separate countries, to the 
Afghan Taliban and Pakhtoons of NWFP, Baluchistan and especially the tribal 
Pakhtoons, it is all one friendly, familiar piece of territory. For them the border, 
Durand line, is just a Western invention. It is indeed interesting to note that the people 
living in these places consider the Afghan Taliban justified in taking up arms against 
the US/NATO forces, but at the same time think of the Pakistani Taliban as 
terrorists.32 
In some respects, the move of the US to station troops as well as Blackwater 
and DynCorp (US non-governmental military, and mercenary companies) in Pakistan 
may be compared to the US troops and bases, especially the ‘Badaber base’ 
established in Pakistan during the 1960s. But American troops and bases in Pakistan 
                                                 
30 Business Recorder, ‘Your men helping terrorists, ISI head Shuja tells CIA chief’,  25 November 
2009. 
31 Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos. 
32 Daily Wahdat, Pashto daily newspaper from Peshawar, 24 March 2009. 
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were then considered as powerful symbols of the strategic relations between the two 
countries. In fact, the Pakistan Army encouraged the establishments of such bases as it 
appeared to strengthen Pakistan’s position in respect to a powerful neighbour, India. 
Today the situation is very different. The presence of US troops and Blackwater on 
Pakistani soil is considered by the Pakistan Army as posing a serious challenge to 
Pakistan’s security. Americans consider such a ‘presence’ as a part of its global ‘War 
on Terror’. However, senior officers in the Pakistan Army with whom I had 
communications believe that the presence of the American military as well as 
DynCorp and Blackwater (just recently renamed as Xe- Xenon) will be for extended 
periods. They fear that such a ‘presence’ will be a direct threat to the security of 
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. My informants in the Pakistan Army also hold 
Blackwater responsible for the car bomb blasts in Pakistan. And they believe that the 
US agencies are intentionally destabilising Pakistan so that, under the pretext of a 
terrorist threat, the nuclear weapons of Pakistan may be taken away.  
In terms of domestic politics, GHQ has grown discontented with the 
possibility that the Pakistani civilian Presidency has gradually turned out to be a 
strategic tool in the hands of US interests. Permission to base Blackwater and the US 
marines in urban areas, including Islamabad, are key issues that have eroded the 
Pakistan Army’s confidence in President Asif Ali Zardari. As a result of a lack of trust 
in President Zardari, the control of the Nuclear Command Authority was recently 
shifted from him to the Prime Minister.33  
The situation during 1947-65 was the most conspicuous symptom of the 
unhealthy state of the Pakistan polity. It was that period which proved beyond doubt 
that Pakistan foreign policy was inefficiently conducted. Moreover, the dismal 
conduct of the government suggests that there was a lack of a comprehensive strategy. 
Unfortunately, the same state of affairs continues to date. Pakistan foreign policy was 
and is the hostage of Indian animosity, previously the containment of Communism 
and todays ‘War on Terror’, and the Army’s interests in domestic politics. This trend 
in Pakistani foreign policy continues to be based on the powerful concepts of the 
realist school of thought: prudence, survival of the fittest, the will and the character of 
the subject. But the search for a Wilsonian voice of the people still continues in 
Pakistan today. Present day Pakistan has not matured sufficiently and the survival of 
                                                 
33 The News, 27 November 2009. 
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the state and its development are still on many occasions dependent on outside 
pressure, help and assistance.  
The findings of this study, although related to a particular period, help to 
explain a number of characteristics which shape contemporary Pakistan foreign 
policy. If allowances are made for the particularities of the other South and Central 
Asian and Middle Eastern States, this model of explanation can be used for studying 
their foreign policies as well. The national army, a few good men, history, the 
interests of the US in the region, and her military and economic support, have been 
shown, by this study, to play a decisive role in shaping the foreign policies not only of 
Pakistan, but arguably of a number of Central South Asian and Middle Eastern states, 









































The interviews were conducted in Pushto, Urdu, Saraiki, and English. 
 
Afzal Khan Shinwari, a tribal leader who participated in the first Kashmir War of 
1948, (Landi Kotal, 10/11-06-2007). 
Ambassador (Rtd) Hamidullah Khan, former officer in Pakistan’s Foreign Office, 
(Islamabad, 16/19-03-2007). 
Baz Muhammad Khan, a senior Pakhtoon nationalist leader of Khudai Khidmatgar 
and a close associate of Bacha Khan, (Akora Khattak, 25-01-2007). 
Brigadier (Rtd.) Inam-ul-Haq Afridi, former Director General Anti-Narcotics Force, 
(Peshawar, 20-06-07)  
Colonel (Rtd) Syed Saleem Zafar, Director, State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi, 
(Peshawar, 22-02-07). 
Colonel (Rtd) Rafiq Ahsan Abbasi, leading a retired life in Peshawar (Peshawar, 26-
06-07). 
Flight Lieutenant (Rtd) Muhammad Sharif, director of his own business, (Peshawar, 
16-03-07).  
Gulzar Ahmed Khan, Senator, a close friend of Z.A. Bhutto and a veteran leader of 
the Pakistan Peoples Party from D.I. Khan (Lahore: 13-06-07). 
Hawaldar (Rtd) Ghafoor Yousafzai, leading a retired life in Peshawar, (Peshawar, 15-
06-07). 
Iftikhar Bhatti, a clerk and librarian in the Foreign Office of Pakistan during the 
1960s, (Islamabad, 25-03-07). 
Interview with One of the Family Members of Ghaffar Khan (henceforth OFMGK). 
The name of the interviewee is kept concealed due to political reasons. (Charsadda, 
17-02-07). 
Jamshed Swati, A senior Muslim Leaguer (Abbottabad, 26/29-03-07). 
Khaista Khan, a veteran nationalist local leader (Peshawar, 10-02-2007). 
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Lieutenant General (Rtd.) Kamal Matinuddin, former Corps Commander Peshawar, 
former Ambassador to Thailand, and a close friend of General Zia ul Haq.  
(Islamabad, 23/24-03-07) 
Lt. Col. (Rtd) Arsalah Khan, leading a retired but Landowder (Khan) life in Mardan 
(NWFP) (Mardan, 16-06-07).  
Major (Rtd) Jamil Farrukh, a resident of Peshawar, (Peshawar, 15-03- 2007). 
Major (Rtd) Sibghatullah Khan, (Nowshera: 26/27-01-07). 
Malik Nadir Khan of Derra Adam Khail. Mr. Khan, former MNA, remained chief of 
his tribe during 1950-90. (Kohat, 16-03-07) 
Mr. Zahoor Butt, a very close associate of former Prime Minister Hussain Shaheed 
Sohrawardy (17-02-2008). 
Musa Khan Shinwari, an Afghan asylum seeker in London, (12-12-2008). 
Pir Sufaid Shah, the Chief editor and owner of a Pushto daily newspaper, Wahdat 
(Peshawar, 14-02-07). 
Sharif Farooq, a senior journalist and the owner of Daily Jehad Peshawar. He also 
worked with the Pakistan Times, during the initial days of his career. (Peshawar, 
12/18-02-07). 
Subedar-Major (Rtd) Muhammad Akram Khan, A senior citizen leading a private and 
secluded life in Peshawar, (Peshawar, 22-06-07). 
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